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How a Router's Missed Range Check Nearly Crashed the Internet
Barlaam writes "A bug by router vendor A (omitting a range check from a critical field in the configuration interface) tickled a bug from router vendor B (dropping BGP sessions when processing some ASPATH attributes with length very close to 256), causing a ripple effect that caused widespread global routing instability last week. The flaw lay dormant until one of vendor A's systems was deployed in an autonomous system whose ASN, modulo 256, was greater than 250. At that point, the Internet was one typo away from disaster. Other router vendors, who were not affected by the bug, happily propagated the trigger message to every vulnerable system on the planet in about 30 seconds. Few people appreciate how fragile and unsecured the Internet's trust-based critical infrastructure really is — this is just the latest example." Vendor A, in this case, is a Latvian router vendor called MikroTik.
I wonder why the summary went out of it's way to use company A & B, then tagged a small Latvian vendor for their range-check bug, but didn't name the much larger vendor that also has a range-check bug, namely Cisco...
Sleep your way to a whiter smile...date a dentist!
When I worked for *unnamed nw regional backbone here* we had peering agreements with everyone except uunet that we connected to, and it was pretty known that if we spat out an bad BGP route we could bring down the whole net by hitting enter ('cept uunet, although I'm pretty sure uunet woulda went down from everyone else routing around them to us)
How is this new? That was the 90's. and when we spent 100k+ on a Cisco 7513 with 64megs of ram so it could hold the BGP tables...
We even wrote our own manual ('cause none existed) on how to deal with BGP tables so junior admins working for us wouldn't fuq it up. (and on top of that, we wouldn't let them touch the routers either)
-meetme room in the westin in Seattle-
Should be obvious, hm? Because Vendor B is the one really to blame: as far as I can see, one router from Vendor A misbehaved, but thousands or more from Vendor B. Unfortunately, Vendor B is also the one with deep pockets for legal action, so you cannot possible put the blame on them. Oops, hope Ido not get sued.
Reminds me of a story that Keith Marzullo told our class in a graduate level reliability class. This was back in the days of using UUCP to send email, and the vendor that he worked for had just released a "failsafe" product they were very proud of -- essentially, it was a mail router that could detect if a path went down, and would try an alternate router instead. The company touted it as a bulletproof solution.
So they go to a conference, and set up some routers, unplug some of them, etc., and everything is going fine until they ask an audience member for his UUCP address. UUCP addresses are in the form of host1!host2!host3!username, with the routing for the username explicitly specified... the addresses could thus get quite long. In this case, the guy's email address was over the buffer limit the company's routers used.
Guess what happened?
The mail server tried sending an email to the next router in the chain. The router buffer overflowed and crashed. The reliable server than tried another router... and crashed it. It then went through the entire network, and crashed every single one of the nodes, turning a bug that would have been a single point of failure into a total network collapse.
=)
Yeah, one of my favorite stories from UCSD.
Untrue. Cisco TAC wil give you the latest firmware for free, provided you tell then n\you need it due to security flaws discovered in your current version. Yoy may need to point to their blletin about the bug, but that should be trivial (http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisories_listing.html)
Since Cisco almost exclusivly patches current versions due to security bugs, all their IOS are belong to us for free.