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Google NativeClient Security Contest
An anonymous reader writes "You may remember Google's NativeClient project, discussed here last December. Don't be fooled into calling this ActiveX 2.0 — rather than a model of trust and authentication, NaCl is designed to make dangerous code impossible by enforcing a set of a rules at load time that guarantee hostile code simply cannot execute (PDF). NaCl is still in heavy development, but the developers want to encourage low-level security experts to take a look at their design and code. To this end Google has opened the NativeClient Security Contest, and will award prizes topping out at $2^13 to top bug submitters. If you're familiar with low level security, memory segmentation, accurate disassembly of hostile code, code alignment, and related topics, do take a look. Mac, Linux, and Windows are all supported."
Simply has to be taken with a grain of salt!
I'm sorry, I just don't buy this whole thing. x86 in the browser? Ugh... Because all that we need is to further promote an archaic instruction set that won't die because of all the pre-existing code compiled for it. An instruction set that was finally starting to loosen its grip as the industry worked toward more abstract solutions.
This game will waste your life. Don't clicky!
Eh, it's an okay choice for a project related to security.
512 MB RAM, 20 GB disk, 200 GB transfer, five datacenters. $19.95/month.
I doubt that. More likely they intend to make its detection and negation easier.
After all, the best language man can devise can only work as well as the coders who utilise it. If they are forced to cut corners in order to meet deadlines, errors will creep in, and we all know the urge to be first to profit is a prime reason for such things.
A learning experience is one of those things that say, 'You know that thing you just did? Don't do that.' - D. Adams
Don't be fooled into calling this ActiveX 2.0 â" rather than a model of trust and authentication, NaCl is designed to make dangerous code impossible by enforcing a set of a rules at load time that guarantee hostile code simply cannot execute (PDF).
So what you're saying is..
Using just one half of NaCl could be poisonous, but when sprinkled atop the web as one all is well?
Beware of bugs in the above code; I have only proved it correct, not tried it.
- Knuth
Which in turn sounds pretty similar to... Java!
where the scientist is saying he's covered all the bases, and nothing can go wrong.
As copyright owner of this comment, I authorize everyone to defeat any technological measure which limits access to it.
Is .NET open source?
Has .NET been vetted by experts in the way open source projects like this will be?
Is .NET likely to ever be cross platform?
Is .NET for running x86 code?
Now I'm no expert and could be way off base but there seem to be some pretty major differences here....
I'll meet you at the intersection of "Should be" and "Reality"
Admittedly, it's after past 1AM, so maybe my maths stopped working by now, but isn't 2^13 about 8000 dollars for the grand prize? It seems a bit low for all the work of basically reviewing their code and concepts.
Hostile code disassembly? If it were that simple to disassemble someone else's code and automatically prove that it can't do anything wrong -- including by having security holes exploitable by a third party -- forget the browser, we'd have it standard in the OS or in the last step of make/ant/whatever. We could all stop worrying about antiviruses (who, in turn, would stop needing signatures and heuristics updated all the time anyway), reviewing code by hand to see if all buffers are checked, etc. Just run the magic utility and it'll tell you.
I'm willing to bet that at least the antivirus makers have tried that before, you know, what with all of them offering some forms of heuristics by now, and none of them got it past the level of hit-and-miss. More miss than hit, in fact.
Not saying that Google couldn't have got some genius that actually made it work, but at the very least it's not going to be a trivial job digging through all their cases to check if they really checked all possible attack vectors.
And 8192 dollars doesn't really seem to be much incentive for doing that work.
A polar bear is a cartesian bear after a coordinate transform.
...guarantee hostile code simply cannot execute (PDF)
Hah! Was that a jab at Adobe?
They're asking for people who are familiar in low-level x86 security fields to point out any issues from their experience that could compromise their sandbox.
"Has .NET been vetted by experts in the way open source projects like this will be?"
What open source projects like this have been vetted by experts in the past? Who were they?
You could beat them up for many things, but they have a working system of arbitrary code execution that generally doesn't expose your system to risk (unless you tell it to, and only when the code is signed, though self-certs are ok).
I'm sure there have been plenty of security advisories over the years, but the general philosophy is sane.
The problem with Java's implementation is that the code is run within Java, which itself has sand-box protection for all executed code. Unless Google is seeking an interpreted language client-side or Google only wants to allow execution of trusted signer code, I think their task is probably a fruitless one.
Bye!
It made me CaCl2.
(Calcium takes two anions.)
Of course, Windows didn't have memory protection until Windows NT (1993), and Macs until MacOS X (2001). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_protection
Hands in my pocket
Okay, they do preemptive code analysis inside the sandbox, too. Relevant portion of the PDF (section 2.2):
This then happens inside a sandbox where CPU segments are strictly enforced and any OS calls are trapped.
I've read Google's paper, and I'm reasonably impressed. Basically, they've defined a little operating system, with 42 system calls, the same on all platforms, and defined a subset of 32-bit x86 machine code which can't modify itself and can't make calls to the regular OS. This requires using the seldom-used x86 segmentation hardware, which is quite clever and rarely used. But 64-bit mode has no segment machinery, so this approach doesn't translate to the current generation of 64-bit CPUs.
The biggest headache with Google's model is that they have to use a sort of interpreter to check all "ret" instructions, so someone can't clobber the stack and cause a branch to an arbitrary location. What's really needed is a CPU with a separate return point stack, accessed only by "call" and "ret" instructions, so return points are stored someplace that code can't clobber. (Machines have been built with such hardware, but there was never a compelling reason for it before.) Google has to emulate that in software. This adds a few percent of overhead.
Note that you can't use graphics hardware Google's OS. Conceptually, they could add a way to talk to OpenGL, which is reasonably secureable. But they haven't done that. They have a Quake port, but the main CPU is doing the rendering.
Interestingly, it would be quite possible to make a very minimal operating system which ran Google's little OS directly. You don't need the gigabytes of baggage of Windows or Linux.
It would also be possible to develop an x86 variant which enforced in hardware the rules of Google's restricted code model. That would be useful. Most of the things Google's model prohibits, you don't want to do anyway. (I know, somebody who thinks they're "l33t" will have some argument that they need to do some of the stuff Google prohibits. Just say no.)
The main question is whether the implementers will have the guts to say "no" to things that people really, really want to do, but are insecure. The Java people wimped out on this; Java applets could have been secure, but in practice they trust too much library, and library bugs can be exploited.
NSA Secure Linux has a similar problem. If you turn on mandatory security and don't put any exceptions in the rules, the security is quite good. But your users will whine and applications will have to be revised to conform to the rules.
Incidentally, the people who talk about "undecidability" and "Turing completeness" in this context have no clue. It's quite possible to define a system which is both useful and decidable. (Formally, any deterministic system with finite memory is decidable; eventually you either repeat a previous state or loop. For many systems, decidability may be "hard", but that's a separate issue. If termination checking is "hard" for a loop, just add a runaway loop counter that limits the number of iterations, and termination becomes decidable again. Realistically, if you have an algorithm complex enough that termination is tough to decide, you need something like that anyway. Formal methods for this sort of thing are used routinely in modern hardware design. Anyway, none of this applies to Google's approach, which merely restricts code to a specific well-formed subset which has certain well-behaved properties.)
No it's not impossible. What is impossible is to reject "exactly all dangerous code" but they don't claim to do that.
A simple implementation will simply reject all code. There will not be any way to get dangerous code past that implementation so I have just made what you said was impossible.
What Google does is that they try to verify that the program is not dangerous. And if they can verify(Create a proof) that the program is not dangerous then they run it. Else they reject it.
This will result in Google rejecting valid programs which are not dangerous, but if google runs a program it knows its safe to run.
To be really useful you develop the compiler and verify code together, so that the compiler only issue code that it knows the verifier can verify.
Java does something like this. The java compiler only output code that it know that the Jvm can verify as valid, but if you write your bytecode directly, you can write valid non dangerous code that
the classloader will reject, because it can't prove that it's not dangerous.
Fair enough. Sean Patrick Timmons, I'm sorry I'm not going to give you my SSN and DOB, though you might be able to find them anyway.
While I understand your issue with the hive mind the disagreements appears to be more rooted in ignorance than just opinions. Your supposition that closed source is more secure because the code can't be inspected is hilarious. In the same way that turning off a light and shutting the door makes a room secure.
I'll meet you at the intersection of "Should be" and "Reality"