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If We Have Free Will, Then So Do Electrons
snahgle writes "Mathematicians John Conway (inventor of the Game of Life) and Simon Kochen of Princeton University have proven that if human experimenters demonstrate 'free will' in choosing what measurements to take on a particle, then the axioms of quantum mechanics require that the free will property be available to the particles measured, or to the universe as a whole. Conway is giving a series of lectures on the 'Free Will Theorem' and its ramifications over the next month at Princeton. A followup article strengthening the theory (PDF) was published last month in Notices of the AMS." Update: 03/19 14:20 GMT by KD : jamie points out that we discussed this theorem last year, before the paper had been published.
Whether the universe is deterministic or not does not really have a great deal to say to the free will debate.
The usual argument runs something like this: If the universe is deterministic, then we cannot have free will, because our actions are determined.
The trouble is with this view is that it equates free will with indeterminacy.
By this argument, to have free will there must be some fundamentally unpredictable element that contributes to your will in order to make it free. (If it were predictable then it would not be free, goes the argument.) But saying that something is fundamentally unpredictable is the same as saying that it has no deterministic cause. If that is the case, then the 'free' part of your will must be something that you - your mind - doesn't determine. But if so, then can it really be called your will?
On the other hand, in a purely deterministic universe, some kind of free will could be possible. Donald MacKay came up with a logical argument that demonstrates that there is no prediciton of an agent's future behaviour that could be given to that agent that the agent would be logically compelled to believe.
There's a reasonable explanation by Dennis l Feucht that Google has just thrown up for me.
The way Conway and Kochen have defined "free will" is, loosely, any behavior that isn't determined by the past. So, no, there's no reason for a particle to be intelligent to "have free will". Plain old wavefunction collapse in the Copenhagen interpretation is a particle exhibiting free will.
Honestly, the actual result isn't particularly interesting, if you believe that human thought and behavior can theoretically be explained by traditional physical processes.
The interesting thing about the theorem is that the proof skips all that, and with a very simple setup, demonstrates that if humans can do something (pick which measurement to make) independently of the past, then elementary particles can too, without making any assumptions on what exactly makes humans act the way they do.