Compromising Wired Keyboards
Flavien writes "A team from the Security and Cryptography Laboratory (LASEC) in Lausanne, Switzerland, found 4 different ways to fully or partially recover keystrokes from wired keyboards at a distance up to 20 meters, even through walls. They tested 11 different wired keyboard models bought between 2001 and 2008 (PS/2, USB and laptop). They are all vulnerable to at least one of the 4 attacks. While more information on these attacks will be published soon, a short description with 2 videos is available."
Indeed. Already a decade ago I was hearing people claim that the best way to enter passphrases and the like would be an on-screen keyboard whose keyboard map changes after each letter is input, all ideally displayed with a TEMPEST-resistant font. Even back then people knew anything wired was snoopable.
Being the only house on your block not radiating all sorts of data sounds like an excellent reason for the DHS to perform a no-knock raid with a legions of SWAT teams and an armored troop carrier or two.
Nothing in the world is more dangerous than sincere ignorance and conscientious stupidity.
Oh no, we will have to learn to type code by tapping on a single key and read the results in the flickering of the hard drive light.
When they can manage the same trick in a noisy office environment with dozens of keyboards and monitors in use, then I'll worry.
I don't see the big "News Flash" on this.
I think the big news flash on this is that they actually performed four different, real attacks on real, physical keyboards. Theory is one thing, someone actually saying "hey, we can really do this on the cheap now to 11 different keyboards sold at your local Best Buy; here's how..." is another. I don't think it's unreasonable to consider that "news for nerds."