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UK National ID Card Cloned In 12 Minutes
Death Metal writes with this excerpt from Computer Weekly, which casts some doubt on the security of the UK's proposed personal identification credential: "The prospective national ID card was broken and cloned in 12 minutes, the Daily Mail revealed this morning. The newspaper hired computer expert Adam Laurie to test the security that protects the information embedded in the chip on the card. Using a Nokia mobile phone and a laptop computer, Laurie was able to copy the data on a card that is being issued to foreign nationals in minutes."
I just can't wait for national ID cards here in the States! It'll be great for plausible deniability: "Oh, you say you saw ID? Prove it was really me."
512 MB RAM, 20 GB disk, 200 GB transfer, five datacenters. $19.95/month.
Just ban cell phones and laptop computers!
Guess they got spent a bit longer on the security aspect than most Government IT projects then.
I unfortunately read the article...
He then created a cloned card, and with help from another technology expert, changed all the data on the new card. This included the physical details of the bearer, name, fingerprints and other information.
Lets hope this puts the final nail in the coffin for this stupid idea.
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Actually, TFA is a post on Computer Weekly, who read the Daily Mail so you don't have to.
So, no, it is actually pretty bloody scary, as they successfully changed the biometrics of the copy.
'If Christ had tweeted the sermon on the mount, it might have lasted until nightfall.' - John Perry Barlow
If it's digital, exact copies are possible.
If it's digital, because of the convenience, analogue security measures will be taken less seriously.
If it's digital, uninformed politicians will think it cool, and believe in it like some do in 70 virgins.
If it's digital, the process is fast and can be automated, and the threat is increased a million-fold (out of arse, of course) by sheer statistics. We need slow electronics
If it's digital, tampering is undetectable.
Either way, this digitally secure ID thing can only lead to government saying: "Look! We've tried, and you also know that the only way to do this properly is to put you all in a database and track your every move."
Can we perhaps agree on forsaking digital security just because it's cheaper and faster in cases where we don't need it anyway (i.e. when people aren't up to no good)?
Of course it can be copied. However if I try to show YOUR ID card "as is", to a guard it might not work - he might realize that I look a bit different from you.
If the ID contains a digital store of your photo and other biometrics on it that is digitally _signed_, even though it can be copied it'll be much harder to tamper with it. And you can only create a new ID if you can sign it with a valid signature.
Of course in the real world, the _printed_ photo might be all the guards check.
Also in the real world, creating fake IDs might not be that hard - you might be able to bribe/trick someone to create a new legit ID for you, or steal/borrow the signing machines + keys (or the backup certs+keys).
BUT, once they realize what has happened, they can revoke your certs (and maybe even those who were responsible for helping you). While this sort of thing might not be that effective against suicidal terrorists, it works well for oppressing your own citizens.
If they start tying these IDs to travel and payment, then it works even better for keeping the sheep in line...
Go figure.
I work in the smartcard industry and most of the time those "breaks" mean nothing: usually the "hacker" simply reads the publicly available information and claims that the system is "broken". The reaction of the public is always interesting and shows that many users do not understand the goals of such a system, probably because the politicians that buy those systems do not explain them very well.
However in this case the article claims that they were able to clone the card AND modify the information in the cloned card, which is really the hack that those cards are trying to prevent. This article is heavier on details than many others and that makes it more credible, but the details are still muddy. I hope that the journalist missed a crucial point and that this card is not as insecure as he thinks.
Small-scale, private smartcard-based systems can be cracked, usually because they are badly installed and used. Large-scale, private smartcard-based systems can be cracked (just look into the MiFare Classic debacle) but it involves months of hard work from people with PhDs and access to expensive equipement. Large-scale, govermental smartcard-based systems can be cracked, but I would be really surprised if it took only a few minutes. Unless that hacker presents the attack in details, I will file this one in the "baseless fearmongering in order to sell more papers" folder (which is already bursting BTW).
Nobox: Only simple products.
Oh, no doubt you can clone a new card with modified data. The real question is - can you get it to verify as genuine in Government readers now you've modified it? Unless the Government's really screwed up, the cards should have digital signatures, which means any unauthorised changes to the data will make them invalid. The Daily Mail article not only doesn't do a good job of addressing this issue, it fails to realise how significant an obstacle it is. I bet they only bothered to check the card in unofficial readers that don't verify anything...
If you'd RTFA, you'd see that he also changed a ton of information as well, and created a fake ID with the modified information; including a line that said, "I am a terrorist, please shoot me on sight."
IOW, there's no security, signing, encryption, anything at all (or if there is it's so broken that it might as well not be there). The fact that it's computerized makes it easier to fake out rather than harder, and simultaneously gives the illusion of being more reliable rather than less. It's bad all around.
TCP: Why the Internet is full of SYN.
Storing a simple hash of the card contents with the hardcoded UID of the card and checking if they match when reading a card is enough to prevent any such attack. While you can copy the card and even change contents on it, it will never validate as an authentic card. Aside from that, smartcards have really gotten quite smart, as far as I know, there are no practical attacks against the newer MiFare cards(most hacks on Desfire or newer systems target the implementation of the system, not the cards themselves).
Unless there have been leeps and bounds in smart card technology in the past couple of years I think this is an overstatement. A few years back I made most my money buying blank smart cards, copying the information from the satelite TV smartcards, changing a few places in the hexidecimal coding, and selling full unblocked TV. Of course we would tell the user to remove the cards from the boxes at night when the companys would do system checks that fry any unauthorized cards. And the cost of such equipment, $49.95. Not expensive and on about average, 15 minutes of work. If the UK is using the same format, that would be a real easy "hack".
Here in Portugal we've had ID cards since the 19th century. We were pioneers in the usage of smart cards as ID cards, together with Belgium and Finland.
While our old paper ID cards were easily falsifiable, the new smart card is virtually impossible to falsify. It has a lot of physical security measures, a few holograms, engravings, etc. As to the chip, all the data in the chip is digitally signed by the government. The RSA private keys inside are generated by the card during personalisation, and are not extractable. I dare you try to create a false one. The British card seems to be a cheap piece of shit.
Anyway, what's all the fuss about ID cards? What do you use to identify yourself? Social Security card? Driver's license? How hard it is to forge one of these?
ID tends to be something like a driver's license or passport. Other measures can be used (e.g. by banks) if you don't drive and haven't been on holiday. Similarly the Government in the UK has some fairly simple ID cards for teenagers who want to prove their age to buy alcohol but don't have a driver's license or passport.
It's not impossible, and it all depends on how hard the passport etc is actually checked, but there are all the normal measures of holograms and watermarks.
It's generally:
a) the extra crap that the government wants to store on there for no good reason
b) the extra crap that the government wants to store in a database (for probably quite bad reasons)
c) the extra expense to get said extra information
d) the fact that the main argument is "do it or teh terrorororoists winz!"
e) the fact that so much money has been poured in to them and they're obviously so broken
f) the fact that it'll become enforceable to display your ID, with the next step being "no ID on the spot? that's a crime"
Indeed. Please tag this story "DailyFail".
I've no grounds for arguing with the facts, and certainly agree with the disgust for these ID cards, but any story in the Mail that touches on "scrounging foreigners damaging our property values and insulting the sacred memory of Princess Di" is not to be trusted.
And the government expert witness, on the goverment's payroll of course, will say the ID is nearly infallible and you'll end up in jail.
I think this is symptomatic of the biggest single problem with so many government powers.
Things will inevitably go wrong in any system as large and complicated as running a national government. This will be true even if everyone tries to be diligent and acts with nothing but good intentions. There is no point either pretending that this won't happen or pretending that it would be better if we dropped all government systems that could possibly cause such problems no matter how much good they might otherwise do.
However, there should always be a system in place that allows mistakes to be detected and put right quickly, and without making things any worse for the unlucky victim. This is particularly true in cases of mistaken identity or other factual errors, where the consequences might be anything from financial loss such as being denied benefits or overtaxed, through loss of reputation and all the damage to relationships and career that might entail, right through to violent arrest and detention (or worse).
As a declaration of interest, I am particularly sceptical about any claims relating to ID, because I was once overtaxed significantly due to a case of mistaken identity at a government tax office. It was bad enough that I was left short of money to pay my rent without warning, but even worse that it took nearly three months and a huge amount of effort on my part to get it put right, and I never received so much as a real apology or full explanation afterwards. I can forgive a data entry error by someone who's probably earning near the minimum wage and typing hundreds or thousands of these numbers every day. I can't forgive a system that damages me for months afterwards because it can't acknowledge that it made a mistake.
If you disagree, post your argument. (-1, Overrated) isn't your personal censorship tool for views you don't like.