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Phoenix BIOSOS?
jhfry writes "In an interesting development by an unexpected source, Phoenix Technologies is releasing a Linux-based, virtualization-enabled, BIOS-based OS for computers. They implemented a full Linux distro right on the BIOS chips, and by using integrated virtualization technology, it 'allows PCs and laptops to hot-switch between the main operating system, such as Windows, and the HyperSpace environment.' So, essentially, they are 'trying to create a new market using the ideas of a fast-booting, safe platform that people can work in, but remain outside of Windows.'"
Imagine that, a mere 10 years after LinuxBIOS (now CoreBoot) first provided a full linux version on the BIOS (with near-instant booting into the OS of your choice), Phoenix gives us with this remarkable invention (complete with the standard idiotic fawning by Rob Enderle).
There is so much FUD about Trusted computting. Go watch Security Now Ep. 99 It will change how you think about trusted computing. It will separate the truth from the FUD.
This idea of putting Linux itself into the BIOS is okay if and only if the chip containing the BIOS is replaceable. In other words, the chip should not be soldered to the board.
You're joking, right? Right????
Because if not, read this then flagellate yourself 20 times with an RS232 cable.
"I don't know, therefore Aliens" Wafflebox1
Virtually? It's called a hypervisor. How do you think any VM works?
Yup, that's all the GPL says they have to do.
In fact, providing a web form is being generous.. they could accept requests only by dead tree.
How we know is more important than what we know.
Even the absolute worst flash memory can be written hundreds of times without any issues.
At a reasonable update schedule of once a month, that would be no less than 10 years. You would almoste certainly be able to update once a week for 3-4 years. And this is worst case...I would be surprised if you would really even want to use the computer anymore (due to performance issues) by the time the flash wore out 15-20 years down the road.
DOS was a BIOS based OS. It passed a large number of its calls directly to the BIOS. We all know how well that worked out.
Let's just call this a gross oversimplification and be done with it, shall we?
Why bother having a separate OS when the kernel could fit on the firmware?
For security reasons. Your firmware OS might have exploitable privilege escalation bugs, so you don't want to run untrusted software under it directly, only in a protected virtual machine environment. That virtual machine environment must have its own OS, and that would be a disk-based OS which is easier (and safer) to update in the event that security holes are found. It's preferable if the whole boot environment is as near to possible as read-only, just to reduce the possibility of malicious exploit. It shouldn't even be possible to re-flash the system without physical intervention (such as changing a jumper).
With kernel drivers *in the hardware itself*, one would never have to worry about getting the correct driver, etc...
This is true for the flash-based OS and the built-in hardware, which is why you can boot into a usable system so long as enough of the hardware is integrated on the motherboard. Don't forget plug-in cards and external peripherals, though. There's no avoiding the need for those drivers, in general.
proof, n. A demonstration that a conclusion is implied by certain premises and axioms.
Its a tool, and can be used for good/ill. I actively build/buy servers and laptops with TPM functionality because it allows me to enable encryption with BitLocker, save the recovery key someplace secure (safe deposit box), and from there on out, the encryption is completely forgotten about. On laptops, I enable the PIN functionality so an intruder would have to have the tech of a chip fab to coax the information needed to grab the HD contents. Even though TPM chips are not hardened against physical attack, few thieves outside of intel agencies have the tech to rip open a chip's package and attach probes to the chip's microscopic pads.
Either way, servers can reboot unattended while the data is encrypted, and laptops are protected against brute force password attacks. If an intruder tries to repeatedly guess a PIN, the TPM will just keep forcing longer and longer delays, if not permanently locking.
All a TPM is, is a cryptographic token that is on the hardware, with two pieces of additional functionality: The ability to validate that the MBR and booting parts of the hard disk have not been tampered with, and remote attestation.
The ability to check for tampering is important because in theory, someone can put a keylogger on the boot sector, then pass the info onto the real preboot authentication system (PGP or TrueCrypt) while saving the boot passphrase for an attacker in some safe area. If someone tries to tamper with the BitLocker subsystem, the TPM won't allow the machine to boot and it will be obvious that something is fishy.
Remote attestation is controversial, but you don't have to turn it on in BIOS. Same with Intel's vPro stuff.
Finally, by the TPM spec, all TPM chips are shipped turned off and disabled by default, so a software maker can't depend on one for DRM reasons.
OSS is a panacea for people that actually own the device and are geeks.