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World's First "Unclonable" RFID Chip

An anonymous reader writes to tell us that a new RFID chip from Verayo claims to be unclonable through the use of the new Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF), sort of an electronic DNA for silicon chips. "Basic passive RFID chips can be easily cloned by copying the data residing on one chip to another. Verayo's PUF-based RFID chips cannot be cloned, and provide a very strong and robust authentication mechanism. No other chip or device can be disguised as the original chip, even if the data is copied from one Verayo RFID chip to another."

320 comments

  1. Yeah? by WillKemp · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Uncloneable today - cloned tomorrow...

    1. Re:Yeah? by morgan_greywolf · · Score: 5, Insightful

      It's kind of like those 'unhackable' computers, networks and software we keep hearing about. *yawn* Wake me up when someone actually makes such a thing and it actually, you know, works.

    2. Re:Yeah? by eln · · Score: 5, Funny

      I have an unhackable computer. I would give you the IP, but it's not hooked up to the Internet. Or any other network. Also, it's powered off and buried 300 feet underground in a 6 foot thick lead-lined vault. On Pluto.

    3. Re:Yeah? by nog_lorp · · Score: 5, Funny

      So you think, but I already have root.

    4. Re:Yeah? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      on Pluto.. But you forgot to mention it's in our parallel universe.

    5. Re:Yeah? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0, Funny

      it doesnt have an OS :)

    6. Re:Yeah? by foobsr · · Score: 1

      I have an unhackable computer. I would give you the IP, but it's not hooked up to the Internet. Or any other network. Also, it's powered off and buried 300 feet underground in a 6 foot thick lead-lined vault. On Pluto.

      You forgot to mention you also switched off the flow of time to prevent it from carrying the potential to be hacked. Congratulations!

      CC.

      --
      TaijiQuan (Huang, 5 loosenings)
    7. Re:Yeah? by Tubal-Cain · · Score: 5, Funny

      Congratulations. You rooted a honeypot VM.

    8. Re:Yeah? by NotBornYesterday · · Score: 5, Interesting

      Okay, so according to TFA (yeah I know, not supposed to read it, yadda yadda yadda), it looks like the RFID device isn't authenticated by its ID, but by a series of challenge-and-response tokens it has that are also stored in some central database, which appear to increment as they are used.

      There appears to be a finite number of challenge-response pairs in the authentication database. How limited is that number? Are they also stored on board the RFID tag? Are they generated from the serial# and/or ID#?

      What is the length of the challenge, and of the response? Could a captured item (ie, passport) with such an RFID tag be brute-force interrogated (hit with a series of random-number "challenges" to see which might elicit stored "responses"), and counterfeited that way?

      Could this scheme be vulnerable to MITM-style attack?

      --
      I prefer rogues to imbeciles because they sometimes take a rest.
    9. Re:Yeah? by scubamage · · Score: 1, Redundant

      Oh snap! Party v& on the way!

    10. Re:Yeah? by angelwolf71885 · · Score: 0

      if it has windows for its os then not evian that will save you.. the p0rnz will still find you and ask you if you would like to make "IT" bigger

    11. Re:Yeah? by Cyner · · Score: 1

      If it can be made, it can be made again.

      --
      FreeBSD.org - The power to serve
    12. Re:Yeah? by SparkleMotion88 · · Score: 1

      Uncloneable means cloneable? What a country!

    13. Re:Yeah? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      mine's on the sun.

      actually, mine IS the sun! Go try hacking that! LoL!

    14. Re:Yeah? by pcolaman · · Score: 3, Funny

      God already hacked it. Good try though.

    15. Re:Yeah? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Let me guess... your mom is pro-life and was in her mid 40s when you were born?

    16. Re:Yeah? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I hacked your computer and gave it a virus called Time. All your data will now eventually corrode and be unreadable!

    17. Re:Yeah? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

      No,no, he hacked it with an axe. Its more fun that way.

    18. Re:Yeah? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Funny

      Congratulation!

      To claim reward, send deposit of $60 as International money order. You have 3 days.

    19. Re:Yeah? by Yeorwned · · Score: 0

      Didn't you hear? Pluto just got owned by Neptune's due to magnetic draw...probably caused by a large chunk of lead being placed on Pluto.

    20. Re:Yeah? by Blimey85 · · Score: 1

      Not this time. After each one is made they break the mold thereby ensuring that no copy can or will ever exist. It's foolproof I assure you!!!

      --
      How is it that one careless match can start a forest fire, but it takes a whole box to start a campfire?
    21. Re:Yeah? by AdmiralWeirdbeard · · Score: 1

      I'm not terribly concerned, as long as i'm not punished for rendering the passport question moot by taking a hammer to the chip.

      --
      Come read my stupid blagablog. Rants and Giggles
    22. Re:Yeah? by Wolfger · · Score: 1

      I give it a week.

    23. Re:Yeah? by Tracking+System · · Score: 0, Offtopic

      I will stick with a gps tracker. ____ Work smarter, not harder, with a tracking system!

      --
      Rise above the competition with a gps tracking system
    24. Re:Yeah? by pxlmusic · · Score: 2, Funny

      there can be only NONE!

      --
      "If for any reason you're not satisfied with our service, I hate you."
    25. Re:Yeah? by collinstocks · · Score: 1

      Damn it! I knew I shouldn't have wasted my time with that!

    26. Re:Yeah? by mollymoo · · Score: 5, Informative

      According to the manufacturer's site, up to 2^64 challenge-response pairs (each 64 bits). They aren't stored on board the tag, but generated on demand. The uniqueness comes from normal manufacturing variations, so they don't need expensive techniques to make each chip unique. With each tag before using it you capture however many challenge/response pairs you will need. The pairs should in theory should only be used once, but in practice I suppose that's up to the implementation, the tags will happily keep giving out the same[1] response to the same challenge. Given you need to interrogate the IC for each challenge/response before putting it in service, there will be a temptation to re-use keys to reduce the time for training the system for each key.

      The large number of challenge/response pairs possible makes cloning implausible (you'd need to capture all 2^64 pairs), until someone can reverse engineer the "algorithm" and find the hidden variables (manufacturing variations) which form the "key" for a particular tag. I'm sure someone will work out how to do that eventually, but given it seems to be an analogue "algorithm" with a potentially large number of hidden variables I don't know how easy it will be. It seems like a sufficiently interesting problem that researchers will be queuing up to try.

      [1] Apparently not always the same - there is some finite probability of the same tag giving different responses to the same challenge, but they have techniques to reduce this and its impact. The vagaries of analogue electronics at work.

      --
      Chernobyl 'not a wildlife haven' - BBC News
    27. Re:Yeah? by Abreu · · Score: 1

      It will surely come to that, pretty soon...

      --
      No sig for the moment.
    28. Re:Yeah? by collinstocks · · Score: 1

      Wait... so if it sends a challenge to the RFID and sends the same challenge to a database to see if they have the same response... then can't you just hook up your RFID copy to query the database and send the correct response?

      Here's how I would do it:
      Have a secret password stored on the device and the same password stored in the database. You ask the device to identify itself. It hashes the password with a random salt that it can get from radio noise. It sends you the salt it used and the hash. You send both to the database, and the database identifies the chip if given correct information, otherwise returns an error.

      You need a good hash, though, like the crypt function used for storing, oh, I don't know, passwords on Linux? Those are salted, too, in order to increase the security of the hash by protecting it from rainbow table attacks, and by making it so that two people can have the same password and have no indication of it.

    29. Re:Yeah? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      3...
      2...
      1...
      .
      .
      .
      Profit!

    30. Re:Yeah? by darkpixel2k · · Score: 0

      It's kind of like those 'unhackable' computers, networks and software we keep hearing about. *yawn* Wake me up when someone actually makes such a thing and it actually, you know, works.

      It's unclonable in the same manner as NT4 met it's government security ratings back in the day.

      NT4 was considered secure if you didn't have a network card or a modem and the server was in a physically secure room.

      This RFID chip is unclonable in the same manner. You have to have the RFID chip disabled, and the passport stored in a led wallet while you yourself are standing in a physically secure room somewhere.

      --
      There's no place like ::1 (I've completed my transition to IPv6)
    31. Re:Yeah? by Yvanhoe · · Score: 1

      RFIDs of the mifare technology were reverse engineered through layer removing and through microscope imaging, and careful semi-automatic understanding of the logical gates layout. The algorithm may be hidden in the hardware, if it is not rock solid (and published) I give this technology a huge chance of failure.

      --
      The Wise adapts himself to the world. The Fool adapts the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the Fool.
    32. Re:Yeah? by Myrddin+Wyllt · · Score: 2, Interesting

      I had an unhackable computer, but unfortunately I tried to ship it to the USA on an unsinkable ship. Now I'll just have to transmit details of it to you using my unbreakable code.

      --
      [ ]Half Empty [ ]Half Full [x]Twice as big as it needs to be
    33. Re:Yeah? by Hurricane78 · · Score: 1

      evian? really?? ;)

      --
      Any sufficiently advanced intelligence is indistinguishable from stupidity.
    34. Re:Yeah? by Monkk · · Score: 1

      Ok, Ok, I'll give you a hint. The IP address is 127.0.0.1 But I bet you still can't hack me! :P

      --
      TomB

      "You can't take the sky from me..."
    35. Re:Yeah? by F'Nok · · Score: 1

      Bah, he just used the tools Yahweh made; clearly just a script goddy.

    36. Re:Yeah? by angelwolf71885 · · Score: 1

      ZOMG thats my ip too hw did you git it.. is your luggage combo 1234 to ???

    37. Re:Yeah? by AmigaMMC · · Score: 1

      Exactly. You just need the technology to read the molecular structure and then replicate it.

    38. Re:Yeah? by ultranova · · Score: 4, Insightful

      The algorithm may be hidden in the hardware, if it is not rock solid (and published) I give this technology a huge chance of failure.

      An analogue algorithm using "manufacturing variations" means basically white noise in the circuit. Cloning that accurately might indeed be an extremely difficult and costly operation: you basically have to recreate the chip with tolerance of tiny fraction of the original tolerance (=very expensive), or use a massively powerful (=big, not something you can carry with you unnoticed) computer to simulate it.

      --

      Forget magic. Any technology distinguishable from divine power is insufficiently advanced.

    39. Re:Yeah? by Ian+Alexander · · Score: 4, Funny

      Congratulation!

      Only one, you cheap bastard?

    40. Re:Yeah? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Don't even get me started on your damned flashlight phobia!

    41. Re:Yeah? by peragrin · · Score: 1

      Why else does a bottle of water costs more than a bottle of soda?

      They had to add something useful to get people to buy it in bulk.

      --
      i thought once I was found, but it was only a dream.
    42. Re:Yeah? by sexconker · · Score: 1

      I get the reference.

    43. Re:Yeah? by Macman408 · · Score: 5, Insightful

      More details can be found for the geekily-minded in their academic paper (PDF warning!).

      Basically, it's a series of multiplexers. The challenge selects exactly what pair of paths through the multiplexers are taken, and the output is a 0 or 1 depending on which path is faster. Presumably, this then gets replicated or reused several times to make a multi-bit response. They show an LFSR in their diagram, but don't explicitly say what they use it for - my guess would be they initialize it with the challenge, then use it to generate the programming bits to select a path through the multiplexers.

      So yeah, it's pretty difficult to manufacture a circuit that exactly matches it. And it would probably take too long to exhaustively try all challenges to discover what the responses are. However, I still see several possible weaknesses.

      First, the challenge/response pairs that are stored (which are outside the RFID chip, used to verify that it is valid) must be selected randomly. If an attacker can reduce the number of possible challenges from 2^64 down to a much smaller number, it's no longer secure: he can interrogate the RFID chip for its responses to those challenges, and then program those into a new chip. It's not completely cloned, but as far as anybody can tell from the stored challenge/response pairs, it is identical.

      Second, the paper shows that about 11 bits out of every 128 are different each time you use the *same* challenge with the *same* chip. To catch most false negatives with the fewest false positives (ie highest security possible), the threshold would have to be probably only 104 correct bits out of 128. (The same challenge with different chips is close to the ideal of 64 changed bits out of 128 total). Presumably, these numbers are approximately halved when using 64-bit challenges and responses. This makes the chip weaker than something that really has 2^64 combinations; you don't have to get all 64 bits right, you just have to get maybe 52 of them right. In the paper, they suggest a threshold of 96 correct bits - or presumably 48-bits with the 64-bit implementation. That effectively knocks a good 5 orders of magnitude off the number of possible responses.

      Third, what's to stop somebody from figuring out the timing parameters of a particular RFID, and emulating the circuit? They say in the paper that they "scramble its output to thwart such 'model building' attacks." OK, how? Is this why the LFSR is in the design? Obviously, they're trying to prevent their competitors from copying their work, but are they also trying to get security through obscurity? We all know how well *that* works.

      Fourth, the challenge/response pairs have to be stored securely. If an attacker can get them, it's game over. Considering most companies still haven't figured out how to secure their customers' credit card numbers, the only thing keeping an attacker at bay is a lack of motivation. Make the payoff good enough, and this is probably the weak point in the system that would be hacked first.

      Fifth, if I'm a malicious supplier of RFID chips, I might be able to find two similar chips. I sell one to somebody else, and keep the second for my own malicious purposes. Since it doesn't have to be exactly identical (within a few bits is fine), and I can use the principles of the birthday attack, this shouldn't be a terribly difficult thing to do. Now, if I did my math right, a malicious supplier would have to buy around 83 million RFID chips to have a 50% chance of getting one pair that are considered to be matches, *if* the threshold is set at the most secure level possible. I'd bet a typical threshold would drop that by another order of magnitude or so. That's a lot of RFID tags, but given RFID's target (low-cost, high-volume), it's not so unreasonable.

      The paper, like many involving an actual company, lacks a lot o

    44. Re:Yeah? by supernova_hq · · Score: 2, Funny

      Meh, just challenge it 2^64 times and record the answers!

    45. Re:Yeah? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      So just DoS it by prompting everything for a "Hey, I'm legit, what's your response to -next-legit0-check-X?" and now it's off by 1 for every legitimate check X, replying X+1 = fail.

      Next.

    46. Re:Yeah? by aXi · · Score: 0

      The Egyptians hacked it for you quite some millennia ago. I think you can still find some of their hacking tools on the Gizeh platform. But be careful they where also the inventors of the curse of dmca. Amun Rah

    47. Re:Yeah? by mollymoo · · Score: 1

      Wait... so if it sends a challenge to the RFID and sends the same challenge to a database to see if they have the same response... then can't you just hook up your RFID copy to query the database and send the correct response?

      Query the database? If someone hacks the authentication database you'd be fucked anyway. Each challenge/response is only used once, so replay and MITM attacks don't work.

      --
      Chernobyl 'not a wildlife haven' - BBC News
    48. Re:Yeah? by conspirator57 · · Score: 1

      it's 12345. please.

      --
      "If still these truths be held to be
      Self evident."
      -Edna St. Vincent Millay
    49. Re:Yeah? by Huwawa · · Score: 1, Insightful

      It's kind of like those 'unhackable' computers, networks and software we keep hearing about. *yawn* Wake me up when someone actually makes such a thing and it actually, you know, works.

      Where do you keep hearing that?

    50. Re:Yeah? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0, Interesting

      Bah, despite the naysayers below, I have no fear.

      My IP address I will happily give out: 127.0.0.1

      Go ahead, make my day and DDOS me to hell!

    51. Re:Yeah? by spamania · · Score: 1

      Verayo's use of metaphor -- that of the chip having "DNA" -- makes their claim sound ridiculous. What's not "cloneable" about DNA? It's just a bit more difficult.

      I expect this story to end up in Bruce Schneier's "doghouse" file.

      --
      My other .sig is a troll.
    52. Re:Yeah? by Oktober+Sunset · · Score: 3, Funny

      Rest of congratulations arrive when money does.

    53. Re:Yeah? by v1 · · Score: 1

      Sounds like something whose response may change over time. Won't that be fun if the tags start drifting sufficiently over a few years to start becoming unusable.

      --
      I work for the Department of Redundancy Department.
    54. Re:Yeah? by Poltras · · Score: 1

      1000000+ UIDs, these days...

    55. Re:Yeah? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The question we should be asking is why does a bottle of soda cost more than a bottle of fuel?

    56. Re:Yeah? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      isn't this similar to what they were trying to do with bd+ and aacs?

      Didn't those fail miserably?

    57. Re:Yeah? by Hurricane78 · · Score: 1, Offtopic

      Because of the aluminium can, which is pretty expensive, and because of the brand.
      The content is just tap water, cheap sugar, and a drop of aromes and color.

      The real question is: Why are you buying it,
      when everyone knows, that it makes you fat and dumb, and is not worth the can it comes in,
      but tastes...oohh...soo...*addictively*...good...? ;)

      --
      Any sufficiently advanced intelligence is indistinguishable from stupidity.
    58. Re:Yeah? by collinstocks · · Score: 1

      I suppose you are right, but that's still not how I would set it up. It requires the chip knowing too much.

    59. Re:Yeah? by carlmenezes · · Score: 1

      So, if I understand correctly, all you really need is to hack the system that stores the RFID challenge/response pairs to say that your RFID chip matches whatever other chip you want it to be. It wouldn't matter whether your chip is a clone or not.

      What prevents them then, from having RFID chips that act as master keys to everything? Or for that matter, from the government or certain security agencies getting master keys because of national security?

      Seems like this is more of a gateway to insecurity.

      --
      Find a job you like and you will never work a day in your life.
    60. Re:Yeah? by Dan541 · · Score: 1

      I wish a building full of journalists would just collapse.

      --
      An SQL query goes to a bar, walks up to a table and asks, "Mind if I join you?"
    61. Re:Yeah? by Macman408 · · Score: 1

      Yes, if you have access to the challenge/response pairs, then you can program that information into some RFID chip without their fancy PUF thingy, and it could masquerade as any of the RFID chips for which it has that data. It's dependent on the reader only asking one of the known challenges, of course. For that matter, if you have access to only the challenges (or if a programmer always seeds the random number generator with the same number, or something stupid like that), and can also get access to the RFID tag, you can query it with all of those challenges and build your own database.

      The difficulty in directly cloning this chip is that, if you don't know what the challenges will be, it's nearly impossible. The fastest RFID rate I found (which is from a 2008 academic paper, so probably not actually implemented) was 4 Mb/s; typical rates seem to be hundreds of kilobits/sec. Even at the faster rate, you can only read 65536 64-bit responses per second (assuming you had full-duplex communications to send challenges at the same time, could generate responses as fast as they could be sent, and basically every other unreasonable assumption possible). At that rate, it would take almost 9 million years to gather every possible challenge/response pair for a single RFID tag.

      So, if you're given one of these RFID chips and want it to be (fairly) secure, generate your own challenges (and gather the responses inside a Faraday cage, so nobody else can listen in). And make sure they're RANDOM. Heck, when verifying the chip, challenge it several times, and make it get them all right. And, most importantly, keep that challenge/response database secure. If the database is compromised, the only way to regain security is to take each of your RFID tags, verify that it is accurate (by a method other than RFID), and generate new challenge/response pairs, and delete the old ones.

    62. Re:Yeah? by htnprm · · Score: 1

      It has a pwned hypervisor.

    63. Re:Yeah? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      momma drunk

    64. Re:Yeah? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If this is performed the way that keyfobs are authenticated, I doubt it. The basic premise is that once you get outside a certain range marked by key presses or access attempts (anything that increments really) you are automatically denied access. What would need to occur is that the increment is stored on the RFID tag and then when a successful challenge is passed, it would send the updated increment count to the host. Anything outside of what might be considered "normal" range would lock the device. What you can do is a Denial of Service attack against the tag forcing a manual reset before it starts working again. While you don't get the information, you can render the system unworkable for a large group to make the technology undesirable.

    65. Re:Yeah? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      "not something you can carry"

      Welcome to the internet era.

    66. Re:Yeah? by JustKidding · · Score: 1

      So basically, they are using the outcome of a fairly large number of race conditions to generate the responds.

      Creating a second, identical chip might be nearly impossible, but emulating the whole thing in software shouldn't be that hard, provided you know the propagation times of the different paths.

      I'd think it would be highly vulnerable to a specialized cryptanalysis attack. Each path is made up of a number of shorter paths, the propagation delay of those adding up to the total path delay. The number of short paths can't be very large, otherwise the thing would be impossible to manufacture.

      If the attacker can get responses for intelligently chosen challenges (basically a chosen plaintext attack), he might be able to figure out the propagation delays of each individual path, and would be able to calculate the delay for any given longer path, and thus generate a valid response for any given challenge.

      This attack could be rather complicated if they mangle the bits after the racing operation, by obscuring where each bit in the response came from. A decent hash algorithm will probably do the trick, as the attacker cannot deduce which bit has toggled between two slightly different challenges.

      One thing an attacker could do, however, is steal the original chip, tear it apart to get at the bits before they are mangled, and create 2 cloned chips, using one the replace the stolen one.

      Unless they have done something really stupid, these chips may not be impossible to clone, but it's at least a hell of a lot more difficult that most other RFID chips.

    67. Re:Yeah? by shilly · · Score: 1

      Actually, the website makes a stronger claim than what you've said here. It says "The number of challenge and response pairs for each IC can be *arbitrarily large* (2^64 in this example)" -- my emphasis.

    68. Re:Yeah? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I can see this relationship is something we're all going to have to work at.

    69. Re:Yeah? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Unfuckable chicks always get fucked!

    70. Re:Yeah? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Uncloneable today - cloned tomorrow...

      This reminds me of a cartoon I saw years ago -- people on a dock watching a departing sailboat with its name painted on the stern -- UNSINKABLE III.

    71. Re:Yeah? by nog_lorp · · Score: 1

      Address? Or Western Union code or w/e?

  2. Honest injun! by Just+Some+Guy · · Score: 4, Funny

    And this time we really mean it!

    --
    Dewey, what part of this looks like authorities should be involved?
    1. Re:Honest injun! by Osurak · · Score: 5, Funny

      And this time we really mean it!

      Anybody want a peanut?

    2. Re:Honest injun! by Whatanut · · Score: 1

      Would you stop that!

      --

      yvan eht nioj
    3. Re:Honest injun! by ReverendLoki · · Score: 2, Funny

      Would you stop that!

      If they are, we'll all be dead!

      *blink* wait a second, that didn't work as well as I expected...

      --
      09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B D8 41 56 C5 63 56 88 C0
    4. Re:Honest injun! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

      In theory this could be possible. I recall reading some years ago about a guy doing "genetic algorithm" development to get the ideal program for a particular type of integrated circuit. When he got done, the algorithm worked great --ON THAT IC ONLY. The machine code made no sort of ordinary sense; it appeared to be taking advantage of subtle interactions between circuit elements on the chip, which cannot be expected to be duplicated exactly on a different chip, and indeed the code did not work when copied to another chip.
       
      The point is if both the chips and the genetic-algorithm-development-for-each-chip could be mass-produced, then the claim could indeed be possible!

    5. Re:Honest injun! by Serenissima · · Score: 1

      Yeah! We totally mean it! I mean... you can copy all of the information off of the chip, but you can't clone it! That means it's still secure!

      --
      Give a man a fire and he'll be warm for a day. But light a man on fire and he'll be warm for the rest of his life.
    6. Re:Honest injun! by dvice_null · · Score: 2, Interesting

      You are not thinking out of the box.

      Consider this. You got a video file, which is drm protected so no-one can copy it. Lets assume that drm is perfect and no-one is really not able to copy the file.

      Okay, now take a video camera and voila, we got a copy.

      If it is readable, it is possible to copy it. It can be made difficult, but never impossible.

    7. Re:Honest injun! by HAKdragon · · Score: 1

      inconceivable!

      --
      "Our opponent is an alien starship packed with atomic bombs. We have a protractor."
    8. Re:Honest injun! by drakaan · · Score: 1

      You keep ona usin that word...I donna think it means wha' you think it means...

      --
      "Murphy was an optimist" - O'Toole's commentary on Murphy's Law
    9. Re:Honest injun! by Feanturi · · Score: 1

      I'm hearing you, but the copy you'd get from that wouldn't be as nice as the original. It would be better if it could somehow be captured right from the video cable, still not as good but better than dealing with light absorption in the room you're doing this in.

    10. Re:Honest injun! by bpkiwi · · Score: 1

      Now imagine every video camera in the word has drm on the hardware to prevent this.

      And every TV has drm to prevent you playing it.

      That is what they are now aiming for.

    11. Re:Honest injun! by mollymoo · · Score: 1

      If it is readable, it is possible to copy it. It can be made difficult, but never impossible.

      There are 2^64 challenge/response pairs per chip. Let's say the tag can communicate at 125kbps (125kHz is a frequency commonly used by rfid tags, no idea what actual data rate they support, probably much less). 64 bit challenge, 64 bit response gives us near enough 1000 interrogations per second. 2^64/1000 = 1.8e16 seconds, or 585 million years to brute-force clone one. It actually allows a few bit errors, so you could probably reduce that by an order of magnitude or three, but we're still talking geological time.

      --
      Chernobyl 'not a wildlife haven' - BBC News
    12. Re:Honest injun! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      No more rhymes now... I mean it!

    13. Re:Honest injun! by MasterOfDisaster · · Score: 1

      But the company seems to be storing the challenge/response pairs in a database somewhere. This means they either do a 500 million year brute force scan of each chip before shipping them out, the keys are predictable from some 'secret' set of data (batch/manufacturing line/serial number, etc), or they only store a small portion of the possible key space. Even if they sample a random portion of the key space for each individual chip, it might be possible to attack the psudorandom generator for the keys - you only have to mimic responses that they will ask for.

      --
      The opinions in this post are ficticious. Any similarity to actual opinions, real or imagined, is purely coincidental.
    14. Re:Honest injun! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Even if they sample a random portion of the key space for each individual chip, it might be possible to attack the psudorandom generator for the keys - you only have to mimic responses that they will ask for.

      Yes, but the point is really that you can't *just* clone this RFID chip in isolation, unlike current chips. You need to attack the authentication database or its algorithms. This makes cloning orders of magnitude harder and possibly (at any given time when no exploit relating to the auth DB exists) impossible.

    15. Re:Honest injun! by lisaparratt · · Score: 1

      Because there's no way a chip fab could afford a true hardware random number generator?

  3. Press release and marketing hype. 1st paragraph: by BitterOldGUy · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Verayo launched the worldâ(TM)s first unclonable silicon chip â" the Vera X512H RFID chip. This new RFID chip is based on recently announced breakthrough technology called Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF). PUF technology is a type of electronic DNA or fingerprinting technology for silicon chips that makes each chip unclonable. Verayoâ(TM)s PUF-based RFID technology offers

    So, is it unclonable?

    Let's have a pool to see when it's cloned. I got by the end of the year by a Stanford student.

  4. Isn't that logically impossible? by danaris · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Forgive me for my ignorance (and I haven't RTFA), but my understanding of RFID is the only way to tell what an RFID device is is by listening to it broadcast. Well, if you listen to a device broadcast enough, particularly if you listen in on a conversation between it and what it's supposed to talk to...doesn't it then become relatively simple to create your own RFID device that broadcasts all the same things as the original chip, and responds in all the same ways to input?

    Seems to me it's just another instance of "DRM doesn't work," only in this case all the communication between supposedly secure nodes literally has to take place in the open air...

    Dan Aris

    --
    Fun. Free. Online. RPG. BattleMaster.
    1. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by corsec67 · · Score: 5, Interesting

      You could have a more powerful RFID tag that has some computation ability. This would allow you to generate a new code for every communication, preventing your replay attack.

      If the list of request-responses was a true one time pad, then they might actually have some fairly good security from a radio attack, but the number of queries to the rfid tag would be finite.

      If they use any kind of cipher, then it is very much open to attack.

      --
      If I have nothing to hide, don't search me
    2. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by repvik · · Score: 1

      If it makes it necessary to listen to many conversations between a reader and the RFID chip, that'll atleast make it impossible for someone to clone my chip by passing me on the street...

    3. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      What about one-time pads that cycle over time? This would require a central server, but it would work.

    4. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by lupis42 · · Score: 1

      Well, sure... too a point. It could use some sort of one-time-pad authentication, or time-based encryption signature, which would make cloning it more difficult. Perhaps even much more difficult. Thing is, they could just mean that it cannot be cloned without taking it apart to get to whatever signature system it uses. --Has not read TFA--

    5. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by maxume · · Score: 1

      It looks like the primary purpose is to make sure that the tag you get is in fact the tag that whoever you are doing business with sent (so the tags don't help you trust your partner, but if you do trust your partner, they help you verify that you received what he sent). Once a challenge is burned (i.e., played in a public situation), as you say, it is burned, but they are still useful for authenticating the RFID.

      --
      Nerd rage is the funniest rage.
    6. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by ignoramus · · Score: 1

      Well, if you listen to a device broadcast enough, particularly if you listen in on a conversation between it and what it's supposed to talk to...doesn't it then become relatively simple [...]

      To me, that's like saying SSH is easy to crack if you can just listen in on it... but the whole idea is that the (encrypted) conversation can be eavesdropped upon without compromising the data being exchanged.

      Not sure how exactly the PUF thing is supposed to work, but it's imaginable to "generate" unique keys based on anything, even physical imperfections in the chips... the account is then somehow setup (say, when you activate your credit card or whatever) without ever exposing the key itself (only the chip ever knows it, only using it to generate interesting numbers for the peer). Thus, you can intercept all you want, you'll never see the unique secret key go by.

      All this wouldn't mean it's literally unclonable... the key exchange, generation, whatever may well be vulnerable to crypto attacks in the end. But you couldn't just swipe someone's butt and go on to make purchases like you can at the moment.

    7. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by The_Wilschon · · Score: 3, Interesting

      You'd be far more likely to see something along the lines of a key pair, where the private key is on the RFID, and any device that needs to read the RFID has the public key. Then the RFID would sign something, eg encrypt a hash of the message it received and send that encrypted hash back along with its response. The reader decrypts the hash, and makes sure it lines up right. As long as public-key encryption isn't cracked, you're good.

      --
      SIGSEGV caught, terminating

      wait... not that kind of sig.
    8. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by Tetsujin · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Forgive me for my ignorance (and I haven't RTFA), but my understanding of RFID is the only way to tell what an RFID device is is by listening to it broadcast. Well, if you listen to a device broadcast enough, particularly if you listen in on a conversation between it and what it's supposed to talk to...doesn't it then become relatively simple to create your own RFID device that broadcasts all the same things as the original chip, and responds in all the same ways to input?

      Seems to me it's just another instance of "DRM doesn't work," only in this case all the communication between supposedly secure nodes literally has to take place in the open air...

      Dan Aris

      Well, I don't know if I can answer your question in terms of the technical limitations of RFID - but in general, your argument ignores the possibility that RFID data is being encrypted.

      For instance: suppose the subway fare system uses a set of encryption keys - some of these keys will be stored on the fare cards (the RFID devices) and some will be stored in the machines that interact with these cards...

      Now suppose the interaction starts with one of these machines broadcasting, looking for a fare card... In some part of the initial handshaking the machine sends out a transaction number - encoded using an encryption key that fare cards can decode. In all further communication that transaction number is part of the encryption key used by the fare card.

      You can listen in on this transaction, but you can't do anything with it unless you can decode the messages... You can't replicate the transaction because your response has to include the transaction ID given to you by the gate machine...

      So in the context of an "uncloneable" chip - you could create another chip that pretends to have the same "Physical Uncloneable Functions" - but that depends on first knowing exactly what they are... If it's handled in a static way and not encoded, that's pretty easy. If it's handled in a way that one RF exchange only gets you one part of the data you'd need to replicate the thing - or if the data you'd need to replicate the chip is encrypted, then that makes the problem substantially harder...

      Fundamentally, though, I believe you're correct - if it can be made once, it can be made again... The trick is to make it difficult to do that.

      --
      Bow-ties are cool.
    9. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by maxume · · Score: 5, Informative

      The chip is characterized at the factory by sending it challenges and recording the responses. Later, the chip is issued one of the recorded challenges and the response is compared to the factory response.

      If the challenge-response is done in such a way that it can be recorded, then each challenge is only good the first time it is used.

      There is some possibility that the behavior they are exploiting is not as robust as they think and that the response characteristics of the chip could be determined from a limited number of challenges (and then emulated), but on the surface, it looks pretty reasonable, especially for situations with a limited number of challenges (so authenticating an event ticket with it is great, but maybe not so much an ID).

      --
      Nerd rage is the funniest rage.
    10. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by debatem1 · · Score: 4, Insightful

      The very idea of a one time pad is that they don't cycle over time. If they do, it becomes an XOR cipher with a known period- trivially easy to break.

      Also, a one time pad cannot securely gain pad length over the untrusted channel, since doing so would violate the 1:1 rule. Each character of new pad would have to be encrypted against- and thus consume- one character from the old pad.

    11. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by Otto · · Score: 2, Informative

      And that's basically what they do. It's a challenge-response mechanism. See here: http://www.verayo.com/solutions.html

      So naturally it's unclonable in the trivial sense, but of course it may be vulnerable to a cryptographic attack.

      What gets me though is that challenge/response mechanisms have been in RFID devices for ages. What's new about this one?

      Note that they claim "Unlimited number of challenge response pairs for each chip" which just sounds freakin' strange to me.

      --
      - Give a man a fire and he's warm for a day, but set him on fire and he's warm for the rest of his life.
    12. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by Thelasko · · Score: 4, Insightful

      This would allow you to generate a new code for every communication, preventing your replay attack.

      Already done. In fact, if there is an "unclonable" RFID chip, my money is on it being in cars before your passport.

      --
      One of our competitors trademarked the term "hypothesis". From now on, we will call them "boneheaded ideas".
    13. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by bradgoodman · · Score: 1, Informative
      By "cycle", you mean restart from the beginning, once you hit the end?

      Do that, and it's no longer a "one-time" pad!

    14. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by DrSkwid · · Score: 3, Insightful

      How does that stop someone reading the private key from the RFID device using non-RF methods?

      --
      There are places where the networks are not touching,and there are places where they are-Boeing's Lori Gunter
    15. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by DrSkwid · · Score: 1

      How long before you start churning out duplicates? Quantum is not analogue.

      --
      There are places where the networks are not touching,and there are places where they are-Boeing's Lori Gunter
    16. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by DrSkwid · · Score: 1

      blah blah blah I have one of the keys in my possession, the method, no matter how many bits, is right there in my key - the RFID device.

      --
      There are places where the networks are not touching,and there are places where they are-Boeing's Lori Gunter
    17. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by It+doesn't+come+easy · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Not to defend the claim (the claim is obviously marketing hype) but when they say cloned they mean you can't take a one of their RFID chips and change it to be identical to another one of their chips (to be read by their scanners, etc.). Adding a computer or more circuitry doesn't count because it would not be a clone (even if it generated the same responses).

      However, obviously with enough money and resources you could copy one of their chips and turn out another RFID chip that would be identical. It may not even take that much effort or money (I'm sure we'll hear about what it takes soon enough).

      If they had claimed that it would be prohibitively expensive or time-consuming to clone one of their chips then maybe I could believe them. But to claim unclonable is in a word unbelievable.

      --
      The NSA: The only part of the US government that actually listens.
    18. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

      Here's the #1 on my wish list for RFIDs and other wireless device technologies:

      All currently available wireless systems use static IDs and reveal the device IDs in the selection phase (and usually during the rest of the communication too.) This is not necessary. A device should not identify itself and indirectly its owner before it has established that the communication partner is authorized to receive that information. All devices should anonymously verify the other device's authorization and only reveal static IDs inside of encrypted tunnels to authorized devices.

    19. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by kalirion · · Score: 1

      Encrypted storage?

    20. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by jopsen · · Score: 1

      Yea... But if you succeed in implementing asymmetric cryptography on a chip that is powered by radio waves... Please let me see the algorithm... Cause I'd put my two cent that you have VERY limited computational power on such a device...

    21. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by cduffy · · Score: 3, Informative

      That's just regular tamperproofing: Put it in an enclosure constructed such that its contents are destroyed on any attempt to open it.

      I'm not saying that it's an easy problem, necessarily... but there are plenty of folks who've done it, and there are standards which folks claiming to have implemented such a thing can be tested against. See FIPS 140-1.

    22. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by jopsen · · Score: 1

      You can't...

      But you could make it pretty damn hard... Like melting the chip in a hard plastic case with no wires out... Practically forcing you to destroy it, in order to open it...

      Also one could consider cloneless using RF secure enough...

    23. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by maxume · · Score: 1

      I have no idea. I doubt it is a significant issue for short term things (but this goes directly to the question of how robust their technique is). Even if they can only produce tens of millions of unique keys it will be fairly useful (because finding that 1 key is going to be rather expensive compared to paying for the authentic merchandise).

      --
      Nerd rage is the funniest rage.
    24. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by zippthorne · · Score: 1

      Seems to me that a naive way to do it would be to construct a linear feedback shift register with a period much longer than the expected number of transactions. Like.. expecting 10,000 transactions over the lifetime of the key fob? Make the period billions of words long.

      The challenge is then fed in as the starting value, cycled a certain number of times, and the output is sent back.

      Of course, the processing on the back end in verifying the output, as well as establishing millions of unique LSFR sequences would be pretty prohibitive. Nevertheless, you could *claim* "unlimited" number of challenge response pairs.

      --
      Can you be Even More Awesome?!
    25. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by JerryLove · · Score: 1

      I've got to second "impossible".

      The toll-booth (or whatever) must have a way to, at the end of this conversation, match to an account number. I could get that information from the RFID the same way the toll-booth does, and then program it into my own RFID.

      In short, if there's something that the toll-booth(or whatever) can use to verify, then I can get it from the tag in the same way. If I can't get it, then I don't need it because the toll booth doesn't want it.

      The difference between this and SSL or the like is that, in SSL, I'm just trying to stop eves-dropping. SSL doesn't stop, for example, a DNS-redirect (which is more similar)

    26. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by plover · · Score: 1

      How does that stop someone reading the private key from the RFID device using non-RF methods?

      You mean like Ross Anderson's many successful attacks on smart cards, using microscopes, logic probes, power-fault attacks, and other really clever methods?

      I'm guessing that'll be prevented mostly by 'lawyers'. "Clone this chip and we'll sue your asses, prosecute you under the DMCA, tell the RIAA you've been downloading Metallica, and unplug your freezer until your steaks thaw and make a mess all over your frozen waffles."

      --
      John
    27. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by corsec67 · · Score: 1

      I included a OTP(one time pad) in my list of possible encryption methods. This means that every request/response would be encrypted using a string that isn't going to be used again, and shouldn't have any relation to any other request/responses. This does mean that the number of queries is limited, though.

      Image the transaction between the base and the RFID tag was like this:
      Base: What is your serial number?
      RFID: 1234

      Base looks up the next valid request string in the OTP table, gets the value "ABCD", and sends the query 'Provide the correct response to 'ABCD'".
      RFID provides the corresponding response in the OTP table: "DEAD"

      Base: Cool, you authenticated, now mark that row as "used"
      RIF: Ok.

      If you try to repeat that response value of "DEAD", it wouldn't work, because it has been used, and you have no way of knowing (without physically inspecting the RFID tag) what the next valid response is, without knowing what the OTP is. Other encryption techniques could work in a similar way, preventing you from simply repeating the conversation to authenticate as the RFID chip.

      --
      If I have nothing to hide, don't search me
    28. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by EveLibertine · · Score: 1

      Ah yes, the infallible "blah blah blah" argument. Well played, sir.

    29. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by fireboy1919 · · Score: 1

      doesn't it then become relatively simple to create your own RFID device that broadcasts all the same things as the original chip, and responds in all the same ways to input?

      This is provably false. You can communicate over a public channel to prove that you're you in such a way that you do not reveal how to do this to anyone else.

      AFAIK, though, I don't think there's any way to keep *you* from knowing what your private key is without a third party in the exchange, though...which is a real pain.

      --
      Mod me down and I will become more powerful than you can possibly imagine!
    30. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by darthwader · · Score: 1

      The key problem is the "... and responds in all the same ways to input". There are 2^64 possible challenges, so you cannot possibly hear all possible inputs. And the nature of the PUF is that you cannot predict what the response to a given challenge will be, without actually issuing the challenge.

      For those who like to RTFM, but didn't quite understand how it works, here what Wiki has to say:

      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physically_Unclonable_Function

      Basically, it is a one-time-pad algorithm. You can't clone it by listening to the conversation, because the authentication part of the conversation relies on each challenge being only used once.

      --
      I hate it when I make a joke and I get modded "+5 insightful". Mod the stupid comments "funny", not "insightful", pleas
    31. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by darthwader · · Score: 2, Informative

      Actually, no that's exactly what they are claiming. The nature of a PUF is that you cannot copy it (at least not with any reasonable amount of work).

      The system works by what is basically garbage that is intentionally and randomly introduced into the circuit. You might be able to take the chip apart and look at where the garbage is, but with current technology (or foreseeable technology), you cannot make another chip with the garbage in exactly (down to an atom's width or less) the same place. And the position of the garbage drives how the circuit responds to inputs.

      You are right that "with enough money and resources", but the idea behind this is that nobody, not even the dreaded Three-Letter-Agencies have enough money or resources to do it.

      See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physically_Unclonable_Function for more details on how PUF work.

      Of course this can be defeated by simply looking at a different part of the system. E.g. if I manage to hack into their secure database of challenge-response pairs, then I can clone this chip with a simple table lookup.

      --
      I hate it when I make a joke and I get modded "+5 insightful". Mod the stupid comments "funny", not "insightful", pleas
    32. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by supernova_hq · · Score: 1

      AHA, not only would my waffles no longer be frozen by the time the steaks thawed, but my frozen waffles are on the shelf ABOVE my steaks!

    33. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by Brandano · · Score: 1

      So, if the response to the challenge is unpredictable, how does the challenger know he's got the proper response? One-time pads are nothing new, and yet they don't offer absolute security

    34. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Rainbow table attack sounds feasible. You would need to do a spectrum analysis of the scanning process over multiple passes. Once you had all challenges, you could take all possible scans of the chip and have every response to play back.

      Similarly: I imagine the scanners use a PRNG to determine which challenge to give. If you could track the scanner challenge, you could have the tag to be cloned at a separate location, with an accomplice attacker to the one about to be scanned. Use a directional antenna to determine the next challenge. Instantly transmit challenge, prepare response, send it back. Bada bing.

    35. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by Apro+im · · Score: 1

      DRM doesn't work because it has two conflicting goals - giving the user access to encrypted data and hiding the means of decryption.

      This, on the other hand, is simple challenge-response authentication. In practice, RFID authentication fails because the chips are not very computationally powerful, so the ciphers employed are weak. However, it's fairly simple to in theory have a device which listens for a challenge, signs the challenge text with its private key, sends the signature back, and the challenger verifies the signature to authenticate.

      As long as both the challenge and key space are large enough, replay attacks can be prevented, and if the cipher is secure, you can have confidence in that the responder is who they claim to be.

      For more info, read up on public key cryptography

    36. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by Apro+im · · Score: 1

      It's very easy to create a system where it's possible for anybody to verify that the sender is in possession of a given key but not to gain that key themselves.

      SSL does in fact stop a DNS-redirect based impostor, if you assume that the keys that the clients trusts are indeed trustworthy. The problem in all of the above systems is three-fold: a.) making sure the cipher is secure (AFAIK, nobody has an efficient way to break RSA yet), b.) making sure the implementation is sound (hence Debian OpenSSL snafu earlier this year), and c.) knowing which keys to trust.

      In a system where all keys are registered by a central, trusted registrar (like easypass), (c) is dealt with. Sadly, a lot of RFID authentication schemes fail tests (a) and (b). Attacks on OpenSSL (Debian debacle aside) often concentrate on (c), because your browser has to trust some other authority to sign off on the validity of a key, and often those authorities are not very rigorous and can be tricked.

    37. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by DrSkwid · · Score: 1

      the blah blah was directed at the irrelevant waffle in the parent post

      --
      There are places where the networks are not touching,and there are places where they are-Boeing's Lori Gunter
    38. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by cryptoguy · · Score: 1

      A challenge-response protocol simply provides a way to prove that you know a certain secret. To claim that this secret cannot be stolen is naive -- even if the secret is based in part on physical properties of a particular chip. In the end it is just a series of bits. Smart money says it can be stolen, given physical access to the chip. Of course there is also the potential to discover the secret by brute force. If there are biases in the physical properties on which it is based, it could be easier to brute-force than advertised.

    39. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by maxume · · Score: 1

      Yeah, that's why I wouldn't be in a big hurry to use such a system to authenticate identification.

      It doesn't seem like it would be worth attacking the chips one at a time for something like a basketball ticket though (of course, such a system mostly protects the gate owner, people buying second hand tickets aren't going to be able to do much authentication, at least not right now). It's possible that the secret is very weak, who knows, but it is probably strong enough to protect a $50 ticket (and the consequences of failure aren't particularly dire in such a situation).

      --
      Nerd rage is the funniest rage.
    40. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by xouumalperxe · · Score: 1

      problem is keeping the private key in its private state. When the key is, by necessity, burnt into the RFID chip somehow, how do you prevent dissection of the chip to reveal it? This is, btw, an honest question. Only way I see of doing that is by using some sort of tamper proof casing around it, which is not necessarily practical for all implementations.

    41. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by The_Wilschon · · Score: 1

      I imagine it isn't possible in passive RFID devices. But in active RFID devices, you could have anything at all in the backend, including hordes of monkeys with encrypting typewriters.

      --
      SIGSEGV caught, terminating

      wait... not that kind of sig.
    42. Re:Isn't that logically impossible? by Apro+im · · Score: 1

      The premise of a PUF is to make it infeasible to recreate the key, because it is determined by physical characteristics too minute to recreate or perhaps even detect.

      For example, if you set up a series of gates with no clock sync and let the data races settle to a steady state, each chip will tend to have a consistent end state, even though the result will vary widely between chips, because of minute, quantum-level differences. I have yet to see a proof for the cryptographic security of such chips, but that is the general premise.

  5. Wrong Section by trongey · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Shouldn't this article have been posted in the Humor section? I know I got a chuckle out of it.

    --
    You never really know how close to the edge you can go until you fall off.
    1. Re:Wrong Section by atraintocry · · Score: 1

      Not if you read the article, or have an understanding of how the thing works. Granted, saying it's unclonable is false in a the very strict sense of "anything's possible", but the summary has unclonable in quotes. You might say that it's more like a SecureID than a traditional RFID tag. And no, those aren't perfect either, but they're used in plenty of places, every day.

  6. From the same folks that brought you the unsinkabl by kunkie · · Score: 2, Funny

    From the same folks that brought you the unsinkable ship.

  7. Re:Press release and marketing hype. 1st paragraph by Kingrames · · Score: 4, Funny

    I'd take your bet, but odds are, it's already been cloned.

    --
    If you can read this, I forgot to post anonymously.
  8. Send in the clones ... by the_rajah · · Score: 0, Redundant

    in 3, 2, 1....

    --


    "Do the Right Thing. It will gratify some people and astound the rest." - Mark Twain
    1. Re:Send in the clones ... by Tetsujin · · Score: 1

      Around the survivors, a perimeter create!

      (Every pair of genes is a hand-me-down...)

      --
      Bow-ties are cool.
    2. Re:Send in the clones ... by pilgrim23 · · Score: 3, Funny

      so technically would one be guilty of making an obscene clone fall?

      --
      - Minutus cantorum, minutus balorum, minutus carborata descendum pantorum.
    3. Re:Send in the clones ... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      In 3, 2, 1....

    4. Re:Send in the clones ... by networkconsultant · · Score: 1

      And if no one was in the playpen would it make noise?

  9. Re:Press release and marketing hype. 1st paragraph by Ngarrang · · Score: 1

    Let's have a pool to see when it's cloned. I got by the end of the year by a Stanford student

    My money is on MIT. They can use that super grocery cart and warcart the new RFID into oblivion.

    --
    Bearded Dragon
  10. Re:Press release and marketing hype. 1st paragraph by getclear · · Score: 1

    Hmm, Im batting for an MIT student, and I bet that Dan Bernstein (slightly obscure reference) will offer $500 dollars if ANYONE can clone it!

  11. Fairly straightforward by jimicus · · Score: 4, Informative

    Most obvious mechanism is that the chip has sufficient intelligence to be able to cryptographically identify itself using public key cryptography, and the keypair is embedded on the chip at the manufacturing stage.

    Would work beautifully, but it's completely broken the day someone manages to get the private key out of it.

    1. Re:Fairly straightforward by 91degrees · · Score: 1

      Which should be possible. It's expensive but a lot of companies will dismantle a chip and reverse engineer it. This includes legitimate large scale chip companies.

    2. Re:Fairly straightforward by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

      The security thing is a no brainer - a good encryption would keep someone from wasting their time to get free subway passes.

      The real kicker is cost and power. How strong a signal do you need to get the necessary power to calculate this stuff? And could you really afford to stick one of these things on every subway card? Adding complexity, to me, is defeating the purpose.

    3. Re:Fairly straightforward by Lumpy · · Score: 1

      the 1-wire iButton does this. they have a cryptographic version that is uncloneable and will self destruct if you try to open it.

      It's probably that tech simply repackaged.

      --
      Do not look at laser with remaining good eye.
    4. Re:Fairly straightforward by FormOfActionBanana · · Score: 1

      I think the idea with good quality secure devices is you enumerate the detectable ways the key can be obtained, and load up the device with detectors that trigger an erasure of the key (and or physical self destruction if appropriate)

      In the context of an RFID chip, I can only imagine this would mean a physical wear sensor and a light sensor, each which trigger an overwrite of the key data on battery power from a little one time battery for this use.

      It sounds completely infeasible though. Bending the card too much (causing small cracks) or leaving it out in the sun would just erase the key.

      --
      Take off every 'sig' !!
    5. Re:Fairly straightforward by Tweenk · · Score: 1

      Don't think so - it looks like an unique hashing function rather than public key crypto. The system is not based on a "magic uncloneable device" but on a strict control of information according to the least privilege principle. Nobody except the RFID vendor knows the algorithm, and probably no one at all knows the seed of a particular chip.

      --
      Those who would give up liberty to obtain working drivers, deserve neither liberty nor working drivers.
    6. Re:Fairly straightforward by CodeBuster · · Score: 1

      Would work beautifully, but it's completely broken the day someone manages to get the private key out of it.

      This is the same reason why DRM cannot provide a cryptographically strong guarantee. No matter how the private key is generated, hidden, or otherwise obfuscated it is still provided to the adversary (i.e. the owner - isn't DRM screwed up like that? You the owner are considered to be an adversary) and forms the "weak link" in the chain. The fact that public key cryptography is used means nothing if the private key needed for decryption is sent along with the package because any crypto system is only as strong as the weakest link. So unless the RFID or the DRM requires Internet access to perform remote attestation (ala Palladium) the private key must be provided and RFID or the DRM is weakened to the complexity of the private key obfuscation techniques (which are never as strong as the crypto itself). Incidentally, this is also why Microsoft and the Trusted Computing Group DO NOT want to implement owner override, because they know that it will break their attempt at strong DRM if they are NOT permitted to treat the owner of the computer or the RFID chip as an adversary via forced remote checks (i.e. using the Internet). I for one will never accept and refuse to use any software (or recommend that others use it) which requires trusted computing and does NOT include owner override. We should all of us refuse to purchase or use any Trusted Computing products which do NOT include owner override. Demand sovereignty over your computing devices, you paid for them and they should obey you.

    7. Re:Fairly straightforward by WolfWithoutAClause · · Score: 2, Insightful

      It's also completely broken if some organisation (for the sake of argument we'll call such an organisation 'a government') nobbles the manufacturer, so they ship chips that were made cloned at the factory.

      --

      -WolfWithoutAClause

      "Gravity is only a theory, not a fact!"
    8. Re:Fairly straightforward by BitZtream · · Score: 2, Insightful

      The whole thing is broken by simply stealing the RFID chip itself. Physical access implies complete access, its just a matter of how long it takes you to get to the data.

      --
      Persistent Volume manager for Kubernetes - https://github.com/dwimsey/openshift-pvmanager
    9. Re:Fairly straightforward by Deanalator · · Score: 1

      Not really. If done right (if they were to act as wireless smartcards) then they would still need to melt the card to pull off the key (private keys should always be stored in write only memory), and within seconds of the victim noticing that their card is missing, they can call a number and revoke the key.

      Then they just get issued a new card (with a new key) next time they are in the office (bank, campus, etc..).

    10. Re:Fairly straightforward by Kjella · · Score: 1

      Would work beautifully, but it's completely broken the day someone manages to get the private key out of it.

      Show me something that isn't broken if you get the private key out of it....

      --
      Live today, because you never know what tomorrow brings
    11. Re:Fairly straightforward by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Extracting the key only requires that someone has the proper motivation to get down and dirty.

      Besides, what are the chances that they would actually implement it correctly? Even if only a partial recovery is possible, there would be a huge push the crack it (even by brute force if necessary) just to prove how stupid it is to trust a static crypto implementation that has proven to be clone-able.

  12. Re:Press release and marketing hype. 1st paragraph by BitterOldGUy · · Score: 1

    Alright, Kingrames for cloned now by anyone.

  13. Why is this automatically discredited? by jeffmeden · · Score: 5, Interesting

    You conduct overheard conversations all the time and have no issue with considering them "secure": namely via SSL/TLS encryption. All that's necessary to create an RFID that can't be completely duplicated is for the chip to hold on to more information than it broadcasts, and then only reveal that information in a clever way (asymmetric encryption). A well coded challenge-response handshake can allow the reader and chip to conduct a conversation that is 'unique' and cannot be easily duplicated later on. Sure, there is the potential for it to be improperly coded, or downright misrepresented. However, don't count it as a failure before it's even seen the light of day.

    1. Re:Why is this automatically discredited? by jimicus · · Score: 1

      The thing about SSL is that it depends on one particular piece of information - the private key - not being available to the general public because it's stored on the server that you're connecting to and (provided the server is properly secured, backups notwithstanding) never leaves it.

      However, with the RFID chip you're distributing the private key along with the public key. All you can do is hope that no enterprising hacker ever finds a way of getting at the private key.

      Of course, we're assuming that this is how the chip actually works. But it seems most logical.

    2. Re:Why is this automatically discredited? by debatem1 · · Score: 4, Insightful

      What they are claiming is not that the key can't be extracted from transmissions- a relatively humdrum requirement- but rather that unlimited physical access to the device cannot reveal the key, which I find dubious in the extreme. Add to that that there have been numerous devices that have claimed this in the past, only to fail miserably, and it seems pretty reasonable to assume that this will fail as well.

    3. Re:Why is this automatically discredited? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Well, I think everyone is instantly discrediting it because of the sheer amount of marketing fluff from TFA. And on a technical level, I think that this system will be useless the first time someone gets their hands on their the challenge/response list. And the chip has to ship with that list on it. This appears to be a trivial level of security. It'll stop the current cloning techniques, but it'll be trivial after a point.

      I don't think that RFID tags will be secure until you can generate your own key, and load others' (public) keys. Till then, RFID tags are barcodes.

    4. Re:Why is this automatically discredited? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The problem with that is that any information can eventually be exracted from the chip if you have it in your possesion

    5. Re:Why is this automatically discredited? by DrSkwid · · Score: 1

      If I had physical access the the server you're talking to I could clone it, poison your DNS and then serve you anything from the server.

      Talking out of your arse doesn't make this thing unclonable.

      --
      There are places where the networks are not touching,and there are places where they are-Boeing's Lori Gunter
    6. Re:Why is this automatically discredited? by ldconfig · · Score: 1

      asymmetric encryption is a joke thousands of folks watch hacked TV that has much better encryption than this. Thanks /. for the giggles

      --
      The spelling and grammar police can kiss my ass
    7. Re:Why is this automatically discredited? by Just+Some+Guy · · Score: 1

      Sure, there is the potential for it to be improperly coded, or downright misrepresented. However, don't count it as a failure before it's even seen the light of day.

      The first 100 times I heard of similar schemes, I thought maybe they were onto something. The second 900 times, I grew skeptical.

      --
      Dewey, what part of this looks like authorities should be involved?
    8. Re:Why is this automatically discredited? by cduffy · · Score: 1

      What they are claiming is not that the key can't be extracted from transmissions- a relatively humdrum requirement- but rather that unlimited physical access to the device cannot reveal the key, which I find dubious in the extreme.

      Has anyone cloned a Crypto iButton?

    9. Re:Why is this automatically discredited? by CodeBuster · · Score: 1

      There have been numerous devices that have claimed this in the past, only to fail miserably, and it seems pretty reasonable to assume that this will fail as well.

      Marketers and managers simply do not understand cryptography and security. To them it is all black magic. They will say whatever they think that they can get away with in order to promote their product whether it is true or not. If somebody calls them on it someday they will just plead ignorance of complex technical matters and claim that they were acting in "good faith belief" or else they will say that the "hackers" who broke in were just really good and that normal people cannot break in so it is good enough (forgetting that it only takes one smart horse to open the gate for the rest to follow).

    10. Re:Why is this automatically discredited? by physicsphairy · · Score: 1

      Actually, it is fairly simple to create a device for which unlimited physical access cannot find the key. You just make entropy part of the fabrication process.

      For example, maybe I swirl together some microscopic impurities in a bit of glass, and the precise x-ray diffraction pattern or whatever forms the key. It is very easy to make such a unique object, but the process of replication is infinitely more complex than the process of manufacture. Assuming it is even possible you would have to spend millions to accurately determine the location and substance of each impurity and then create a new object atom by atom.

      There are obviously countless such methods. However, it does not seem very purposeful to me to unite this with RFID. Digital radio is of course very easy to replicate, so to avoid replay attacks you would need the object to generate rolling keycodes. But the only way you could have a reader for the rolling codes would be to have capped your use complexity to where you object can be reverse-engineered.

      Really, you just need a more comprehensive diagnostic of the object than the radio signal it emits.

      But, paranoia aside, you don't actualy need to complexify RFID to the point of being unbreakable. You just need to complexify it to where the cost of breaking it exceeds the expected payoff to your potential thief, such that, even if he can theoretically break it, he just isn't going to bother with the trouble.

    11. Re:Why is this automatically discredited? by debatem1 · · Score: 1

      I'm sure you're making a point about the glass and diffraction, I'm just not sure what it is. An unkeyed one-way function is just a hash- a useful primitive to be certain, but it isn't going to provide you with the kind of security that this is claiming, especially since your example has no primary entropy, and is thus vulnerable to known plaintext attacks, which are particularly dangerous against this type of system.

      I'd also just like to point out that adding complexity to a cryptosystem is nearly always the worst way to secure it, and if you ever find yourself tempted to do so, I urge you to remember that anybody can make a cryptosystem that they're too stupid to break.

  14. So far, 2 for MIT... by BitterOldGUy · · Score: 1

    Come on! What's happened to Caltech, Georgia Tech, and Texas A&M?

    1. Re:So far, 2 for MIT... by getclear · · Score: 5, Funny

      Texas A&M may be able to find an organic replacement for the silicon used in the chip, and then implant it in farm animals to further research on the effects of "I can't beleive its NOT silicon" based RFID chips in them.

    2. Re:So far, 2 for MIT... by Tekfactory · · Score: 1

      What not Carbon Nanotubes?

    3. Re:So far, 2 for MIT... by mikiN · · Score: 1

      So here comes Dolly the cloned RFID sheep. No ear tag required, that'll go down nice with farmers. Cool...I mean Baaaah!

      --
      The Hacker's Guide To The Kernel: Don't panic()!
    4. Re:So far, 2 for MIT... by mikiN · · Score: 1

      Of course, it would be difficult to distinguish pure RFIDolly clones, but if the biocloning process is refined to have natural variation in DNA mutations during procreation influence the RFID payload, mate her with a (possibly preseeded) ram and there's no need to re-tag her offspring.

      --
      The Hacker's Guide To The Kernel: Don't panic()!
  15. Re:Press release and marketing hype. 1st paragraph by repvik · · Score: 1

    But he'll refuse to pay out when it has been cloned!

  16. How venture capital works by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

    1. Incredible claim
    2. Investors
    3. Profit!

    Somehow there's a product or service, but it's really corollary to the process...

    1. Re:How venture capital works by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      1. Incredible claim
      1A. Free publicity from Slashdot for making ridiculous claim
      2. Investors
      3. Profit!

  17. so -...err...right by shnull · · Score: 1

    uncloneable == not possible to hack therefore !valid ... ?

    --
    beware he who denies you access to information for in his mind, he already deems himself to be your master (SMAC-ish)
  18. Terrible marketing... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

    "DNA" is unclonable why, exactly?

    1. Re:Terrible marketing... by DrSkwid · · Score: 1

      Don't mention Polymerase chain reaction and we'll be alright.

      --
      There are places where the networks are not touching,and there are places where they are-Boeing's Lori Gunter
  19. duh! by MobyDisk · · Score: 4, Interesting

    From the illustration, it looks like a simple challenge response mechanism. All I have to say is: duh!

    So they finally added some form of authentication. This is what smart cards were supposed to be when I first heard about them 10 years ago. Simple RFID was never intended to be used for something secure: it was meant to replace bar codes or magnetic strips.

  20. Not for Active by brunes69 · · Score: 5, Informative

    What you are talking about is a passive RFID device, like most offense keycards from the 80's and early 90s. RFID nowadays is more complex, with the devices having a small computer chip in it that is actually powered up by the RFID. Having this chip allows secure encryption between the device and the terminal such that sniffing in on the conversation should get you no further than sniffing on a properly negotiated SSH session will.

    The hole in the scheme of course is, if the crook gets his hands on the keyfob for a short period of time, it is the same as having your SSH private key, and he can clone the chip in the keyfob and return the original without you even knowing.

    This company is saying they have a new chip that incorporates physical properties of the chip itself int the encryption somehow such that cloneing it would be recognizable.

    1. Re:Not for Active by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      1. compromised terminals

      2. gets his hands on the keyfob - more like sitting near you at a restaurant/bus/train/airpl

    2. Re:Not for Active by cduffy · · Score: 1

      2. gets his hands on the keyfob - more like sitting near you at a restaurant/bus/train/airpl

      No, really, hands. You don't transmit the private key over wireless, of course, just do challenge-response.

      And if the folks building this thing do their jobs right, it won't be possible to clone even then without (1) expensive equipment and people able to defeat the tamperproofing, and (2) destroying the device being inspected.

    3. Re:Not for Active by Strilanc · · Score: 1

      Even if they use physical properties of the chip you can still clone it. Your clone will simply contain a digital copy of the physical information, instead of actually measuring it every time like the original chip.

    4. Re:Not for Active by Fred+Ferrigno · · Score: 1

      It sounds like they do some sort of hash with a 64-bit challenge input to produce a 64-bit response. To exhaust all of the possibilities, you'd have to query the device 2^64 times then store 2^64*64 bits (128 exabytes) worth of responses.

      Unless the attacker happens to have a scanning electron microscope and barring some weakness in their hash, it actually sounds like it could be effective.

    5. Re:Not for Active by maxume · · Score: 1

      There is a good chance that the electron microscope wouldn't be of any help:

      http://slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=957201&cid=24923625

      (it all depends on if the advertised understanding of the PUF is true; if an attacker figures out an easy way to characterize the PUF, poof.)

      --
      Nerd rage is the funniest rage.
  21. Only one threat by Thelasko · · Score: 1

    Sure, it can allegedly stop them from being cloned, but what about read?

    --
    One of our competitors trademarked the term "hypothesis". From now on, we will call them "boneheaded ideas".
  22. Famous Last Words by ErichTheWebGuy · · Score: 1

    The gauntlet has been thrown down.

    --
    bash: rtfm: command not found
  23. Emulation/Spoofing by ZeroNullVoid · · Score: 1

    Fine, you have hardware limitations in hardware you control that prevent it from being directly cloned (as of now)... but how does it handle against someone spoofing it or emulating what is expected?

    If you make a reader that can detect a difference, you surly can create an emulation device to produce a sample of the difference back.

    If it's a matter of a mutating algorithm over time and reads, then it can be spoofed through reverse engineering and bruteforce to discover the seed and algorithm.

  24. Manufacture by flyingfsck · · Score: 1

    So, how do they manufacture these things? Obviously there must be a way to copy them.

    --
    Excuse me, but please get off my Pennisetum Clandestinum, eh!
  25. "Unclonable", eh? by SamSim · · Score: 2, Insightful

    That sounds like a wager to me!

  26. Obligatory by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

    The war for clones, begun they have.

  27. I call BS... by g0dsp33d · · Score: 1

    If it is predictable, then there's a series of characters its expected to send under a given condition and it can be cloned.

    Otherwise it is random and can not be differentiated from others.

    --
    lol: You see no door there!
  28. Unique PKI keys (DNA?) Re:Fairly straightforward by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    If they can manufacture them and distribute them in bulk, with unique private keys for each RFID chip, but still have it be cheap enough, then en masse yeah, they'd be un-hackable. In specific single units though, it'd just be a matter of time, as it always is.

    All that is of course assuming that they'd actually succeed at implementing the whole mess without leaving exploit gates open.

  29. World's first "Unclonable" RFID Chip cloner by brennz · · Score: 3, Funny

    August 4, 2009
    Hackers at the annual DEFCON conference have announced they have succeeded in cloning the "unclonable" RFID chip. Jerry "Botnet" Goldblatt led the effort in defeating the security on the RFID chip. According to Jerry, "Cloning the 'unclonable' RFID chip was even easier than breaking Oracle's 'unbreakable' Linux. It just goes to show that marketing runs IT." The team is now accepting donations of Red Bull, Grey Goose and Hawaiian skunk as they add a module to metasploit to further simplify the attack.

    1. Re:World's first "Unclonable" RFID Chip cloner by MarkGriz · · Score: 2, Funny

      The team is now accepting donations of Red Bull, Grey Goose and Hawaiian skunk as they add a module to metasploit to further simplify the attack.

      Later that day.... "The team is now accepting donations for their legal defense fund."

      --
      Beauty is in the eye of the beerholder.
    2. Re:World's first "Unclonable" RFID Chip cloner by jonaskoelker · · Score: 1

      Unfortunately, parent is ha-ha-only-serious.

      The ha-ha- part is good, but there's a tendency to try to achieve good security by shutting up the people who explain why the bad stuff is bad.

      Remember Dmitry Sklyarov, the Russian programmer who got imprisoned for five months in 2001 for saying that eBooks were encrypted with (so my story goes) essentially ROT-13?

      Remember Black Hat (I don't recall which year), where Cisco tried to shut up a couple of dudes for pointing out Cisco's bad security?

      Remember Ed Felten, who was bullied into shutting up about the findings of his research, which he was encouraged to do by the very people who later tried to shut him up? (I think it was on watermarking music). He was allowed to speak at a later date.

      When it comes to IT security, blame the guilty parties: those who deliver bad security, not those who uncover it.

      I'm not sure how well the principles of IT security applies to non-IT security, since most IT-security can be made nigh-unbreakable in most scenarios with good crypto and a little bit of the right hardware (i.e. CPUs with ring 0 and ring 3).

  30. I like strong statements... by Ecuador · · Score: 1

    So, is it unclonable like the Titanic was unsinkable?

    --
    Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent. Polar Scope Align for iOS
  31. No, just very, very difficult to do right. by OmniGeek · · Score: 4, Informative

    In theory (crypto theory), this can be done if the parties communicating have a shared secret piece of data and a crypto algorithm, resistant to reverse-engineering from outside, that enables them to exchange that secret data without eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle attacks, or a brute-force cracking of the crypto algorithm.

    This is quite hard to do properly in general, as the plethora of lousy cryptosystems attests. It *can* be done if one has enough processing power (tough for RFID chips that operate from microwatts of someone else's broadcast RF energy) and a good enough encryption algorithm (see "lousy cryptosystems" above).

    Of course, if you can duplicate the data content and algorithms of the RFID chip, say by physically dismantling it layer-by-layer with a destructive analysis, you can clone it even if you don't know the shared secret. The article is claiming (without ANY credible evidence, BTW) to have somehow made this impossible, presumably by creating some random-but-repeatable property in the chip that cannot be extracted by analysis for reproduction in a cloned chip. Unless they've come up with something VERY effective, I'd bet on this system being cracked within months just like all the other RFID schemes. The lack of description or references to how their system works smells like bad crypto and security-by-obscurity to me.

    --

    "My strength is as the strength of ten men, for I am wired to the eyeballs on espresso."
    1. Re:No, just very, very difficult to do right. by quo_vadis · · Score: 1

      Destructive analysis wont work if they are using a coating PUF. There are many crypto algorithms which work with low power requirements. Additionally, Veryao is a based on work done by Dr. Srini Devdas who is a pioneer in the area of PUFs

      --
      Legally obligatory sig : My opinions are my own... etc etc
    2. Re:No, just very, very difficult to do right. by BitZtream · · Score: 1

      All crypto is security through obscurity.

      --
      Persistent Volume manager for Kubernetes - https://github.com/dwimsey/openshift-pvmanager
    3. Re:No, just very, very difficult to do right. by ps_inkling · · Score: 1

      Of course, if you can duplicate the data content and algorithms of the RFID chip, say by physically dismantling it layer-by-layer with a destructive analysis, you can clone it even if you don't know the shared secret. The article is claiming (without ANY credible evidence, BTW) to have somehow made this impossible, presumably by creating some random-but-repeatable property in the chip that cannot be extracted by analysis for reproduction in a cloned chip.

      Wasn't there a problem with the SID chip on the Commodore 64, where the filter section came out differently on different SID chip lots? Wiki mentions it briefly; I remember some games gave the ability to disable the SID filter if it sounded pants.
      I would conjecture that it is possible to spec a circuit that would have the potential to have unique characteristics per chip. Or just design it so that 2.0 + 2.0 = 4.00000013 or 3.99999985 or other random number because of a silicon flaw unique to each chip.

    4. Re:No, just very, very difficult to do right. by TwistedSymmetry · · Score: 1

      Of course, if you can duplicate the data content and algorithms of the RFID chip, say by physically dismantling it layer-by-layer with a destructive analysis, you can clone it even if you don't know the shared secret. The article is claiming (without ANY credible evidence, BTW) to have somehow made this impossible, presumably by creating some random-but-repeatable property in the chip that cannot be extracted by analysis for reproduction in a cloned chip.

      It's simple. The RFID chips have souls! Hey, it works for humans. Right???

    5. Re:No, just very, very difficult to do right. by TwistedSymmetry · · Score: 1

      Actually (and to reply seriously this time), couldn't they just put an information source inside the chip that would be destroyed upon any tampering? Unless you put it through some sort of hypothetical high-resolution scanning device, this seems like it would be mostly foolproof. (Even here it could maybe detect the scan and self-destruct then).

      Of course, these guys haven't done this. But it should work in principle. Heck, someone who knows more about physics could probably think of something better. Would quantum cryptography (or something of that sort) within the chip make any sense?

    6. Re:No, just very, very difficult to do right. by mstahl · · Score: 1

      With a good cryptosystem, even intimate knowledge of the system's operation should not give an attacker sufficient information to break it. Also, in the case of, say, a one-time pad (wiki wiki wiki), the cryptography is absolute security, and knowing how a OTP cipher works won't help you at all to break it. Read the wikipedia article for the theoretical caveats that go along with that statement ;).

      Knowing all about how Diffie-Helman works, to pick another simple example, doesn't really help you when breaking it quickly requires a polynomial-time solution to the Discrete Log problem. Find one of those and you'll be famous!

    7. Re:No, just very, very difficult to do right. by dead_one · · Score: 1

      You consider obtaining the data content and algorithms by physically dismantling the chip, but I think the whole point of PUFs is that the physical structure of the chip is part of its data content, and thus would also have to be recorded in a reproducible fashion in order to clone.

      There was a talk on this at last year's Elliptic Curve Crypto workshop by Pim Tuyls of Philips, but the slides aren't available online (the problem of working in industry instead of academia I guess- everyone elses are available). Doesn't take long to google up papers on the theoretical basis, but I can't rememeber how far along they were at the hardware level unfortunately.

    8. Re:No, just very, very difficult to do right. by WindShadow · · Score: 1
      Your last paragraph is the key to the value of a chip like this, if the only way to clone it is molecule-by-molecule replication, it will be a "secure" chip as long as the cost of replication is significantly greater than the value of having a copy.

      There's also the time value, the cloning needs to be done before the value of having a clone decreases, and if you need to have physical posession of the original your options are further limited.

      I think this chip could be highly useful just by being secure against electronic evesdropping.

  32. They used Unclonable and DNA in the same sentence by cutecub · · Score: 5, Interesting

    The use of language is strange.

    Unclonable: cannot be cloned
    DNA: a molecule that clones itself.

    Its not the best choice of marketing metaphor.

    Its like saying that an event is possibly inevitable.

    -Sean

  33. Even a unique chip can be cloned in principle by davidwr · · Score: 1

    What this boils down to is that each chip is unique in the hardware or hardware+firmware.

    In order to clone one, you have to manufacture a new chip. A determined adversary such as a government or a well-heeled competitor with access to electron microscopes and similar technology may be able to clone a particular chip.

    They shouldn't advertise "unclonable." Instead, they should advertise "heavily clone-resistant."

    One way to make it harder is to embed the unique parts in a tamper=destruct casing, so any attempt to peek inside will cause the circuits to change in a hard-to-reverse-engineer before they can be analyzed.

    Even 20 years ago, certain chips used by the military had to be encased in tamper-resistant or at least tamper-evident casing to deter espionage. In order for a particular to chip to be "unclonable," it must not fall into the hands of someone with the will and means to clone it. Making it self-destruct-on-inspection goes a long way to raising the cost of any cloning attempt.

    --
    Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
    1. Re:Even a unique chip can be cloned in principle by DrSkwid · · Score: 1
      --
      There are places where the networks are not touching,and there are places where they are-Boeing's Lori Gunter
  34. Re:Press release and marketing hype. 1st paragraph by hotdiggitydawg · · Score: 3, Funny

    I couldn't guess how soon it'll happen, but I'll tell you what sound it'll make when it does: "PUF"

  35. Re:Uh Huh? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    If it's that far away and offline, how do you know I didn't install one too?

  36. Summary for those that didn't RTFA by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    According to their pdf, the chip is manufactured in such a way that each chip has physical flaws due to the manufacturing process that are "impossible" to duplicate. These flaws are then used in a challenge/response mechanism to provide authentication for the chip. Basically, after you manufacture the chip you feed a bunch of challenges into the chip and then record the responses "in a database". Once the chip is deployed, you can issue one of the same challenges and see if the response is the same as what you have stored.

    1. Re:Summary for those that didn't RTFA by IndustrialComplex · · Score: 1

      Wouldn't it then be trivial to clone a chip for each challenge?

      Challenge A = Response: 234211
      Challenge B = Response: 328058
      .
      .
      .

      --
      Out of modpoints but really liked a post? 1BDkF6TtmmeZ3yqXbz9yhdYVqRYnwFoXDj
    2. Re:Summary for those that didn't RTFA by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Wouldn't it then be trivial to clone a chip for each challenge?

      Challenge A = Response: 234211 Challenge B = Response: 328058 . . .

      Challenge 2^64 = 234256
      Hope you have a lot of time.
      If each challenge takes 1 ms, thats about humm humm 500000000 years?

  37. Where did this idea come from? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    "Well, we were watching Prison Break, and we figured that we can't have that happening all willy-nilly!"

  38. Santa? by ZeroNullVoid · · Score: 1

    I am sure jolly ole santa clause can clone them in his/her/their workshop.

    You do know the elves only make one of each toy and then send them through a cloner that assembles every quark identical to the original, including the elves fingerprints.

  39. Worst... analogy... ever by Arthur+B. · · Score: 0, Redundant

    Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF), sort of an electronic DNA for silicon chips.

    The very essence of DNA is self replication.

    --
    \u262D = \u5350
    1. Re:Worst... analogy... ever by starglider29a · · Score: 2, Funny

      Right. I'd be worried less about their cloning, and more about if you put two in the same area, you end up with a litter of them!

  40. Re:Press release and marketing hype. 1st paragraph by Beardo+the+Bearded · · Score: 1

    Maybe Unclonable(TM) is the brand name.

    I wouldn't give it to the end of the year, unless it doesn't come out until xmas time.

    Hey, wouldn't a warranty replacement be kind of hard to find?

    --

    ---
    ECHELON is a government program to find words like bomb, jihad, plutonium, assassinate, and anarchy.
  41. Re:Cloned... by debatem1 · · Score: 1

    Is it ironic to mod this redundant?

  42. Re:Private Keys by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

    This is how DVD encryption was broken. The theory was fine, but there was no way to secure the private keys when they were included in every shipped device. "DVD John" (IIRC) lifted the private key from Xing's player and it was game over for DVD encryption. I believe this happened within six months of when DVD players began shipping.

  43. Re:Press release and marketing hype. 1st paragraph by Bandman · · Score: 1

    Then complain that the clone doesn't function according to his definition of the word, and that anyone who cloned it like that was just /asking/ for trouble anyway

  44. Don't... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    ...taunt the hackers...

  45. Re:Press release and marketing hype. 1st paragraph by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    It totally depends on the actual implementation. Unclonability is certainly possible, in the sense that cloning would require the destruction of the chip and is likely to fail anyway. It would require rather elaborate calculations on the RFID chip though. "Electronic DNA" and "fingerprinting" don't quite sound like the chip uses an internal secret and cryptographic functions to protect the secret. It sounds more like they use an analog implementation detail which differs from chip to chip and is currently "too difficult" to replicate close enough. That is certainly clonable nondestructively, given sufficiently expensive high frequency radio technology.

  46. Blackbox engineering. by jameskojiro · · Score: 1

    Why clone it when it is easier to mimic it's output?

    --
    Tsukasa: All I really want, is to be left alone...
    1. Re:Blackbox engineering. by Tweenk · · Score: 1

      If the challenge and response are 64 bits each, you would need 128 exabytes of data to store all possible challenge/response pairs... I think it's easier to steal the original.

      --
      Those who would give up liberty to obtain working drivers, deserve neither liberty nor working drivers.
  47. DVD-Jon to become RFID-Jon? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    This sounds suspiciously similar to how DVD's are encrypted. The key is unique to each DVD and then an encryption algorithm was supposed to make the DVD unreadable to law-abiding consumers.

    We all know how well that worked out.

    It also seems to me that the concept of an unclonable RFID is an oxymoron. On the one hand, a mass-produced electronic device, on the other unique identifiers that are not intrinsic the the manufacturing process. In addition, the chips must work with each other. In short two competing and mutually exclusive imperatives.

    What happens when the chip in my iGadget get zapped by my overly precocious 4-year old in the microwave? How can I prove legitimacy?

    It is certain to end up in the courts.

  48. Re:They used Unclonable and DNA in the same senten by cinnamon+colbert · · Score: 1

    on a strict grammatical basis, you have a point.
    In terms of how scientists actually use the words "clonable" and "unclonable": clonable means you can get copies of the original DNA molecule to replicate inside a new cell, either from the same organism or a different organism.
    In many cases, DNA that is quite happy in one cell type is not happy in another; this was a big problem in the human genome project, as most of the work was done with human dna cloned into E coli, and there is a lot of human dna that is very unhappy in E coli ie, uncloanble.
    another part of clonable is that in vivo, most DNA exists as long (> 1e6 bases long) molecules, and most clone (pace BACs, Pacs, YACs, etc) is much shorter. If you chop up DNA, you can remove control sequences, and make the dna unclonable, eg if you had the gene for cell death, which is normally OFF becuase next to the gene is an OFF signal, and you try to clone a piece that lacks the OFF signal, you might kill every cell the dna gets into - functanally, the dna is unclonable.

  49. Introduction of a delay by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Heres my theory...

    The RFID chip identifies itself with the RFID receiver, allowing to the receiver to lookup the chips encryption keys and respond with a password. Now all communications are encrypted. In order for the chip to communicate it has to encrypt its transmission, so the chip requests the key from a separate chip. The separate chip will only respond with the key if it has the correct password that was received during the handshake.

    In order to thwart a brute force attack, the separate chip has a built in delay to prevent multiple failed attempts. Now the key that is returned by this chip is probably some sort of physical fingerprint unique to the chip.

    1. Re:Introduction of a delay by FormOfActionBanana · · Score: 1

      I think if an attacker listens to the handshake conversation with a reader, your model leaves a replay attack vector.

      Also, by "physical fingerprint" do you mean "electronic fingerprint"? I thought a physical fingerprint only comes from a human finger. If I'm being dumb today, sorry.

      --
      Take off every 'sig' !!
  50. What the heck are they talking about?? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Hybrid Smart cards that do Card To Card Reader security contactlessly and on card crypto can do this now. RFID is fundamentally a type of smart card (a dumb one). Are they now claim to have slapped "RFID" on a (decent) smartcard and claiming an innovation or am I missing something??

    If you want unclonable you want a smartcard not an RFID tag. To call the latter RFID is dumb. It is just going to cause confusion.

  51. A short primer on PUFs by quo_vadis · · Score: 5, Informative

    This chip utilizes PUFs (so called Physically Unclonable Functions). These are currently a hot topic of research, especially in the secure embedded computing community.

    The fundamental idea is that a PUF should produce a unique value for a chip, in a repeatable fashion, with a side effect that modification of the chip will be detectable.

    PUFs are of 4 main types -
    1. Optical - These are the oldest forms of PUFs. They started with physicists trying to use chips as diffraction gratings. You shine a laser at the silicon vias and record the signature of light. These require depackaging the chip in question and are mostly impractical
    2. Silicon - Usually implemented as long delay lines, but are sensitive to environmental conditions (mainly temperature & injected faults) There remains an ongoing research attempt to make these better (less reliant on environmental factors)
    3. Coating - These are currently considered one of the best forms of PUFs. The topmost layer of the chip has some embedded metal flakes. The bottom layer of the chip has a capacitance sensor. Since the distribution of the metal flakes is random, the capacitance is random and unique to each chip (the resolution of the capacitance sensor is tuned to ensure this). This method has the added advantage that the minute someone tries to attack the chip, by depackaging it, the capacitance changes and the chips data (usually the secret key for an encryption cipher such as AES/DES) can be wiped. The main problem is that it adds a few extra fab steps , which means it increases the cost. Additionally, the first calibration costs more money to do.

    4. Intrinsic - These are the current area of research. In particular for FPGAs. As any hardware designer knows, RAM cells are initalized to random values, but most FPGAs have some small logic which resets them all to zero. If we remove that logic, we have a chip, which has a whole bunch of random numbers, which will usually initialize the same way, based on process variation etc. This technique has been shown for FPAGs and will probably be brought over soon to full scale chips.

    In order to keep this short, i have omitted a lot of references, but you can find more info, about intrinsic PUFS here.

    Actually Phillips does a lot of research with PUFs and I am surprised that Verayo claims to be the first maker of PUF based chips.

    --
    Legally obligatory sig : My opinions are my own... etc etc
    1. Re:A short primer on PUFs by FormOfActionBanana · · Score: 1

      ...the minute someone tries to attack the chip, by depackaging it, the capacitance changes and the chips data (usually the secret key for an encryption cipher such as AES/DES) can be wiped.

      But where does the power come from to wipe the keys?

      I would figure the attacker would just physically destroy the little battery or capacitor first. Then he just opens the device and reads the key at his leisure.

      --
      Take off every 'sig' !!
    2. Re:A short primer on PUFs by quo_vadis · · Score: 2, Informative

      Traditional depackaging attacks are carried out by depackaging the chip, attaching probes to the interesting testpoints, and then powering the circuit. No power also means that it is hard for the attacker to read the value, as it depends on how good (i.e. low leakage) the transistors are that make up the RAM (usually they will leak the value in a few milliseconds). The key for encryption is typically 128 - 512 bits, which is very easy to clear.

      You can read more about coating based PUFs here
      Basically, I simplified it, but what actually happens is that the key (the signature from the PUF) is generated, used and deleted as one step. For the additional step of deletion of data on the chip, that can be easily accomplished by using gating transistors on the reset line of the SRAM.

      --
      Legally obligatory sig : My opinions are my own... etc etc
    3. Re:A short primer on PUFs by quo_vadis · · Score: 4, Informative

      I realize its bad form to reply to my comment, but I would like to add a bit about how authentication works using PUFs

      When the chip is manufactured, the device creator records the original response of the chip to a series of challenges and calls this reponse vector r'. When a chip is powered up, it energizes the PUF circuitry and records the output into the internal PUF value register(k). Next, when the chip (usually a passive RFID) needs to be authenticated, the external party sends a challenge. The challenge (c) is processed through some encryption mechanism (called f() )using the key (the saved PUF register value) to produce a response(r).(For those keeping track at home, r = f(c,k)). This response is sent back to external party. The external party sends n such requests and compares the received response vector to the expected response vector (r') if r and r' are the same, then the chip is authenticated and work continues.

      Of course, like any normal physical phenomenon, there is some variation between any two power ups. Thus, the key might change. In order to compensate for this, the key is calculated to be the codeword of some code with a long length. Then, for each subsequent power up, the new key(k') is decoded using nearest neighbor decoding as a codeword of the same code. Finally, the distance of the new key(k') and the expected key(k) is stored into a special vector(l), which is reapplied to key produced at next power up.

      So, to clear up a few questions -
      1. Its not like OTP (one time pad) encoding, because a unique challenge should produce a given response for a unique chip every time
      2. It is not meant to be the only encryption being used. There is usually a second code on the set of challenges to ensure that the challenge vector being created is itself part of a code.
      3. Man in the Middle & duplication attacks should be hard as the device manufacturer can release a small subset of real challenges and could always hold back some challenges, which it can use to be completely sure. Additionally, it may release different sets of challenges to different customers.

      --
      Legally obligatory sig : My opinions are my own... etc etc
  52. absurd by ILuvRamen · · Score: 1

    Okay so it can't be "cloned" but with any RFID chip or any wireless device really, you don't have to clone or fake anything. This makes it sound easier than it is but basically you just record what it beams over wirelessly and then repeat it and tada, it thinks you're the original chip. You don't have to decrypt it or even know what it is you're beaming over, just broadcast exactly what the original one did and it thinks you're that one as long as it doesn't change every time. That could be a problem for passports and those badge sensor things at workplaces. Not so much for chips that don't repeat the same thing over and over though but who uses them for that?

    --
    Google's Super Secret Search Algorithm: SELECT @search_results FROM internet WHERE @search_results = 'good'
  53. Re:Private Keys by Rakishi · · Score: 1

    I doubt it's a problem with most rfid installations since the reader needs to verify the tag against some central database. Thus you can now have a unique private key for each tag while storing the unique public tag in the database. If any private key is retrieved then it can be simply disabled in the database without problems. DVDs can't do this because they need to work on stand-alone non-networked players.

  54. Sure it does by gardyloo · · Score: 4, Funny

    Plan 9 from User Space.

  55. Re:Press release and marketing hype. 1st paragraph by alta · · Score: 1

    Yeah yeah, and then he'll tell you that qmail is so secure it's never needed patching. The truth is, he's tired of it and will never WANT to patch it.

    --
    Do not meddle in the affairs of sysadmins, for they are subtle, and quick to anger.
  56. Re:Press release and marketing hype. 1st paragraph by pcolaman · · Score: 1

    I'll take that action, I'm splitting my bet, half to MacGuyver, who does it with lemon juice, a ball of twine and pencil lead, and the other half on Visa and Mastercard, who then patent the process of cloning and sue anyone who tries into oblivion.

  57. This is bigger than the Beatles!!! by Phizzle · · Score: 1

    "electronic DNA for silicon chips" Do you grasp the full meaning of this people?!?!? THEY CREATED ARTIFICIAL LIFE! And it all started with a humble search for improved RFID...

    --
    I will not be pushed, filed, stamped, indexed, briefed, debriefed or numbered. My life is my own.
  58. I'm skeptical by wfstanle · · Score: 1

    All these claims of "unclonable", "unhackable" etc. are probably untrue. It's sort of like the claims that were made about locks. All that a lock does is to keep the honest man honest. A lock works by delaying the intruder long enough to catch him. If someone wants to overcome your security and has enough time, they will prevail. All that good security does is to buy you some time. If Fort Knox had only the locks and vaults but nobody watching, thieves would eventually get in.

  59. Re:Press release and marketing hype. 1st paragraph by machine321 · · Score: 1

    Why, was it developed by djb?

  60. If it bleeds, we can kill it by CorporateSuit · · Score: 2, Funny

    If it reads, we can clone it

    --
    I am the richest astronaut ever to win the superbowl.
  61. Hell with cloning. Bury the technology in bullshit by Anachragnome · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Seriously.

    All one would have to do, provided there is a limited amount of responses (which seems plausible considering it is embedded in the chip), just carpet-bomb the RFID with queries. Burn up all them responses, and "Presto!", useless chip. And THAT could be done while some guy is standing next to you on the subway. Get to work and the fucking thing doesn't function anymore.

    Now, if they used a rotating list of responses, the same carpet-bombing would reveal that, eventually resulting in a list of correct responses to queries.

    Yay for ineffective technology!

    If nothing else, it will inhibit the use of them if people that have them for legitimate uses find them unusable all the time.

  62. Wouldn't it be nice by hey! · · Score: 1

    if we could take a young child, possessor of the greatest marvel known to biological or computational science, namely a brain, and manage to educate that child so he had a statistically reasonable chance of not growing up to think like a moron?

    The specific moronity I have in mind is all or nothing thinking.

    There is not a safe in the world that cannot be opened without its combination or keys. That's why you don't rely on a safe to be perfect. You have burglar alarms, surveillance cameras, and frequent physical checking. A good safe turn out to be highly useful, if you understand its limitations. But even a very good safe can be worse than useless if you believe it to be impenetrable.

    Any artifact which is subjected to the scrutiny of hostile ingenuity will fall to that ingenuity. So you don't buy anything with the idea that it is magical unbreakable pixie dust you can sprinkle on a problem. Anybody selling magical unbreakable pixie dust is selling to people they think are morons. So caveat emptor.

    Now, if somebody said they are selling clone resistant RFID tags, that's interesting. How resistant? Even just a little resistant may in some cases have a great deal of value, for example where the value of what is protected by the technology exceeds the cost of effort to duplicate it.

    --
    Post may contain irony: discontinue use if experiencing mood swings, nausea or elevated blood pressure.
  63. no way dude by bechthros · · Score: 1

    household hacker. and he'll do it with an onion, some gatorade, and a penny.

    but the penny has to be REALLY SHINY.

    1. Re:no way dude by pcolaman · · Score: 1

      too bad the penny was probably stolen and melted down for the copper.

    2. Re:no way dude by pcolaman · · Score: 1

      If it was stolen, then the net cost to obtain the copper is $0.00. So it matters not the value of the copper in the current 1982 and beyond penny.

    3. Re:no way dude by sexconker · · Score: 1

      1983 called.

    4. Re:no way dude by pcolaman · · Score: 1

      ...and said, "if you steal me, it doesn't fucking matter how much content of copper I have, because you didn't fucking pay for me, bitch!"

    5. Re:no way dude by spun · · Score: 1

      You either didn't read the linked page, or didn't understand the implications. A penny is worth more as a penny than melted down. That's not even counting the cost to melt it and separate out the copper from the zinc. The total value of the metals in a post 1982 penny is worth less than a penny. Now do you understand?

      --
      - None can love freedom heartily, but good men; the rest love not freedom, but license. -- John Milton
    6. Re:no way dude by pcolaman · · Score: 1

      Was your sense of humor always missing, or did they take it when they stole the pennies?

    7. Re:no way dude by spun · · Score: 1

      Humor? I think you are backpedaling. You made reference to pennies being melted down for copper. You were corrected on this. Rather than admitting you were wrong, you angrily attempted to defend your penny-melting position by claiming that stolen pennies might be melted down, utterly missing the point that they would then be worth less. I did read the whole thread here, including all of your replies. You weren't posting in jest, you just hate that you were corrected in public.

      ...and said, "if you steal me, it doesn't fucking matter how much content of copper I have, because you didn't fucking pay for me, bitch!"

      Your words. Not funny, angry.

      If it was stolen, then the net cost to obtain the copper is $0.00. So it matters not the value of the copper in the current 1982 and beyond penny.

      Your words. Not funny, serious.

      What the fuck is Guyver. I said MacGuyver, and I didn't fucking stutter. Were you born in the 90's? If so, get back to your homework, son.

      Your words. Not funny, angry again.

      --
      - None can love freedom heartily, but good men; the rest love not freedom, but license. -- John Milton
  64. Oh, shit. Nobody tell Sony. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

    Wait till Sony gets a hold of this idea. You'll be buying your movies in 1 second clips each stored on a different RFID chip.
     
    DRM, it's for the greater good.

  65. How it works (I think) and possible attacks by Tweenk · · Score: 3, Interesting

    The chip is not a public key crypto device; it looks like it has an unique hashing function built in. The system is based on a manufacturer-controlled database of message and digest values. Once the RFID reader detects this chip, it gets its ID and sends to the manufacturer database; the database sends back a one-time message for the chip to hash (the one-time thing is crucial - it guarantees that a given challenge will not be sent twice, so no replay attack and no MITM on the network connection from the reader to the manufacturer DB). The digest is sent back and if the stored digest and the one returned by the reader match, the chip's identity is confirmed. It seems that the manufacturer builds a database of message / digest values after getting the chip from the vendor treating it as a black box device, and the hashing algorithm never leaves the RFID vendor.

    The chip might also be a stateful device, but this would introduce many problems (if the manufacturer DB gets out of sync with the chip, it's useless).

    I think that obtaining the original chip (stealing it) would be always easier than duplicating it with this system. To successfully attack it (convince an uncompromised reader that you have the true chip) you would have to:

    a) Record all possible responses to all possible challenges from the original chip. I think this is the way the system is particularly resilient to - if the message and response are at least 64 bits long, or there is any delay, then it is impossible.

    b) Replicate the chip physically, using a microscope. This is theoretically possible but would be extremely costly, and probably unfeasible.

    c) Steal the hashing algorithm from the RFID vendor. This would give you next to nothing if the hashing algorithm used a seed that is never broadcast from the chip (eg. serial # from the picture), so you would have to resort to b) to get it.

    d) Steal the C/R database from the manufacturer. This is probably the easiest way, but the manufacturer can't notice or you have to steal the data for very many chips, making revoking them all a major blow for the company.

    The main idea here is not being able to construct a fake chip based on data the real chip broadcasts.

    Any other ideas?

    --
    Those who would give up liberty to obtain working drivers, deserve neither liberty nor working drivers.
    1. Re:How it works (I think) and possible attacks by broomer · · Score: 1

      at a: 1. if the manufacturer has all challenge-responses combo's for all chips, and need to verify them in real time, they need a very big server-farm, and any network-fault would kill the response-time. (or the system)

      2. delay-time is not acceptable in a RFID-card:
      bleep-bleep---read fault, you need to wait 5 minutes to try again... likely missed my train.

    2. Re:How it works (I think) and possible attacks by Tweenk · · Score: 1

      re 1: They only need a small subset of the combinations, equivalent to the expected maximum number of times a given chip is to be identified. 1024 pairs should be more than enough. Network faults would also kill credit card terminals yet everyone is cool with using them.
      re 2: The delay is only to prevent copying all possible responses, so a few milliseconds is enough.

      --
      Those who would give up liberty to obtain working drivers, deserve neither liberty nor working drivers.
  66. doesn't help much by speedtux · · Score: 1

    While the physically random properties can't be cloned, any digital system must derive a digitized, binary version of that signature, and that can be cloned.

    In the end, this gives you a little extra security relative to just putting a bunch of bits in a PROM, but not much.

  67. Authorizing ... please wait. by meist3r · · Score: 2, Insightful

    So every one of these chips has to be synched with a central database? Good luck speeding up clocking times with that. And if there are multiple databases you surely could also circumvent one to make a chip work for you. Why not just give me a key for anything again? At least that can't be copied just by walking past my pocket.

  68. Major Malfunction by 0x000000 · · Score: 1

    There is a new contender in the ring!

    --
    cat /dev/null > .signature
  69. By the time... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    you get done reading this message, it will have been cloned.

  70. Re:From the same folks that brought you the unsink by networkconsultant · · Score: 1

    And the Hindenburg!

  71. I am to much of a pothead ! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I parsed puf as puff and I asked myself what were they smoking....

    capcha insipid how insightful

  72. Hey slashdot! I know what are you doing. by dvh.tosomja · · Score: 0

    I've seen articles like theese before, on slashdot. They have one thing in common, few hours or days later, the completely opossed topic is submited on /.

    I claim original poster (OP) allready has a proof that it can be hacked.

    How it works?

    1. OP accidentally find shocking article (vendor is usually some unknown company)
    2. OP search for older, usualy bit boring article which claim oposit and post it here
    3. Wait 1 day
    4. Post article from #1
    5. Profit

  73. Used bad example in OP by dontmakemethink · · Score: 2, Informative

    a new RFID chip from Verayo claims to be unclonable through the use of the new Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF), sort of an electronic DNA for silicon chips.

    DNA is cloneable. In fact, DNA routinely clones itself. Hell, the word "cloning" refers directly to DNA manipulation. Saying uncloneable like DNA is like saying it's unspreadable like peanut butter. The OP should refer to fingerprints, a unique physical assignment that can only be duplicated physically.

    The crucial part is that the PUF must be packaged with reading hardware/firmware, such that you can't access the PUF without physically breaking in, disrupting the PUF rendering it invalid. And even if the key was effectively "sampled", the damage should quickly result in the termination of the key's access permissions, before a substitute could do much damage.

    Also it would be difficult to clone many original keys, since they would have to come into a hacker's physical possession, though it may be easy to make many copies of one key. Kind of moot when it's been cancelled.

    Sounds like a step forward, from magnetic strip cards at least!

    --

    War as we knew it was obsolete
    Nothing could beat complete denial
    - Emily Haines
  74. These people are a joke... by Chineseyes · · Score: 1

    Secure and "Passive RFID" should never be used in the same sentence. Let us completely ignore the fact that the rfid tag is going to have a a finite number of challenge respone pairs which makes this scheme a total joke. You will never see a secure passive rfid system because there isn't enough energy transferred to power a circuit with a scheme complicated enough to pull this off. Active RFID could be secured to the point where it would be effectively uncloneable, but it would still be pretty difficult.

    --
    I think the invisible hand of the market has its middle finger extended

    --A wise old fart named SC0RN
  75. Stradivarius Clone by toddhisattva · · Score: 1

    The fiddle freaks of the world have yet to clone a Stradivarius.

    Every bottle of wine tastes different to wine snobs.

    In principle it is possible to make absolutely unique items.

    In practice you just have to make cloning prohibitively expensive.

    So when something's clonable iff you have a spare wafer fab capable of handling interesting geometries and strange substrates, or the signal is clonable iff you're willing to haul around a quarter ton of DSP racks, then it's _practically_ unclonable.

    Really you folks, need to be thinking more Stradivarius, or Stevie Ray's Stratocaster, and cogitating on the way your brain can identify a song given just a fraction of a second, to understand how even cheap RFID tags can be made practically unclonable.

    And I'm only thinking of passive tags and tiny amounts of power.

    Wasn't Ted Glum's talk at COMDEF-2008 fascinating?

  76. Perhaps the next /. survey should be... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    how many weeks until this is broken?

  77. 1990s-style Butthead Response... by Dogtanian · · Score: 1

    But you couldn't just swipe someone's butt

    Uh, is that like an ass-swipe? Huh huh huh....

    --
    "Slashdot - News and Chat Sites Deviant". (Click "homepage" link above for details).
  78. Hooray for unclonable! by Nerdposeur · · Score: 1

    I, for one, take all marketing messages at face value.

    I don't know what's up with you guys.

  79. Fascist gov'ts drool... by harrie_o · · Score: 0

    Fascist gov'ts drool... maybe this will finally be the chip that goes into our necks?

    IT folks designing stuff that cannot be defeated remind me of the Nazi scientists and all those experiments Germany was so interested in that filled our nightmares in the 63 years since.

    Why are they (maybe you?) helping them, hmmm?

  80. Clone Pool by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    My money is on MIT, within two weeks.

  81. safe? by WeeBit · · Score: 1

    "No other chip or device can be disguised as the original chip, even if the data is copied from one Verayo RFID chip to another."

    So because it can still be copied... is "that" suppose to make us feel more safe?

    Oh wait! it's not the original!

    blah... I thought the idea was to be copy proof, as well as "safe, and secure data"? Guess not.

  82. Re:From the same folks that brought you the unsink by drachenstern · · Score: 1

    And the frist complete, correct, ontopic slashdot pos

    --
    2^3 * 31 * 647
  83. remind anyone of that quote from bioshock? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    "Sure, the boys in Ryan's lab can make it hack-proof. But that don't mean we ain't gonna hack it." -- Pablo Navarro

  84. Cue Ralph Wiggum... by Mister+Whirly · · Score: 1

    Unclonable? That's unpossible!

    --
    "But this one goes to 11!"
    1. Re:Cue Ralph Wiggum... by Samizdata · · Score: 1

      You preemptively cloned my response, you insensitive clod!

      --
      It's not the years, honey, it's the mileage. - Colonel Henry Walton Jones, Jr., Ph.D.
  85. Market-Speak Semantics by eskwayrd · · Score: 1

    Most of the comments here are from people who are getting tripped up on the market-speak. When they say 'unclonable', most of us here think 'not possible to copy'. And this idea is reinforced with the idea of PUFs, so it's understandable you'd think this way.

    However, I think they mean 'not clonable AND still functional'.

    See, there's one thing they are doing that other RFID implementors have typically avoided, which is communication with a central database. When you have that, you don't have physical access to the central store, so that is, by itself, a (or the) PUF.

    Couple that with read/write storage in the RFID itself, and you have a simple, automated way to make all copies invalid: if you successfully clone a working RFID, if the original is used, the challenge-response counter is incremented in the central database as well as in the original RFID. The clone _cannot_ have the same counter, so it is immediately unusable.

    However, if their scheme is mostly that simplistic, then it's ripe for DoS attacks, where you clone an RFID and use the clone before the original can be used again, making the original unworkable.

    If there is a defense for such a DoS attack, then they still have an issue: if the central database considers an RFID invalid for any reason (non-malicious, but slow communication with central database causes the RFID to miss its RF power cycle window, perhaps), such that you no longer trust it, is it still an 'id'? If it is, what's all the crypto for? Maybe it's just a sales tool, too?

    Anyway, semantics aside, I think someone will prove them wrong in relatively short order.

    For crypto products in general, this may always be the case: to me, it seems that there's more unemployed brain power with the right mindset to tackle such problems than there is in employment, in large part, because being employed causes the right mindset to become not-the-right-mindset over time.

    --
    eskwayrd = m^2c^4
  86. Only one way by BlueParrot · · Score: 2, Interesting

    There is precisely one way to make a device un-clonable, and that is by quantum mechanically entangling it with a central authority. The no-cloning theorem of quantum mechanics then ensures that there is no way to record the state of the system without disturbing it in the process, thus destroying the entanglement. Obviously this is tricky to implement in practice ( read: impossible with existing technology ), and the device could only be identified once, after which its state would be ruined and the entanglement broken, but at least in theory every classical system ( i.e every system not relying on QM ) can be cloned. It may be exceedingly difficult to achieve in practice ( good luck creating two diamonds with the impurities at the same locations in the crystal lattice as an example ), but it is in at least in principle possible.

    1. Re:Only one way by blair1q · · Score: 1

      It doesn't need to be uncloneable.

      Just expensive enough to clone that it's not worth what is to be gained from it.

      So don't store anything expensive in something that's inexpensive to break into.

  87. DNA by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    As we all know, the most unclonable thing in the world happens to be DNA.

  88. Re:Press release and marketing hype. 1st paragraph by mikiN · · Score: 1

    Do you mean the new (fan?)twist to the Bio Booster Armor Guyver manga where a handyman builds his own Guyver from stuff from the scrapyard, the chicken farm, at the slaughterhouse and in the McDonalds dumpster? Anyway, why leave out the duct tape?

    --
    The Hacker's Guide To The Kernel: Don't panic()!
  89. Unclonable? by big+whiffer · · Score: 0

    somebody get Adam Savage!

  90. Memo to marketing.... by TiggertheMad · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Implausable to crack != Impossible to crack.

    moreover...

    MadTigger's 1st law Law of Cryptography: The harder you claim it is to crack, the more people will work to crack it.

    --

    HA! I just wasted some of your bandwidth with a frivolous sig!
    1. Re:Memo to marketing.... by rjhubs · · Score: 1

      I hope you never wondered why they didn't hire you for that marketing job.

    2. Re:Memo to marketing.... by mcrbids · · Score: 1

      Implausable to crack != Impossible to crack.

      You're not a businessman. To a businessman, implausible and impossible are pretty much the same. I've said many times: "As a Programmer/System Architect/Software Engineer, I work in a realm where just about anything is possible. The question for you, is what's feasible".

      To a businessman, "impossible" means "can't happen in a practical way".

      --
      I have no problem with your religion until you decide it's reason to deprive others of the truth.
  91. Good security not what protects gold in Fort Knox by leftie · · Score: 1

    There's lots of security schemes to protect valuables. Every one of them has been defeated at one point or another except for the FDR Admin. plan to keep the US Gold Depository safe. They stored the gold beside a US Army tank brigade. There's an Air Cav regiment there too now. They could put that gold bullion in a pile in an open field and still nobody will touch it. Nobody is going to screw with the tanks that are right next to the gold.

  92. Sounds like... by nategoose · · Score: 1

    They said that it used some wrote once ROM, so I'm thinking that they are thinking that since no one could take one of their chips and over write it with the data of another chip completely (b/c of the write once ROM) that it can't be cloned. If this is true then it's totally clone-able since no one ever said that the clone had to even fit into anything resembling the original. I don't know a lot about RFID, so I'm speculating a lot.

  93. "Unclonable" vs "unemulatable" by henrypijames · · Score: 1

    This chip might be indeed unclonable, i. e. it cannot be emulated by another chip with the same look and same inner structure. But it's still very much copyable, i. e. it can be emulated by another chip with a different look and/or inner structure.

    Think of a mechanical door key made of platinum: A normal locksmith may not be able to clone it since he doesn't have platinum key blanks and his tools are not tuned to process platinum. But he can still copy the key using a usual key blank, and this copy, though not made of platinum and thus not a clone, can still emulate the original key, i. e. opening the respective door.

    Since the whole purpose of RFID is contactless access, the chips are usually out of sight during real world usage. That means clonability is nearly irrelevant, emulatability is the real issue.

  94. Misnomer by Metasquares · · Score: 1

    Perhaps calling it "electronic DNA" was a bad idea if you're going to claim people can't clone it.

  95. Idiots by sexconker · · Score: 1

    If they're using the slight differences that come about in a chip due to the manufacturing process, they're doomed to fail.

    The physical characteristics of the chip will change with temperature, humidity, use, time, etc.

    All of our digital stuff is run by analog physics, and we have to be very careful to make sure our digital world can tolerate the variations in the analog world. By tapping into the physical characteristics, you end up relying on the random, unpredictable characteristics.

    They are not static. They are not to be trusted. TFA mentions making the damn thing reliable, which only means giving the thing a margin of error, probably by reducing the precision at which you measure the chosen physical characteristics and map them to discrete digital values (whether said values are stored or not).

    It then becomes a matter of discovering which physical characteristics are used and how. Microscopes, tiny probes, and patience will get you very far in this regard.

    Physically encasing the chip in plastic or resin or what have you only slows the process down.

    (And yes, all the analog physics is really digital when you go down far enough.)

    1. Re:Idiots by Creepy+Crawler · · Score: 1

      ---(And yes, all the analog physics is really digital when you go down far enough.)

      Id disagree with you solely on that statement... We're unsure how exactly data and state information could be encoded into quark triplets or femtomechanics. One things' for sure... It's probability fields and they're not binary.

      --
    2. Re:Idiots by sexconker · · Score: 1

      It's quantum.
      Nothing is random or based on probabilities.
      We just don't know the details (yet).

  96. You mean like the SecureID FOBs? by tlambert · · Score: 1

    You mean like the SecureID FOBs?

    Where it takes two of them to make a working one, manually disassembling one (destroying the chip) and using solvent on the other (destroying the LCD)?

    -- Terry

  97. Irony of seeing... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    both cloning and DNA in the same summary and it implying the latter is not possible...

  98. I smell snake oil by wembley+fraggle · · Score: 1

    The article wasn't super informative, which is troubling. Even with a very complex physical layer providing a challenge-response tokening system, we're going to have to be able to validate the tokens. That means that there has to be a knowable pattern from challenge to response, stored in the central certifying authority (otherwise, how will you know that my RFID is actually authentic?)

    If you've got access to the RFID for a fair amount of time (say, you're sitting at the next table over at a cafe with a laptop), you'll probably have enough time to keep poking the RFID with challenges in order to gauge its responses. Enough responses and you'll have enough data to reverse-engineer the mechanism, right? Even if it's a public-key system, you've got to be using some sort of standard crypto in there.

    So, now you've got a lot of data, generated through some cryptosystem, but the system has to be able to run forwards on a very simple chip, while you've got a very complex and powerful computer to reverse it. I'm not particularly excited about those possibilities, even if you are deriving your private key from some truly random bit of noise at the edge of a silicon spray or something.

    The shorter version, of course, would be to say, "uncloneable"? Bah. Maybe "difficult-to-clone". But if it runs on electronics and it's not quantum, I'd be VERY hesitant to say "uncloneable".

  99. THHGTTG Docet by Brandano · · Score: 1

    Every time I read about this sort of claims on this sort of products I am reminded of that genius that was Douglas Adams:
    "The Hitch Hiker's Guide to the Galaxy, in a moment of reasoned lucidity which is almost unique among its current tally of five million, nine hundred and seventy-five thousand, five hundred and nine pages, says of the Sirius Cybernetics Corporation product that "it is very easy to be blinded to the essential uselessness of them by the sense of achievement you get from getting them to work at all"."
    And, if you'll excuse me if this isn't taken verbatim, as I don't have the books handy:
    After the great commotion caused by the air conditioning and phone exchange protests, the Sirius cybernetics corporation was condemned to apply to every one of their appliances a note stating that, if a product can't possibly fail, when it eventually does it will prove almost impossible to fix. And naturally had to modify the Guide headquarters windows so that they could be opened.

  100. So what? by Fishbulb · · Score: 1

    Maybe I'm not RTFA'ing right, but this doesn't actually stop anyone from snagging the data from it, like the ones on passports or credit cards.

    Who cares if you can't clone an RFID-laden credit card! You don't need a physical card to make fraudulent purchases.

  101. Re:Hell with cloning. Bury the technology in bulls by mollymoo · · Score: 1

    It's the challenges which get rotated, not the responses. Each challenge generates a unique response and you can issue the same challenge to the chip as often as you like, so you can't DOS the chip. They aren't embedded, they're generated on-demand, and there are 2^64 in the top-of-the-line model. You needn't increment the challenge for every incorrect response as the odds of guessing the right 64-bit response are vanishingly low, so you can't DOS the system. An exhaustive interrogation would, at the rate of 1000 per second, take half a billion years, so you can't do that either.

    Yay for ineffective technology!

    Yay for ill-informed criticism!

    --
    Chernobyl 'not a wildlife haven' - BBC News
  102. Re:Hell with cloning. Bury the technology in bulls by Anachragnome · · Score: 1

    Hey!

    Whats with editing out the operative word from my posts title!?

    Foul! Foul!

  103. Re:Press release and marketing hype. 1st paragraph by pcolaman · · Score: 1

    What the fuck is Guyver. I said MacGuyver, and I didn't fucking stutter. Were you born in the 90's? If so, get back to your homework, son.

  104. Re:Hell with cloning. Bury the technology in bulls by mollymoo · · Score: 1

    How odd, it certainly wasn't intentional. I generally try not to mess with other people's shit :)

    --
    Chernobyl 'not a wildlife haven' - BBC News
  105. Re:They used Unclonable and DNA in the same senten by Kjella · · Score: 1

    Its like saying that an event is possibly inevitable.

    In statistics, that would be pefectly valid. Assume that you're trying to determine if an event is inevitable or not, but your testing so far has failed to narrow down the confidence interval. Thus you can not say with confidence that it is inevitable nor with confidence say it can be avoided and so it is still possibly inevitable. Obviously it can't both be inevitable and not, but you can certainly have a probability about a probability. Without things like that, math just wouldn't be confusing enough.

    --
    Live today, because you never know what tomorrow brings
  106. The titantic was unsinkable by codepunk · · Score: 1

    Sounds like someones marketing department is writing checks they cannot cash.

    --


    Got Code?
  107. Re:Good security not what protects gold in Fort Kn by wfstanle · · Score: 1

    This I know and is the entire point of what I said. The vault merely provides time for the army to act. In the case of Fort Knox, the response time would be very short.

  108. Oh! Goody! Goody! by Rockin'Robert · · Score: 0

    That'll be 2 grand for your next passport.
    RR

  109. Been there, done that by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Yeah, and the crew of the Titanic used these RFID badges to get into rooms where they applied CSS to DVDs.

  110. Update: Someone cloned it by LostMyBeaver · · Score: 1

    Well not yet, but when the tech goes public, I give it a week... MAX before it is.

  111. hardware people... by bogado · · Score: 1

    Just because you can't physically alter one chip into another, because of some hardware id fitted into the device it don't mean that another chip could not emulate the protocol perfectly. So one ship cannot be cloned to another chip of the same type, so what?

    --
    []'s Victor Bogado da Silva Lins

    ^[:wq

  112. Re:Press release and marketing hype. 1st paragraph by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Puff is also a legal term, used by 2nd hand car salesmen to hawk their wares/ push product.
    Physical access = game over, even it it conforms to nist, and wrapped in some tough glue and wire.
    Scanning lithium nicobate labs, and tunneling deposit/removal devices mean anything can be read - it is just more expensive. Schiener is never stupid enough to say never. It may buy time, but cat/mousetrap means, like say cable decoders, it is just a matter of time, but never NEVER.

  113. Cosmic Law by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    If it can be made, it can be unmade.

  114. Re:Press release and marketing hype. 1st paragraph by mikiN · · Score: 1

    Either you're joking (but I don't hear any whooshing sound passing over me using my Pringles-can/cut-in-half-balloon-duct-taped-to-opening/sucked-out-air-through-hole-in-the-bottom parabolic antenna enhanced hearing device) or you're consistently mis-spelling MacGyver. And yes, I've watched 'a few' episodes from that show and like them very much, thank you.

    For your info, a Guyver refers to the manga by Yoshiki Takaya who just happens to have the same family name as my grandmother. Thanks for asking.

    --
    The Hacker's Guide To The Kernel: Don't panic()!
  115. Spaceballs? by conspirator57 · · Score: 1

    Ring a bell?

    --
    "If still these truths be held to be
    Self evident."
    -Edna St. Vincent Millay
  116. Re:Press release and marketing hype. 1st paragraph by pcolaman · · Score: 1

    Thank you grammar police. Take your crappy, second rate manga and go enjoy your dictionary.