Government Begins Securing Root Zone File
Death Metal notes a Wired piece on the US government beginning the process of securing the root zone file. This is in service of implementing DNSSEC, without which the DNS security hole found by Dan Kaminsky can't be definitively closed. On Thursday morning, a comment period will open on the various proposals on who should hold the keys and sign the root — ICANN, Verisign, or the US government's NTIA.
Anyone really thinks any of those organizations should be trusted with this? How about some UN organization instead?
If he explores all forms and substances Straight homeward to their symbol-essences; He shall not die.
Verisign
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US Government
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ICANN
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I'm definitely of the opinion that ICANN should be running it. That said, I don't know everything about the matter, so perhaps there's something that would change my mind. I figure, though, that if it's not broken, don't fix it.
It's better to vote for what you want and not get it than to vote for what you don't want and get it.
- E. Debs
But in the end, who really cares who signs it now - what can be signed once, must be able to be signed again (especially if there is a validity period of the signature), and if the signatory needs to change in the future then it can be changed then. Delaying the signing process is counter-productive, as procrastination in this regard only helps the hackers and not the greater unwashed masses who don't know they need this process to be completed in the first place... Maybe they should ask for comments _after_ they have told us the first signatories name. They will get comments then regardless of who they choose ;)
Catapultam habeo. Nisi pecuniam omnem mihi dabis, ad caput tuum saxum immane mittam.
I can't think of anyone more qualified.
Yes, I know he's dead, but I still can't think of anyone more qualified.
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
"On Thursday morning, a comment period will open on the various proposals on who should hold the keys and sign the root -- ICANN, Verisign, or the US government's NTIA."
ICANN: Organisation situated in the US, can be heavily influenced and controlled the US government
Verisign: Private company that is only interested in profit and is situated mostly in the US thereby it can be heavily influenced and controlled the US government
NTIA: US government
CHOOSE: US, US, or US
American election time!
Knowledge is power. Knowledge shared is power lost.
I can't wait if they get it... Within a couple of years we will all have to start paying for DNS queries. Of course- they will offer to allow your query for free if they can insert ads into every site you go to.
The problem is that this scheme might work now, but it is not very future proof. How would you avoid the issue of Participant A borging participants B through T, thereby owning enough pieces of the key to do whatever they want, no matter what Participants U through Z have to say?
This might happen with private organizations (companies get bought) or with states (Russia takes over Georgia's piece of the key, just going on what's in the news).
I think ICANN is still the least bad choice. Somebody has to be the ultimate arbiter, and at least ICANN's fights so far have been confined to ICANN. It has not become a bargaining chip in bigger fights, which would be almost guaranteed with organizations such as the UN.
" There is a rational explanation for everything. There is also an irrational one. "
Except that DNSSEC is DNS. Period. It isn't compatible with DNS, it is DNS. It simply adds some additional records that aren't normally present that a DNS server or resolver can, if configured to, use to verify that the responses come from a valid server. It's not difficult to deploy, all current DNS servers already implement it so it's already deployed. What's difficult is the process of generating the signature chains, since the validity of the signatures at any level depends on the signature chain back to the root be intact and valid. So, if I have silverglass.org signed, the com and root domains also needs to use DNSSEC and sign their records before the DNSSEC records on silverglass.org can be verified.
Note that the signature chain's the critical part. The first question that needs answered, before you can validate any response, is "What's the correct, valid key I should verify this domain's records with?". Fail to solve the problem of answering that question securely, and the system's not secure regardless of anything else it may try to do.
And which part of the AC's post condones violent protest?