Google NativeClient Security Contest
An anonymous reader writes "You may remember Google's NativeClient project, discussed here last December. Don't be fooled into calling this ActiveX 2.0 — rather than a model of trust and authentication, NaCl is designed to make dangerous code impossible by enforcing a set of a rules at load time that guarantee hostile code simply cannot execute (PDF). NaCl is still in heavy development, but the developers want to encourage low-level security experts to take a look at their design and code. To this end Google has opened the NativeClient Security Contest, and will award prizes topping out at $2^13 to top bug submitters. If you're familiar with low level security, memory segmentation, accurate disassembly of hostile code, code alignment, and related topics, do take a look. Mac, Linux, and Windows are all supported."
Simply has to be taken with a grain of salt!
Don't be fooled into calling this ActiveX 2.0 â" rather than a model of trust and authentication, NaCl is designed to make dangerous code impossible by enforcing a set of a rules at load time that guarantee hostile code simply cannot execute (PDF).
So what you're saying is..
Using just one half of NaCl could be poisonous, but when sprinkled atop the web as one all is well?
Which in turn sounds pretty similar to... Java!
where the scientist is saying he's covered all the bases, and nothing can go wrong.
If this is a monster movie, I'd hate to think what ActiveX was.
...guarantee hostile code simply cannot execute (PDF)
Hah! Was that a jab at Adobe?
Admittedly, it's after past 1AM, so maybe my maths stopped working by now, but isn't 2^13 about 8000 dollars for the grand prize?
I contacted Google and their reply confirms your approximate amount.
It made me CaCl2.
(Calcium takes two anions.)
Looks like you already did.
/me ducks and runs
Crumb's Corollary: Never bring a knife to a bun fight.