Slashdot Mirror
Web Scam Bilks State of Utah Out of $2.5M
KitB sends in a story in the Salt Lake Tribune that tells of a Web-based scam, resembling some used by Nigerian gangs, that snared the state of Utah. $2.5M was sent to a bank account in Texas before the bank raised a question and then froze $1.8M in the account. "Thieves apparently used a Nigerian-based scam to steal $2.5 million from the Utah treasury, covering their tracks by using intermediaries and a church address. A Salt Lake Tribune review of the names listed in a search warrant as receiving or transferring money [found] names of African origin or connections to that continent. Michael Kessler, ... a forensic accounting [investigator] in New York City, said the thieves appear to have used a simple scam that originated in Nigeria about five years ago. The Utah theft is the first time he's seen a government victimized. 'Their IT people should have known better,' Kessler said after reviewing a copy of the search warrant Thursday. 'It sounds like any kid could have done this.'"
*sigh* can't you read TFA? There wasn't a scam like the Nigerian scams - this is more a case of someone forging invoices.
Essentially, the scammers changed the bank details for the University of Utah, and submitted invoices. The state paid them. Yes, the state was slack and had poor procedures for identifying and preventing fraud, but it wasn't one of the 419 scams. Importantly, there doesn't appear to have been an element of greed on the scamee's part.
This was a scam technique that originated in Nigeria. It wasn't the Nigerian 419 Scam. Strangely enough, Nigeria has been the origin of more than one type of scam.
"Software is too expensive to build cheaply"
Already there are lots of people making silly comments about how stupid the state must be to fall for a 419 scam. But this wasn't a 419 scam or anything like it- the fraudsters submitted paperwork to change the bank account information for a group with which the state already did business and then submitted a bunch of fake invoices. The state paid the bills. They should have had more things in place to protect against these kinds of fraud, but this wasn't a case of idiotic gullibility or greed.
Unless they mean the insurance company's IT department, as a password sniffer apparently got past them.
What that story has to do with the 'change the account number for vendor and submit bogus invoices' story I don't know. At no point do they actually appear to explain the fraud.
Also, a 'Nigerian' scam traditionally refers to advance fee fraud, aka, 'I have X million here that you can get if you send me Y thousand.'. That does not appear to be what happened here.
There's a difference between being dumb and falling for that scam, and having someone break in and change the address your business (Or, in this case, government) are supposed to send money to.
If corporations are people, aren't stockholders guilty of slavery?
Could He have been in on the scam?
Those who do study history are doomed to stand helplessly by while everyone else repeats it.
That doesn't sound at all like a Nigerian scam to me. It sounds like good, old-fashioned white collar fraud. The story is horrible. The Ohio insurance firm case apparently has nothing to do with the story. There's no explanation why the university's "IT people should have known better". What did the IT people have to do with it? I love the suggestion that people should immediately be suspicious of those with "names of African origin or connections to that continent". And let's see who we're looking for. A guy with a Minnesota driver's license. A truck driver -- but not a Minnesota license? Narrowing it down here ...
It wasn't even changing the bank accounts. This was a situation where somebody got some purchase orders for a university department and the state paid what appeared to be legitimate purchase orders drawn on department funds. The "vendor number" is to speedily process and simplify the task of allocating funds to people who are providing services or products to the university.
Where this scam became a scam was with the process of submitting the purchase orders to the state, and submitting new bank account information for the vendor. Indeed, some of the purchases that were made may have even been legitimate, in terms of having a vendor like a computer supplier deliver a dozen or more computers to the department and then submitting the purchase order to the university accounting office. (I don't know what exactly was purchased here, but this seems to be something on the order of what was done.) The goods were delivered, payment was expected, and a check was cut and sent to what state records said was the legitimate vendor.
The "vendor number" wouldn't be the department's code number, although it is possible that the director's signature was forged and several purchase orders were sent through asking payment for items that have never even been delivered in the first place. The reporters on this incident certainly got the details screwed up in terms of typical purchase order procedures.
Having used Utah state purchase orders myself as a state employee, I can see how this would get missed for some time until the paperwork gets through. Accounting for all of this takes months and quite a bit of good faith is depended upon through out the whole process... although there are a number of points where purchase orders are questioned eventually and have to be reviewed. Smaller businesses would scream quickly if they didn't get their money right away, so it would have to be a larger vendor like Wal-Mart or Circuit City (again, I don't know the specifics here, but this is typical) where the accounting chain is much longer and wouldn't get caught right away.
What is the scary thing here is that this department had so much money to throw around that missing a couple millions dollars wouldn't be missed. It wasn't the "department's bank account number" as all state funds are deposited together in one place, including tax funds and research grants. This is about how money was disbursed once authorization from the project administrators/department chair has occurred and was intended to pay what appeared to be legitimate debts.
The University of Utah does have billions of dollars floating around from various research grants and project of various types, so even though the amount of money here seems staggering, it is a drop in the bucket compared to how much money flows through that campus. It isn't even the first inappropriate allocation of funds, although this one should have had flags come up quite some time earlier from a whole bunch of different sources.... not the least of which was the project lead who should have been reviewing invoices charged to his project (where this design department comes into play) and questioning things that seemed out of place. The state won't allocate money if the project has insufficient funds on the charge code.
I wish I had mod points for you. When people trust a system implicitly it is at least as bad as trusting a person implicitly. At least with a person they may have the character to not screw you. A systems has the morals of whoever is using it, and that changes with every user, legitimate or otherwise.