Compromising Wired Keyboards
Flavien writes "A team from the Security and Cryptography Laboratory (LASEC) in Lausanne, Switzerland, found 4 different ways to fully or partially recover keystrokes from wired keyboards at a distance up to 20 meters, even through walls. They tested 11 different wired keyboard models bought between 2001 and 2008 (PS/2, USB and laptop). They are all vulnerable to at least one of the 4 attacks. While more information on these attacks will be published soon, a short description with 2 videos is available."
I won't type what I think about that...
This appears to be related to why TEMPEST attacks work on monitors.
Is this going to be another one of those hollow claims backed up by a viral video, like unlocking car doors with a tennis ball?
Looks like a room or building size Faraday Cage (a foil hat the size of your house!) might be the only defence...
Especially considering that you can also detect what is shown on monitors (again, by detecting the electromagnetic radiation), and so on screen "keyboards" operated with a mouse become not so useful.
It's not clear from the article whether they have have the keyboard before hand to be able to record which key-press outputs what radiation, or if they can use this (and by that I mean one of the four) technique on any old keyboard, including ones they haven't seen before.
Anyway, this shouldn't be too surprising to anyone, electronics emit electromagnetic radiation, which can be captured.
I wank in the shower.
"like unlocking car doors with a tennis ball".
Its much easier with a cricket ball. Just use it to break the window.
There are 10 kinds of people in the world... those who understand binary and those who don't.
I saw this demonstrated about 10 years ago while working for a military contractor during a demonstration to increase awareness of security risks. They were able to capture video and keyboard data through a wall adjacent to the PC being monitored. (I can't elaborate on who 'they' were...but I'm sure astute readers can guess correctly.)
If your only tool is a hammer, every problem becomes a nail.
I'm not so sure...I would expect that the Model M probably produces a spark-gap kind of effect which can be picked up on AM radios a block away.
If your only tool is a hammer, every problem becomes a nail.
If you watch the video he sets the keyboard.eavesdropper into a listening/polling state waiting for keypress information. From there it's filtered and decoded --fine. Now the part that seemed odd to me is it exits as soon as it finds the 'e' in 'trust no one', why?
If the eavesdropper is in a polling state it should continue looking for more keypresses, unless something there are some smoke and mirrors going on. Also, if you listen there's no termination sent --no keypresses heard on camera.
Most modems back in the '80s just ran either RD, TD, or (RD|TD) through the LED. It was cheap and easy and gave you a good activity signal. Nobody cared about people sniffing the data through the LED, and really hardly anyone is ever going to be in a situation where they're even potentially exposed. And for virtually all the rest, this is hardly the low hanging fruit... if you can get close enough to read the LED, you're close enough to see what the target is doing any number of easier ways.