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Compromising Wired Keyboards
Flavien writes "A team from the Security and Cryptography Laboratory (LASEC) in Lausanne, Switzerland, found 4 different ways to fully or partially recover keystrokes from wired keyboards at a distance up to 20 meters, even through walls. They tested 11 different wired keyboard models bought between 2001 and 2008 (PS/2, USB and laptop). They are all vulnerable to at least one of the 4 attacks. While more information on these attacks will be published soon, a short description with 2 videos is available."
This appears to be related to why TEMPEST attacks work on monitors.
I understood that the disconnecting of the charger was because of that the "victim" laptop computer and the "attacker" desktop computer were connected to the same electrical mains network of the building.
By disconnecting the laptop charger it was proven that the keyboard signal was truly intercepted from over-the-air electromagnetic radiation, as the laptop was "independent" and not connected to anything. There was not any chance that the signal could have leaked or transmitted any other way.
It's called van Eck phreaking, and it's been applied to monitors for a while now, but no-one's really talked about sniffing from the keyboard.
"I think an etch-a-sketch with an ethernet port would beat IE7 in web standards compliance."