Microsoft's Urgent Patch Precedes Black Hat Session

Julie188 writes "Mystery solved! Microsoft's latest emergency out-of-band patch was weird beyond belief. A notice was sent to journalists and researchers late Friday evening that the patch was coming Tuesday, but Microsoft refused to explain the flaw and even put a cone of silence around researchers who would have otherwise talked about it. But finally, one researcher broke ranks and explained that the patch was caused by a flaw introduced in Microsoft's own development tools. This flaw was also the source of the emergency ActiveX patch, which took about 18 months to complete and which supposedly fixed the problem by turning off ActiveX (setting a 'killbit' on the control). Researchers at Black Hat on Wednesday will be demonstrating how to override the killbit controls and get access to vulnerabilities supposedly stopped with a killbit. What's really scary is that Microsoft has issued 175 killbits fixes so far."

Comments

Re:Imagine.

[TheRaven64]

Namely - A $100 fee every year to upgrade from 10.4, to 10.5, to 10.6, and so on

I don't like to contradict your wonderful hyperbole with mere facts, but the upgrade from 10.5 to 10.6 is going to cost $29, and comes two years after the release of 10.5, making the cost $14.50 per year, not $100. The upgrade from 10.4 to 10.5 cost $129 I believe (although it was $20 if you had bought 10.4 after 10.5 was announced) and was release 2.5 years after 10.4, making the cost per year $51.6. If you bought both of these upgrades, you will have spent $35.11 per year on upgrades.

Re:It's the commonality.

[neonsignal]

There is truth in your argument that third party additions to a browser pose a security problem, but you are comparing coffee and fish.

Plugins pose a security risk because you are running software from unknown sources as part of your browser. However, you don't need to install the plugins in order to enjoy the browser functionality.

Active X on the other hand was always intended to be integrate with web pages, which means that in many cases you would not even have been able to view the content without downloading a COM object of dubious origin. Fortunately this has largely failed, and most web content is still accessible without it (though there are a number of commercial services on the other hand that require Active X to work).

The better comparison with Active X is other dynamic web code, such as scripting languages like javascript, and of course Java, which have been used for similar purposes. There are clear differences, because Active X is running native code, and so is notoriously difficult to sandbox effectively. It is obviously a matter of degree; no system is fully secure. But whereas exploits of Active X tend to often be total (access to the host machine), exploits of systems such as javascript often revolve around more subtle issues such as masquerading.

I actually think there is merit in having internet distributable native code. But having said that, there are multiple issues. I don't think the solution is merely to improve the containment of the downloaded code (indeed, that only makes it harder for the plugin to do anything useful). The problem is one of trust: how do I know if the binary code is trustworthy (Microsoft rubberstamp certification just doesn't do it for me!); and why do most sites need Active X at all (shouldn't we just be trying to agree on some browser standards like video formats so that typical functionality can be built into the browser!).