Schneier Says We Don't Need a Cybersecurity Czar
Trailrunner7 writes "Threatpost.com reports that security guru Bruce Schneier says not only should the NSA not run cybersecurity for the federal government, no one should. 'Really what I think is it shouldn't be anybody. We do better without a top-down hierarchy. Our economic and political systems work best when there isn't a dictator in charge, when there isn't one organization in charge. My feeling is there shouldn't be one organization in charge. Not only shouldn't it be the NSA, it shouldn't be anybody,' Schneier said."
Our economic and political systems work best when there isn't a dictator in charge
Next in News: Bruce Schneier asked to be member of a Cybersecurity Tribunal.
The internets are decentralized (mostly), so why shouldn't the security model be?
Linux, you magnificent bastard, I read the fucking manual!
I, for one, would be happy without an overlord.
He won't make any friends with the government research grant people with that attitude, though. Seriously, if you only occasionally read what Schneier has to say, and follow his advice and guidelines, you'll be more "secure" than 99% of everyone else. That's because 99% of the people (and companies) don't follow his advice, which is often simple and just requires a little effort and awareness. It's the "effort and awareness" thing that most people find challenging.
I couldn't agree more. I wrote this blog post a few months ago arguing the exact same thing. There will always be crisis situations where government intervention and coordination may be necessary, but the first line of governance and management should be at the personal, community, and company level.
DHS is a hodge podge of federal agencies that performs like the Keystone Cops in Gestapo uniforms. Not only is the NSA more qualified to take over federal infosec in a time of crisis, but it is statutorally safer for the general public because as a member of the intelligence community, it is not legally a part of the law enforcement apparatus. In order for information to flow to law enforcement, the NSA would not only have to be willing to cooperate, but have to jump a large number of hoops and hurdles to hand off the information. There are a lot of restrictions on the intelligence community with respect to information about Americans that simply don't exist for law enforcement like DHS.
The real reason why we don't need a Cybersecurity Czar is that 99 times out of 100, the systems that are getting hacked are not sensitive systems. Who cares if the Department of Labor or Interior gets hacked here and there since the intelligence community and military are generally competent at securing their classified networks?
Better question is why the USA needs Czars of anything?
Weren't they leaders of imperialist Russia?
Why would that label seem appropriate?
Top down works -- for managing the efficient, repeated performance of a task with well defined and stable success criteria, and where performance can be improved incrementally by local adjustments. Top down has a place in the world. When consistent is at a premium, top down is the way to go.
Bottom up works too -- for tasks that involve things that are too complex and fluid for a single person or chain of command to comprehend and react to. Where creativity is at a premium, bottom up is the way to go.
No structure works too -- for tasks where there is a body of people who understand every part of that task. Think a Shaker barn raising. When you have a body of people who've mastered every aspect of a task and everyone can see what task needs more hands, then no structure is the way to go.
It seems to me that something like cybersecurity needs a bit of each approach. It's organizationally difficult, if not impossible to approach such a problem perfectly. However, I think the rough appearance of a structure to handle this would be top down with expertise pushed out to the various groups in the organization and discretion allowed.
Post may contain irony: discontinue use if experiencing mood swings, nausea or elevated blood pressure.
The second they use the term "Czar", to describe a person in administrative capacity over a regulatory body, they betray the authoritarian and anti-democratic ideology with which they conspire against representative government and individual rights and liberties.
Czar is the Slavic rendering of Caesar. Why anybody sees this as an expediency worthy of trade-off for democratic involvement and oversight is a question I leave you, the dear reader to resolve.
"Speaking the Truth in times of universal deceit is a revolutionary act." -- George Orwell
Schneier seems to instinctively grasp what so many people don't: the hierarchical nature of virtually all human organizations - and derived from that vestigial alpha-male instinct - is prone to corruption, subversion, and ultimately ethical failure. Or to quote the old cliche: the Peter Principle applies here, with a twist: it's often the least ethical scum that rises to the top, not the least capable. Even the supposedly democratic United States government is organized in such a fashion, and the successful treasonous behavior of the Bush administration is a useful demonstration of how it can go wrong very quickly.
What Schneier is very reasonably suggesting is that we lessen that hierarchy, not add to it.