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Feds Tighten DNS Security On .Gov
alphadogg writes "When you file your taxes online, you want to be sure that the Web site you visit — www.irs.gov — is operated by the Internal Revenue Service and not a scam artist. By the end of next year, you can be confident that every U.S. government Web page is being served up by the appropriate agency. That's because the feds have launched the largest-ever rollout of a new authentication mechanism for the Internet's DNS. All federal agencies are deploying DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) on the .gov top-level domain, and some expect that once that rollout is complete, banks and other businesses might be encouraged to follow suit for their sites. DNSSEC prevents hackers from hijacking Web traffic and redirecting it to bogus sites. The Internet standard prevents spoofing attacks by allowing Web sites to verify their domain names and corresponding IP addresses using digital signatures and public-key encryption."
"you can be confident that every U.S. government Web page is being served up by the appropriate agency."
The easiest way entrap a victim is to promote a feeling of security.
Nothing says 'rob me blind' than 'trust us'.
If only we could fall into a woman's arms without falling into her hands
They really need to crack down more on sites like this one: http://www.usagc.org/ while they're at it.
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If my memory is correct, DNSSEC is one of the prerequisites for making opportunistic encryption easier to deploy widely. I hope this catches on and becomes more widespread.
Slashdot: Failed Car Analogies. Amateur Lawyering. Anecdote Battles.
I've been told that DNSSEC is basically just a proof of concept when it's done on a single TLD, not providing much real security. If I understood it right, the main attack DNSSEC is intended to prevent is a man-in-the-middle returning a fake response to your computer's (or your ISP's computer's) DNS query, a fake that it accepts in place of the real response.
If so, then when your ISP queries one of the thirteen root servers for the .gov authority, the attacker could still return a fake response and set himself up as the DNS authority for .gov, at least as far as your ISP knew.
Anyone know how plausible that attack remains? Knowledgeable responses welcome :)
Of course, part of getting DNSSEC set up for the whole internet is seeing how well it plays out in real-world testing, and .gov is the logical place to start. I assume once any kinks are discovered from this rollout, we'll be one step closer to enabling it on the root servers, which will allow any TLD to achieve a real security gain.
who can squeeze every last drop of juice out of a lemon. So, the local strong guys line up and try....
The first guy, a big burly construction guy give it a try and squeezes the lemon so that nothing comes out.
A big body builder guy walks up and squeezes some more drops out but then nothing.
Another big guy shows up and nothing. Just as the bartender was about to announce a winner, a small, bespectacled fellow wearing a business suit walks up and says in a mousy voice, "Let me try."
Laughter ensues around the bar and they hand him the lemon. He squeezes and out pours more juice and he's declared the winner. The body builder asks, "How did you do that ?!?"
The little guy answers, "I work for the IRS."
This won't solve all the problems of the universe, but this is a GOOD THING. Securing DNS is absolutely critical to making the Internet a safer place. If I type in "irs.gov", I want to go to "irs.gov", not some spam site, and this helps me get there. DNSSEC can provide IP addresses with a strong guarantee that the IP addresses are actually correct. DNSSEC can even provide other keys, and make it possible to EASILY send secure emails without having to do a key exchange ahead-of-time. See, for example: http://www.dwheeler.com/essays/easy-email-sec.html
- David A. Wheeler (see my Secure Programming HOWTO)
My understanding is that unless DNSSEC is implemented in the last mile resolvers (e.g. my ISP), it doesn't buy a whole lot, especially when it comes to preventing cache poisoning attacks. Moreover, according to RFC4035, delegation records and glue records aren't subject to public key verification (i.e. not signed), so DNSSEC could still be vulnerable. Until DNSSEC is pushed out to the end user to the point that are browsers are performing signature verification, I don't think it's going to buy us the security we're looking for. Even then, with PKI being notoriously difficult to implement, I'm sure it will be botched and somebody will find ways to poison public key registries with fake public keys, etc.
You're quite right, it's perfectly secure if the client systems have the .gov TLD public key. And almost no one does, today. Of course, no one will bother trying to get DNSSEC or these keys until there's something to verify.
.gov keys.
This is a classic chicken-and-egg problem. The good news is that the U.S. government _CAN_ require that its OWN sites implement DNSSEC - and once that's done, people who deal with those sites (most U.S. citizens) will have a reason to install DNSSEC and the relevant
What will probably happen is that there will be a Firefox plug-in (if there isn't already) that supplies these keys, and slowly browsers will add support for all this. The result: Accessing these sites will become more secure, over time. Good thing.
- David A. Wheeler (see my Secure Programming HOWTO)
Ignoring if DNSSEC is good or not, this is a pretty bad example of why to do this. Nobody goes to irs.gov to file their taxes. Instead, they go to a third-party (like Quicken, as just one example) who will file their taxes with the IRS. This was part of a deal worked out many years ago - in exchange for the IRS not providing its own e-file solutions, the third-party companies would have to provide free online e-filing (but would still, of course, be able to sell their own software to do the same thing).