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Real-Time Keyloggers

The NY Times has a story and a blog backgrounder focusing on a weapon now being wielded by bad guys (most likely in Eastern Europe, according to the Times): Trojan horse keyloggers that report back in real-time. The capability came to light in a court filing (PDF) by Project Honey Pot against "John Doe" thieves. The case was filed in order to compel the banks — which are almost as secretive as the cyber-crooks — to reveal information such as IP addresses that could lead back to the miscreants. Or at least allow victims to be notified. Real-time keyloggers were first discovered in the wild last year, but the court filing and the Times article should bring new attention to the threat. The technique menaces the 2-factor authentication that some banks have instituted: "By going real time, hackers now can get around some of the roadblocks that companies have put in their way. Most significantly, they are now undeterred by systems that create temporary passwords, such as RSA's SecurID system, which involves a small gadget that displays a six-digit number that changes every minute based on a complex formula. If [your] computer is infected, the Trojan zaps your temporary password back to the waiting hacker who immediately uses it to log onto your account. Sometimes, the hacker logs on from his own computer, probably using tricks to hide its location. Other times, the Trojan allows the hacker to control your computer, opening a browser session that you can't see."

205 comments

  1. Real Time? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

    My Windoze apps at work don't even respond in real time. Maybe the trojan provides a free performance boost?

    1. Re:Real Time? by commodore64_love · · Score: 1

      Go into Task Manager.
      Select program you want to run in real time
      Right click and "go to process"
      Right click and "set priority"
      Choose real time.

      Easy. I do this for Windows Media Player since it eliminates annoying lags while watching the pro....er, downloaded movies.

      --
      "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." - historian Evelyn Beatrice Hall
    2. Re:Real Time? by shentino · · Score: 1

      Well, lubrication does often make things go faster...

    3. Re:Real Time? by Inner_Child · · Score: 4, Funny

      I understand, it's embarrassing to admit to watching professional wrestling...

      --
      Today is red jello day - all workers must eat all of their red jello. Failure to comply will result in five demerits.
    4. Re:Real Time? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      My Windoze apps at work don't even respond in real time. Maybe the trojan provides a free performance boost?

      The ribbed ones do ("for her pleasure"). Wait, what were we talking about?

    5. Re:Real Time? by ls671 · · Score: 1

      and *synthetic* lubrication has the reputation the make things go even faster...

      --
      Everything I write is lies, read between the lines.
  2. OTP !! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    RSA Secuid is a one time password,it can't be reused.

    1. Re:OTP !! by shird · · Score: 4, Insightful

      That doesn't stop them from blocking your login such that they are the only ones using the password/id. They log the keystrokes prior to it being sent over the wire to the bank, block the post to login.cgi, and login for themselves.

      --
      I.O.U One Sig.
    2. Re:OTP !! by growse · · Score: 1

      Think it's Cain and Able that can work out successive securID values based on 3 or 4 sequential correct values. What we really need is challenge response, done properly.

      --
      There is nothing interesting going on at my blog
    3. Re:OTP !! by Jah-Wren+Ryel · · Score: 4, Insightful

      They log the keystrokes prior to it being sent over the wire to the bank, block the post to login.cgi, and login for themselves.

      If they are smart they can even provide a fake error page once they've acquired the credentials that tells the user that the site is "experiencing technical difficulties" and that they should please try again in 15 minutes. 99.99% of users won't think a thing of it.

      --
      When information is power, privacy is freedom.
    4. Re:OTP !! by kabloom · · Score: 1

      That's probably a really hard hack to pull off. But I doubt most users would notice anything if they got an RSA SecurID password wrong once -- they'd assume it's a typo.

      (By the way, I don't see any information saying RSA SecurID only lets you use the token once. Sure it changes every 60 seconds, so that's as good as "once", but if two people happened to be racing to type in the same code at the same time, I don't see anything saying it would deny access.)

    5. Re:OTP !! by scottv67 · · Score: 1

      >(By the way, I don't see any information saying RSA SecurID only lets you use the token once. Sure it changes every 60 seconds, so that's as good as "once", but if two people happened to be racing to type in the same code at the same time, I don't see anything saying it would deny access.)

      That feature is set on the RSA server. The first device to present your username and passcode gets the green light. The second device (VPN appliance, webserver, whatever) to present that same username and passcode gets a red light, even if that passcode is still valid.

    6. Re:OTP !! by bytethese · · Score: 1

      I don't see it as very hard. Use DNS poisoning to redirect the page that looks like a normal login page, user types in their RSA Passcode and it's still valid for at least a few more seconds. The user is shown a "Technical Difficulties page" and then the attacker uses the real time captured Passcode to log in to the real site.

      This would probably work best as an active attack rather than passive, that is someone is targeting someone directly.

  3. Execute Them by Nom+du+Keyboard · · Score: 0, Flamebait

    Only when we start immediately and publicly executing these hackers whenever we discover them will we start to put a dent into this problem. Frankly, I don't think that they'll be missed afterwards.

    --
    "It's the height of ridiculousness to say for those 9 lines you get hundreds of millions."
  4. Thwarted by properly designed online banking by upside · · Score: 4, Informative

    Again, a proper banking system like my bank uses

    - a one time pad for logging on
    - another set of codes, from which one is picked randomly, to confirm transfers

    The one time pad means they can't open a second session. Even if they could hijack the session I've opened they can't transfer money without my explicitly authorizing each transfer by entering the second code.

    --
    I'm sorry if I haven't offended anyone
    1. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Mine does this too. It is (almost) impossible to transfer funds to an unknown account without a key-signing operation, in which I see the destination account number.
      But i'm sure people are dumb enough to sign whatever the computer asks them to, so it's not foolproof.

    2. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by fbjon · · Score: 1

      Technically, it's possible to modify the browser itself so it inserts unwanted transactions into the list, but hides them from view for the user, and then just waits for them to get confirmed in conjunction with some other transaction made by the user. Don't know if it's worth the trouble though.

      --
      True confidence comes not from realising you are as good as your peers, but that your peers are as bad as you are.
    3. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Jah-Wren+Ryel · · Score: 3, Interesting

      The one time pad means they can't open a second session.

      RSA secure-id keys are single-use too. They roll every minute but they also roll on every successful use.

      --
      When information is power, privacy is freedom.
    4. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Uh no. A proper security system has to work as follows.

      You have a dongle that you can insert between the keyboard and the computer machine that signs each keystroke. If you do this then the bank can verify that the input is passing through the dongle. Including the users password. Note that the dongle can be built into the computer if needed, for instance on a laptop.

    5. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

      An alternative used by at least one bank in Australia is that when you request a transaction they send ans sms to your pre-authenticated mobile number detailing the transaction, i.e who to and how much, and giving an authorisation code that you then enter. That code only authorises that specific transaction.
      No need to carry a one-time pad around or a special code generator

    6. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You're confused, One-Time Pad != One-Time Password.

    7. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      They can, however, act as a MITM and perform a transfer they desire while displaying it as the transfer you desired. Without a trusted hash or cipher on your end, you're ultimately screwed.

      I don't know why the stupid RSA tokens don't have the banking interface built into them and talk SSL over bluetooth/USB for a much more secure solution. At the very least, they should be able to display the account numbers in question for a transfer, as well as the amount, and be used to sign that information so the bank will not be able to accept MITM'd transactions.

    8. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by CrashandDie · · Score: 5, Informative

      Disclaimer: I work for one of RSA's competitors in this domain.

      The article focuses on RSA's SecurID, but one of the main drawbacks of RSA's SecurID is that it is only time based. Other companies also use event-counters, which means that you can't actually replay the attack.

      The parent is right (and I should now, I deploy these solutions), most serious banks will use OTPs (One Time Passwords) for the initial log-on, but then require Challenge-Responses to sign the transactions (website provides a challenge, which can be a completely random number, or based on a number of variables: amount, target account, etc; this challenge is provided to the token (stupidly named "gadget" in the summary), and it spits out a response.) This can be verified by the server.

      OTPs have always had this flaw, and this really isn't any news. I've heard of attacks were real-time keyloggers would interrupt the network connection (wifi, ethernet, whatever) on a software/OS level temporarily (I assume by refreshing the DHCP bumf) as to allow the attacker to use the OTP.

      However, this can be easily thwarted.

      Any good Authentication Server will provide the option to use seeded authentication, and even though this doesn't apply to OTPs (most OTP algorithms actually include clock counter (and event counter if it is implemented, not RSA's case) related information in the OTP, hence the whole OTP is required for authentication), it does apply to Memorable Data. For example, 2nd and 8th character of your secret passcode. Or for example, even better: multiply the 4th digit of your OTP with the 6th digit of your secret passcode. (OTP still required to be input completely). Yeah sure, given sufficient time, the attacker should be able to know what your passcode is, but heck, that's going to require quite some effort.

      Wikipedia has a bit of a section about the MITM attacks vulnerabilities of OTPs (even though it is right in SecurID's article, it doesn't apply to them alone, but to the concept as a whole). The main issue, however, with RSA's implementation isn't necessarily the MITM attack, but quite simply, stealing the token. It doesn't have a PIN code, heck, it even just shows the code the whole time (last one I checked did this), and I could read the number right off my friend's keychain.

      Also, let us not forget that a one-time attack (which again, shouldn't be much of an issue if banks have a good solution that requires CRs for each transaction) on an account really isn't a big deal. It's a One-Time Password. It's only valid once. After he's visited the account, and seen the balance, that's about as far as he's going to go.

      Nothing to see here, please move along. If anything, this is just going to drive our business a bit.

    9. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by CrashandDie · · Score: 3, Insightful

      A good solution (read as "implementation") would consist of a challenge that the user can verify corresponds to the transaction he wishes to do. Four first digits of the Challenge are the four last digits of the sum. Six last digits of the Challenge are the six first digits of the target bank account. Etc.

      Nobody can expect good security if the user doesn't watch out and double checks what's happening. The attack you're talking of could very well be done to a poor old lady paying her bills for the month in front of her bank manager. Just slip a bill she shouldn't pay: if neither she or the bank pay attention, the money will be stolen.

      Even though I work in this field, and I'd love to come up with a solution that fixes all the issues, I just don't believe it. There will always be monkeys reading through tons of transactions, trying to spot the one that doesn't belong, and you will always having your credit card company calling you when suddenly there's $5k flying through some casino 800 miles from your residence.

      There is no ultimate security when it comes to banking apps, especially when you give end-users, and thus end-computers (which can and will be infected/modified/hacked in all ways imaginable or not) access to your application, you can't trust it. The only thing we can try to do is mitigate the risk for the general population, and hope we can filter out the few hacks. If you don't spot it, just pay the bill. The amount of money you lose that way will always be less than trying to fund impossible research that may yield nothing at all.

    10. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by mce · · Score: 1

      For starters, I don't think they roll on success (how would the device know, by the way?). -- Disclaimer: I'm holding one in my hand right now, so I'm pretty sure. ;-)

      But even if they would: the legitimate user would not be able to know the difference between a failure due to making a typo and a failure due to some hacker beating him to the line. So he'd assume the former and simply try again, not understanding that someone else is active at the same time. Providing such a false sense of security, doesn't sound like good design...

    11. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by bruno.fatia · · Score: 3, Funny

      My bank has so much more security that even when I want to I can't transfer anything!

    12. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Quothz · · Score: 1

      The one time pad means they can't open a second session.

      No, it means you can't open a second session. You never posted your login, because they control the vertical and the horizontal. Although the transfer confirmation code should stop 'em, one hopes.

    13. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Jah-Wren+Ryel · · Score: 5, Informative

      For starters, I don't think they roll on success (how would the device know, by the way?).

      The server enforces it. You can't authenticate multiple times with the same token. The server returns an "an already used" code if it was recently used. I know this because I've written software that uses RSA's secure-id toolkit.

      But even if they would: the legitimate user would not be able to know the difference between a failure due to making a typo and a failure due to some hacker beating him to the line.

      Again, see the point out about return values from the server-side. The application may choose to report this information directly to the user or simply flag it for the security team to investigate further. I prefer the later because false positives are going to be pretty rare unless the client software is broken in other ways.

      --
      When information is power, privacy is freedom.
    14. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Jah-Wren+Ryel · · Score: 3, Interesting

      An alternative used by at least one bank in Australia is that when you request a transaction they send ans sms to your pre-authenticated mobile number detailing the transaction, i.e who to and how much, and giving an authorisation code that you then enter. That code only authorises that specific transaction.

      That's common in Europe too. But the result has been that hacking sms in various ways has become of great interest to thieves. If they don't already exist, you can count on seeing java trojans for cells phones that silently forward SMS too.

      --
      When information is power, privacy is freedom.
    15. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by timmarhy · · Score: 1

      my bank does something similar - all transfers require inital confirmation via an sms sent to my mobile.

      --
      If you mod me down, I will become more powerful than you can imagine....
    16. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by ckaminski · · Score: 1

      Which bank is this, and how do you get your codes?

    17. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Disclaimer: I work for one of RSA's competitors in this domain.

      That's ok. Which one? Entrust? If Entrust had better support of OWA, cisco, radius & clustering my company probably would have gone with Entrust.

      The article focuses on RSA's SecurID, but one of the main drawbacks of RSA's SecurID is that it is only time based. Other companies also use event-counters, which means that you can't actually replay the attack.

      You can set your RSA SecurID server so that replay isn't allowed - even though the token changes every 60 seconds, it can only be used once in that 60 second time period, so replay isn't possible.

      Actually, it can be annoying: I sit down at my desk and log on to my desktop with my token. Next, I log on to a different server - I have to wait until the token number changes before logging on to the next server.

      Wikipedia has a bit of a section about the MITM attacks vulnerabilities of OTPs (even though it is right in SecurID's article, it doesn't apply to them alone, but to the concept as a whole). The main issue, however, with RSA's implementation isn't necessarily the MITM attack, but quite simply, stealing the token. It doesn't have a PIN code,

      Normally RSA tokens do have a PIN code, and you need both the PIN and the token to log on. It's true that you can set the RSA SecurID server to NOT require a PIN, but RSA strongly recommends against it.

      Personally, I think the biggest flaw of RSA securID is the abomination of the version 7.1 server. RSA reprogrammed the entire thing in java. What used to be a small fast lightweight app now requires 4 gigs of memory to run well, and even with that, it typically takes 10-15 minutes for the app to start.

      I would prefer to use the 64-bit version & throw a lot of memory at it, but RSA's radius server doesn't yet work on 64-bit.

    18. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by ColdWetDog · · Score: 1

      My bank has so much more security that even when I want to I can't transfer anything!

      You have to have the money in your account in the first place.... Most banks are pretty good at making sure that requirement is upheld. Sorry if it messes up your plans.

      --
      Faster! Faster! Faster would be better!
    19. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      My company uses RSA's SecurID tokens for VPN access and they do require a PIN along with the token code. You cannot simply read someone's token and log in with the number unless you also know their username and PIN.

    20. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Grieviant · · Score: 1

      An alternative used by at least one bank in Australia is that when you request a transaction they send ans sms to your pre-authenticated mobile number detailing the transaction, i.e who to and how much, and giving an authorisation code that you then enter. That code only authorises that specific transaction. No need to carry a one-time pad around or a special code generator

      Could this be made stronger by requiring an actual voice message to be sent as a response, to which the bank could apply a voice recognition algorithm to verify that it was actually sent by you? It wouldn't have to be a true confirmation "voice message" per se, but the alphanumeric code spoken rather than keyed.

    21. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by kafka47 · · Score: 4, Insightful

      I work for RSA and you are absolutely correct. Attempting to authenticate twice with the same tokencode will automatically yield a rejection.

      I believe the idea of this "real-time application" is that they see you typing in your passcode and zap that code into the authentication system before you do. The success of this hack is predicated on the notion that they are watching with baited anticipation, ready to spring into action the exact moment you sign into your online bank.

      The chance of this actually occurring is highly remote, to say the least. The technique of racing ahead of a potential 2-factor authentication is compelling in theory, but of little practical use. If they're going to get into your bank, it has nothing to do with "defeating" Securid (or any other one-time display mechanism).

      Suffice to say, this story is bunk.

    22. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Interesting, wasn't aware of the linked issue. Of course, it would require that they also know your mobile number but I'll concede there are a number of ways they could get that. As for trojans on the mobile, haven't heard of any but your right that they'll almost certainly appear. If nothing else they'll want them to do key-logging for people who access their bank accounts from their phone.

    23. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by anarche · · Score: 1

      Which is why the article suggests closing business accounts without secondary coding; and using personal accounts with secondary code authorisation for money transfers.

      --
      Wait! Whats a sig?
    24. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by mjwx · · Score: 1

      If they don't already exist, you can count on seeing java trojans for cells phones that silently forward SMS too.

      Not that easy to do silently as in Australia and Europe SMS's cost the sender not the receiver. At AU$0.25 per SMS this will be noticed easily by even the dumbest of phone users. It will take one case in front of the TIO (Telecommunications Industry Ombudsmen) for Telco's to block SMS forwarding all together, despite the fact the telco will likely win in front of the TIO (virus is on the client side, telco has nothing to do with it) they don't want to go through the hassle of dealing with their infected customers so blocking SMS forwarding outright will be the easiest option for them.

      I can agree that phone virus's are coming but at the moment there is not enough of a unified operating environment to make it worthwhile, even Symbian differs from handset to handset.

      SMS authentication is a good idea, it's a cheap way of providing reliable two factor authentication, which is something that is sorely needed for internet banking. Even if this system gets cracked (and it will) it will be a lot more difficult then just simply grabbing the users password, you also need the users phone making it significantly more secure then just a username and password.

      --
      Calling someone a "hater" only means you can not rationally rebut their argument.
    25. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Swedish online banking requires.

      1) One time PW to log in (this is broken with the technology described)

      2) One time PW based on account number for any new account to send money to (this means that you have to enter a code once for each company or person you want to be able to send money to)

      3) One time PW based on the amount total sent when you confirm a group of payments.

      So basically, even if I'm not careful the only situation where they can get money from me is if they hi-jack my browser while I'm paying someone new (someone I never payed before) and fake the name and account number so that I think that I'm adding the account that I want to add, and hope that I don't notice that the numbers are incorrect. And even in that case they will only get the amount that I intended to pay to the real recipient, unless they also change the amount, which they then have to show me in plain text (since I need to punch the amount into my pad to get a new one time PW).

      So that attack requires me to make 2 mistakes (besides not having proper firewall and browser integrity). Now since my pad gives the same code answer if I type the same sequence twice in a row (perhaps this changes once per minute as previously suggested) it might be possible to change the amount sent out covertly by changing the total to the same as the account number and reuse that one time code but that would require that I had more than 1 million SEK (150K USD) available in my account, or if they reuse the login code (which always starts with a 9) more than 9 million SEK in my account. And these attacks are moot if the pad rolls on successful use.

    26. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Thanshin · · Score: 1

      Pff, that's nothing. My bank system is much safer.

      It demands a password.
      It demands the code from a one time pad.
      It demands a confirmation of the full detailed transaction.
      As the transaction surpasses a certain amount it asks you to physically go to the bank.
      You then get to the bank, to assure the bank director you do want to make the payment.

      From that point, the information required depends on your skill convincing the bank director that you actually do want to buy diamonds through "THA INTARWEBS!" and that you're not crazy nor a moron.

      I suggest starting the conversation with "No, they don't use your data to buy children in the third world and put them in a mine."

      Oh, now that I think on it, I also suggest not letting the conversation derive into "where were the diamonds you're trying to buy found, and how many children died extracting them, you fraking child murdered." as it may reduce your chances of closing the transaction in a reasonable time span.

      If the hacker manages to do that remotely and in real time I say he can keep the children.

    27. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by mcrbids · · Score: 1

      A properly designed security system fails gracefully by limiting the knowledge available at *every* step of the game.

      Let's make a few assumptions:

      1) The bank has a password generator. It's a simple key/value randomizer. It's very, very secure.

      2) The end user has a cell phone. It may or may not be hacked.

      3) The end user is attempting to get money or do something with the bank. It might be on a computer, or it might be a credit payment machine at a grocery store. The device can be reliably tracked (EG: IP address, or something similar) but it also may or may not be hacked.

      You are the end user, and wish to make a credit card payment.

      A) You swipe your card. The payment machine connects (indirectly) to the password generator, sending the balance to be paid. The password generator creates a key/password combo tied to the address for the device.

      B) The password generator sends the key, password, and amount to be paid to the user's cell phone by SMS. The password generator sends only the key to the payment machine.

      C) The end user gets the text message, and compares the key and amount charged to the machine. Verifying both, he enters in the password, and then a PIN (as now) completing the transaction.

      D) Password generator compares the key, the source, the amount charged, and the password. If all match, the payment is approved and funds are delivered.

      This protocol provides an attack window that is small and shallow.

      A) If your credit card is stolen, the hax0r must have your cell phone to authorize a transaction. Value ~ worthless.

      B) If your credit card AND cell phone are stolen, the hax0r must also know your PIN. Value ~ worthless

      C) If your phone is hacked and hax0r sees your SMS messages, they can't use the key/password on any other payment gateway, since it's no more useful than any other random number for a purchase. And your PIN is never sent on the cell phone. Value ~ worthless.

      D) If the credit machine is hacked, having the key, password, and balance doesn't do much since they can't charge for any amount other than the end user can verify, and also can't use the password for any other purchases without at least alerting the cell user.

      E) This method drastically mitigates MITM attacks since the balance deducted is reviewed by the end user, and is only as good as the presence of the cell phone.

      To defeat this system, the hax0r must:

      1) Have a reliable means of reading YOUR cell phone messages while simultaneously blocking you from receiving them.

      2) Have your PIN code.

      3) Have a copy of your credit card.

      Possible, perhaps. But still damned hard to do. And even if SMS were made vulnerable, *any* other communications channel can be just as effective. Email, pagers, even Twitter could be used. (the SMS messages don't exactly *have* to be private)

      And while this protocol isn't perfect, and there are SOME weaknesses, these weaknesses are vastly reduced from the current "anybody can fake being you just by knowing the credit card number that you pass out to anyone you buy from" method that's used today.

      --
      I have no problem with your religion until you decide it's reason to deprive others of the truth.
    28. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by cerberusss · · Score: 1

      The success of this hack is predicated on the notion that they are watching with baited anticipation, ready to spring into action the exact moment you sign into your online bank. The chance of this actually occurring is highly remote, to say the least.

      (Emphasis mine).

      Well, if a background process would be waiting with baited anticipation, and would create a valid login and then sit back, the hacker would have 20 minutes (or whatever the server-side determined session timeout) to get to his terminal and use the open, authenticated session.

      Where I think this totally fails, is that my bank uses two-factor authentication for logging in as well as for doing an actual transfer. This is where the hack fails for such systems: it depends on letting the user create a session but the user itself will need to validate the transfers.

      --
      8 of 13 people found this answer helpful. Did you?
    29. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by CrashandDie · · Score: 2, Informative

      That would depend on the version of the token, I guess. There is not just one universal version. Some have keypads, others don't.

    30. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yes the story is bunk, "real time keyloggers" (a new scare word from now on?) is nothing new. As for the 2 factor identification system: I think its a little bit naive saying that a keylogger alone can't break it. Never forget that computers are turing complete, meaning: If there is a keylogger installed it would be trivial to redirect the client to your server instead of the banks.

      As for the "ssl warns about this" argument, it's completely moot since 95% of users press ok anyways (I pulled that number out of my ass any real numbers would be appriciated...)

    31. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by hab136 · · Score: 1

      The success of this hack is predicated on the notion that they are watching with baited anticipation, ready to spring into action the exact moment you sign into your online bank.

      Or have an automated system waiting to do the same. It's not hard to automate logging in to a website and clicking "transfer funds".

    32. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Much easier to simply prevent sending of the RSA token (hook relevant Win32API and drop the request). You no longer have to race the user and are now only concerned with token timeout.

    33. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Peter+Mork · · Score: 1

      The article focuses on RSA's SecurID, but one of the main drawbacks of RSA's SecurID is that it is only time based.

      I can only speak to the RSA authentication I use, but once a 6-digit password has been used, it cannot be used a second time. This feature is enforced server-side and is especially annoying if you need to authenticate multiple times because each remote application (email, timecard, etc.) requires a separate authentication.

      Moreover, at least in this instance, the SecurID password must be combined with a 4-digit PIN. Actually, according to Wikipedia: "A user authenticating to a network resourcesay, a dial-in server or a firewallneeds to enter both a personal identification number and the number being displayed at that moment on their RSA SecurID token (emphasis mine)." However, it then goes on to note that "some systems using RSA SecurID disregard PIN implementation altogether." Thus, a PIN seems to be an optional component of SecurID.

    34. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by xtracto · · Score: 1

      The chance of this actually occurring is highly remote, to say the least. The technique of racing ahead of a potential 2-factor authentication is compelling in theory, but of little practical use

      Some food for thought:

      After you have successfully installed a Trojan into a victims computer you could:
      - Log for a predefined time, the web usage, filtering specific sites of interest (like online banking logon pages)
      - Extract time/date patterns of such information to predict the next time the victim will hit the interest page.
      - Create a trigger that enables real time logging of the http traffic when the victim is login in. You can use VNC-like screen capturing for real-tiem monitoring.
      - Ask the victim for TANs while impersonating the web page.
      - Use those TANs along with other obtained information to gain unauthorized access to the victim's account.

      --
      Ubuntu is an African word meaning 'I can't configure Debian'
    35. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by CrashandDie · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Actually, my point was that other vendors provide tokens that require a PIN to be input into the device, rather than to the server. The device can be locked if an incorrect PIN is entered, etc.

      Also, I never intended to say that Authentication Servers implementing SecurID weren't able to counter replay-attacks (this is a base functionality), I was merely stating that it didn't use event-counters to calculate the OTP. Other vendors provide this functionnality, and this enhances security, as instead of having only a time-based OTP (that is, having an OTP that changes every x seconds), you can also include event-based information (an event counter is basically just a number that gets incremented every time the OTP is generated), and thus the server is able to know how many times an OTP has been generated (this also removes the issue you were talking of, a new OTP can be generated on-demand, even if the time-window hasn't changed, the OTP will be different).

      The added advantage is that one can monitor how many tries a user needs to successfully login. Also, devices can get "unsynchronised" if too many OTPs are generated (the server only calculates that many OTPs).

      Another thing is that some vendors will have the device update its key after every OTP generation (hence the reason the event counter is useful, as to know how many times the key has been updated). This is not something RSA is able to do. They keep yelling to their customers that AES is absolutely required on these devices, and in their case it is. However, other vendors get away with using much lighter encryption keys (3DES, for example), because the key is a brand new one after every single OTP, the OTP is only valid for a few minutes, whereas 3DES still requires 10 hours or so to be cracked.

    36. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by synackpshfin · · Score: 1

      The OTP on RSA tokens are still valid only for a period of time - usually current time +-1 minute.

    37. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Lord+Ender · · Score: 1

      Did you even read the summary? They are intercepting authentication attempts and using the one time password (not "pad," you ninny).

      --
      A slashdotter who didn't build his own computer is like a Jedi who didn't build his own lightsaber.
    38. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by synackpshfin · · Score: 1

      I don't have too many good things to say about RSA but they actually do have challenge-response capable tokens. http://www.rsa.com/node.aspx?id=1311

    39. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by TheKidWho · · Score: 1

      What the system should do is kill the session for both users if a duplicate key is used...

    40. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Qzukk · · Score: 1

      As for the "ssl warns about this" argument, it's completely moot

      If I was going around installing keyloggers, I'd also install my fake CA certificate so that my fake bank sites appear trusted to the browser.

      --
      If I have been able to see further than others, it is because I bought a pair of binoculars.
    41. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by do0b · · Score: 1

      The main issue, however, with RSA's implementation isn't necessarily the MITM attack, but quite simply, stealing the token. It doesn't have a PIN code, heck, it even just shows the code the whole time (last one I checked did this), and I could read the number right off my friend's keychain.

      That would be incorrect. While it does display the token code all the time, the user needs to remember his PIN. Reading the code off of the keychain wouldn't do you any good.* *: depends on a proper SecurID setup.

      --
      After 12 years and a few days, I finally gave in to the dark side and joined slashdot.
    42. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Ironica · · Score: 1

      So people who don't own their own computers shouldn't have access to online banking?

      --
      Don't you wish your girlfriend was a geek like me?
    43. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Ironica · · Score: 1

      The system you describe would be feasible for online banking from a computer terminal, but not from a merchant pay terminal. SMS is often near-instantaneous, but the increase in cycle time from having to wait for the message and key in an additional code would cause massive complaint in busy retail environments. (Yes, people are stupid... but hey, it's a reality, we need to deal with it.)

      --
      Don't you wish your girlfriend was a geek like me?
    44. Re:Thwarted by properly designed online banking by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      So working for another company in this same area, there are a number of banks using 2 one time passwords already. One at login and One at transaction. This is great for real-time phishing sites, but really doesn't do anything for true real-time man-in-the-middle attacks.

      There are ways to combat these attacks, and there are banks out there that have already started deploying (yes, even here in the states). The most common is out of band electronic signature (eSig). This is generally done with a hardware device that requires the user to type fields into the device and the device generates a unique time/event based one time password. Basically the idea is that if the challenges entered into the device are modified before they get to the other side, then the password would be invalid.

      We are finding that there is a lot of movement towards mobile options, but there are many attacks on that too, so the hardware option is currently probably the most secure.

  5. Sigh... by Annwvyn · · Score: 1

    "By going real time, hackers now can..." Exactly the kind of crap that gives REAL hackers a bad name to the lay-person. The douchebags stealing info from banks aren't hackers... they are thieves and crackers.

    1. Re:Sigh... by John+Hasler · · Score: 1

      I think that the guys who write the software qualify as hackers. Evil hackers, but hackers nonetheless.

      --
      Warning: this article may contain humor, sarcasm, parody, and perhaps even irony. Read at your own risk.
    2. Re:Sigh... by commodore64_love · · Score: 1, Interesting

      >>>The douchebags stealing info from banks aren't hackers... they are thieves and crackers.

      You don't know your definitions son. For as long as I can remember, a hacker was someone who broke-into secured computers. I don't see how you can claim there's anything "good" about such a person. (shrug). And a "cracker" is someone who defeats copy-protection. Originally that applied to cracking floppies, but now it also applies to CDs, DVDs and downloaded media like MP3/AAC files.

      So in other words the article used the proper terminology for somebody hacking to secure websites - hackers.

      --
      "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." - historian Evelyn Beatrice Hall
    3. Re:Sigh... by Annwvyn · · Score: 1

      There are several definitions of hacker. The original definition of the word is not someone who does what you mention, not even close. The definition that you give is the 'modern mainstream culture' definition, but I view most mainstream culture as retarded and ignorant (because of articles that mention hackers in a negative light, which you apparently have also been brainwashed by). Do a wikipedia on hacker, see what else is out there. Most people that call themselves 'hackers' in the computer-savvy world that I know are people that are more curious than anything else and just want to 'solve the puzzle,' usually by tweaking their own software and hardware. If you also want to, go look up a programming job site that sells jobs and I bet you will see the word hacker used just as much as programmer--no, it is not to 'hack' into your friend's computer to plant an idiotic virus that makes naked ladies pop up on his screen.

    4. Re:Sigh... by commodore64_love · · Score: 1

      I've been using computers since the early 80s, and hacking very specifically meant someone doing things that the "authorities" would consider crimes - like phreaking to get free phone calls. Or wardialing to find computers to break into. Or just guessing people's passwords on BBSes so you can raise havoc. And of course cracking software so it could be copied freely amongst friends (aka piracy).

      Adjusting settings hardly qualifies you as a "hacker" - that's just your average, ordinary computer "user" and nothing special. Anyone can adjust settings if they just put in the time.

      --
      "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." - historian Evelyn Beatrice Hall
    5. Re:Sigh... by rduke15 · · Score: 1

      Google says it's "someone who plays golf poorly".

    6. Re:Sigh... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Google says it's "someone who plays golf poorly".

      Huh... I thought that was a duffer.

    7. Re:Sigh... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You might want to check the history: look at Jargon 1.1.0

      HACK n. 1. Originally a quick job that produces what is needed, but
            not well. 2. The result of that job. 3. NEAT HACK: A clever
            technique. Also, a brilliant practical joke, where neatness is
            correlated with cleverness, harmlessness, and surprise value.
            Example: the Caltech Rose Bowl card display switch circa 1961.
            4. REAL HACK: A crock (occasionally affectionate).
            v. 5. With "together", to throw something together so it will work.
            6. To bear emotionally or physically. "I can't hack this heat!" 7.
            To work on something (typically a program). In specific sense:
            "What are you doing?" "I'm hacking TECO." In general sense: "What
            do you do around here?" "I hack TECO." (The former is
            time-immediate, the latter time-extended.) More generally, "I hack
            x" is roughly equivalent to "x is my bag". "I hack solid-state
            physics." 8. To pull a prank on. See definition 3 and HACKER (def
            #6). 9. v.i. To waste time (as opposed to TOOL). "Watcha up to?"
            "Oh, just hacking." 10. HACK UP (ON): To hack, but generally
            implies that the result is meanings 1-2. 11. HACK VALUE: Term used
            as the reason or motivation for expending effort toward a seemingly
            useless goal, the point being that the accomplished goal is a hack.
            For example, MacLISP has code to read and print roman numerals,
            which was installed purely for hack value.
            HAPPY HACKING: A farewell. HOW'S HACKING?: A friendly greeting
            among hackers. HACK HACK: A somewhat pointless but friendly
            comment, often used as a temporary farewell.

      HACKER [originally, someone who makes furniture with an axe] n. 1. A
            person who enjoys learning the details of programming systems and
            how to stretch their capabilities, as opposed to most users who
            prefer to learn only the minimum necessary. 2. One who programs
            enthusiastically, or who enjoys programming rather than just
            theorizing about programming. 3. A person capable of appreciating
            hack value (q.v.). 4. A person who is good at programming quickly.
            Not everything a hacker produces is a hack. 5. An expert at a
            particular program, or one who frequently does work using it or on
            it; example: "A SAIL hacker". (Definitions 1 to 5 are correlated,
            and people who fit them congregate.) 6. A malicious or inquisitive
            meddler who tries to discover information by poking around. Hence
            "password hacker", "network hacker".

      The meaning you are using is just one of 6, and is one of the more recent ones. Among hackers in the other senses, those are commonly called crackers.

    8. Re:Sigh... by commodore64_love · · Score: 1

      "Hackers follow a culture of anti-authoritarianism"

      In other words they commit acts that the authorities consider crimes, like breaking-into secure computers, making free phonecalls, copying software without permission, et cetera. Just like I said previously. (Also it's worth nothing that wikipedia article is marked "unverified claims" so it's basically an invalid reference and proves nothing.)

      --
      "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." - historian Evelyn Beatrice Hall
    9. Re:Sigh... by Ironica · · Score: 1

      "Hackers follow a culture of anti-authoritarianism"

      In other words they commit acts that the authorities consider crimes, like breaking-into secure computers, making free phonecalls, copying software without permission, et cetera. Just like I said previously.

      But that's not *all* they do.

      Hacking is not by definition illegal. You can "hack" a piece of hardware or software such that you change its behavior from that intended by the original designer without breaking any laws. You're still a hacker.

      Here, I'll translate it into car-analogy for you.... The other day, my husband watched someone use a couple of special shims and inflatable bladders to open the door of a BMW without the keys and without setting off the alarm. Now, certainly, such activities *could* be done in the pursuit of lawbreaking, but as it happens, my father-in-law had locked his keys in his car, and the guy was a Triple-A dispatched mechanic.

      --
      Don't you wish your girlfriend was a geek like me?
    10. Re:Sigh... by theaveng · · Score: 1

      That's called engineering (hardware) or programming (software), not hacking. Hacking is very clearly "breaking" something that is not meant to be broken, like the old-fashioned safecrackers, but done electronically.

      --
      FOX NEWS.com should be BANNED from television and internet. Have the Congress take it over and give us Truespeak.
  6. Not a problem by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    RSA SecurID can be configured to only allow a tokencode to be used for authentication once. If configured in this way, the above keylogger still wouldn't let someone log in remotely after the legitimate user had used the tokencode.

    Not too much of an issue, really.

    1. Re:Not a problem by Mascot · · Score: 1

      I think the assumption would have to be made that the trojan prevents the token from actually being transmitted to the bank, thus giving the thief its one login.

      As I mention in my other post though, I still don't see it as an issue, since every actual transaction would require a freshly generated token (assuming a sane bank).

    2. Re:Not a problem by fwr · · Score: 1

      You're not thinking out of the box. Sure SecurID is a one-time password system, but that doesn't mean it still can't be exploited. If the keylogger is sophisticated enough to be able to pick out the username, pin, and tokencode, it is sophisticated enough to send the real tokencode to the hacker, in real time, while fudging it up for the user. Passwords are usually masked anyway, so the user would never know that the keylogger changed the tokencode. The hacker logs in, and the user tries again, possibly waiting for the next tokencode.

    3. Re:Not a problem by John+Hasler · · Score: 1

      The cracker logs in. The guy who wrote the trojan may qualify as a (evil) hacker but the one using it is a mere cracker.

      --
      Warning: this article may contain humor, sarcasm, parody, and perhaps even irony. Read at your own risk.
    4. Re:Not a problem by QuantumG · · Score: 1

      Except that the attacker can just return a "no, that's invalid, try logging in again" and the user will happily give them a second token which they can now use to do the transfer.

      --
      How we know is more important than what we know.
    5. Re:Not a problem by Mascot · · Score: 1

      The calculator won't give you a new token for another 30-60 seconds (depending on configuration).

      Of course, one could argue that people that won't notice anything odd with a forged site, also won't mind the usually instant "eeer, wrong!" taking a whole minute. But nothing will save the idiot from the persistent phisher, so at some point the line between security and convenience needs to be drawn.

    6. Re:Not a problem by QuantumG · · Score: 1

      Umm.. it's a banking website.. I dunno about your bank, but my bank takes 30+ seconds to log me in on a good day.

      Oh, and blaming the user for a failure of technology is classic geek arrogance. The simple fact is, these token devices a part of the arms race and if you want to keep ahead, you've got to keep innovating. For example, most users don't even *need* wire transfer capabilities so they should be disabled by default, when they ask for it to be enabled the bank gets the opportunity to educate users that the second generator built into the device is for authorizing wire transfers only.

      --
      How we know is more important than what we know.
    7. Re:Not a problem by Mascot · · Score: 1

      Umm.. it's a banking website.. I dunno about your bank, but my bank takes 30+ seconds to log me in on a good day.

      I covered that in my text. Ours are pretty much instant.

      People will physically travel to other countries to give money to Nigeria scams, and you think any amount of technology will secure their online bank accounts? Now that's truly geek arrogance.

      As with any thing else, there are no fool proof systems. You could shutdown online banking completely, and you'd just get more identity theft.

      A bank having token based security today is somewhat like having a burglary alarm. It won't stop people from breaking in, but they're more likely to do the next house if they don't have an alarm (and if they _do_ pick yours, it's harder from them to do it unnoticed). There are still plenty of banks in some nations that do not even use token based security, or so I hear.

  7. I'm not feeling the menace by Mascot · · Score: 1

    The technique menaces the 2-factor authentication that some banks have instituted:

    Sure, they could intercept my login, but that would get them nothing. A new token is required for each and every transaction once logged in. I suppose they could try to add an emulation layer of sorts for the entire bank site, but that starts to become a lot of work with a lot of opportunity to notice something strange going on.

  8. And? by ledow · · Score: 1

    Does it really matter? If they have access to your PC, why on Earth is this an issue anyway? Two-factor authentication or not, they have *ACCESS* to your Visa numbers, Amazon account, bank details (if you pay some bills online by direct transfer etc.). What the things *do* once they are on your machine is irrelevant. How they got there and finding them is infinitely more important.

  9. 2-factor by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    This doesn't break RSA's 2-factor at all, as long as they have it setup to accept each temporary password only once.

  10. Re:Biometrics by vux984 · · Score: 3, Informative

    RSA was good while it lasted. It's still better than nothing. Looks like we may need to invest in biometric laptops for the crew. What a pain.

    Reread what they are doing, biometric laptops won't help. They could capture the biometric data as easily as the keyboard data.

  11. Execute them? No. Catch them. by John+Hasler · · Score: 4, Insightful

    No need to execute them. No need to punish them severely at all. We just need to catch them. Given a 50% risk of being caught a one year prison sentence would provide more than adequate deterrence. Given the present one in 100 million risk of being caught an 18th century hanging would offer no significant deterrence.

    This applies to crime in general as well.

    --
    Warning: this article may contain humor, sarcasm, parody, and perhaps even irony. Read at your own risk.
  12. I just got nailed by a logger by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

    I'm careful but I just noticed a lag in my e-mail typing so I'm assuming I got nailed by a logger. I switched off that machine and don't use it for the internet but I am having trouble getting rid of it. I've been having a lot of trouble getting rid of things since I switched to Vista. What's the best software these days? I had all my security up and I hadn't been downloading even commercial software so I haven't a clue where it came from. I do a lot of on-line banking so I'm not about to use that machine again but I'd love to get rid of it since I do have a lot of web sites saved off on that one. All I can think was I got it from clicking on a web link to a story. I do surf a lot of news.

    1. Re:I just got nailed by a logger by michaelhood · · Score: 1

      If you were naive enough to get a trojan to begin with, almost certainly the best "software" (OS?) for you is going to be not going online at all.

    2. Re:I just got nailed by a logger by Sir_Lewk · · Score: 1

      I switched to Vista

      And you say you are having lag issues. How curious...

      --
      "linux is just DOS with a UNIX like syntax" -- Galactic Dominator (944134)
  13. Time for a secured endpoint like IBM's ZTIC? by mlts · · Score: 2, Interesting

    I wonder if the next step will be a dedicated hardware device such as IBM's ZTIC, where one does their transaction confirming on a closed secure device. This way, even though the consumer's PC may be compromised, an attacker trying to run transactions would be stopped when there is no device confirming the transaction.

    Of course, there are always issues like spamming the user with bogus transactions, or compromise the hardware device. However, it is a lot harder to compromise a hardware device than a generic PC which has to parse/execute/render untrusted code from the Internet on a common basis.

    1. Re:Time for a secured endpoint like IBM's ZTIC? by ckedge · · Score: 1

      I already do this basically. I have an encrypted OS on a USB key that I boot from when I want to do online banking, and in that OS image I do ONLY banking, no other websites of any kind. It's linux and it's firewall is on, auto-updates/etc are off. Nothing short of a full BIOS virus running a VM emulator can get at me, that or a hardware key logger. And that's unlikely, because I generally use a dis-used PC at work that has no hdd/os (spare in the corner of the equipment room), or a spare system at home that is generally off and never used as a desktop/etc.

    2. Re:Time for a secured endpoint like IBM's ZTIC? by mlts · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Long term, what comes to my mind for secure transactions would be placing a hypervisor at the BIOS level, and having a hardened OS dedicated for banking and other items. Then having an OS in another VM for general stuff (gaming, /., etc.)

      Of course, there are five issues with putting hypervisors in every PC out there:

      1: The hypervisor needs to be hardened. By default, these have a smaller attack surface than an OS, but there are ways to get around its protection. If malware in an untrusted partition is able to flash the machine's BIOS, modify the location where the hypervisor is stored, or edit the NVRAM where the hypervisor settings are stored, game over.

      2: Training people to use the protected OS partition as opposed to just pulling up whatever Web browser they are using for browsing their pr0n with all the dubious software "codecs" installed. Once you get the functionality to be able to have a secure partition, getting users to always switch to it before doing sensitive work will be hard. A lot of users balk to any security getting in their way even if it means devastation later on down the road.

      3: Concerns about it being Palladium NGSCB v2, loss of owner control over a PC, and DRM stacks enforced by hardware. One can point to the PS3 to show how tough it takes to crack a well engineered piece of hardware.

      4: The secure OS will need to be hardened from the ground up with few bells and whistles that can be exploited. The kernel would likely need some type of MAC (mandatory access control) similar to SELinux/TrustedBSD, except that every app that runs would require a profile. This OS may not be as user friendly as some may like because it isn't intended to be a full OS for day to day work, but one that accomplishes basic tasks (Web browsing, E-mail, remote desktop sessions, ssh client, bare bones Open Office functionality) in a secure environment. Things like Flash and other add-ons that can't be vetted line by line in source would have to be left out, making the user experience nowhere as good as a regular operating system.

      5: The embedded OS for this has to load fast and have a small RAM footprint. I'm not meaning 15-30 seconds that a normal OS takes to get to operation, but as fast as alt-tabbing to another app and typing in details. If a secure OS takes too long to load, users won't bother using it and take the gamble that their general purpose OS doesn't have malware present.

  14. Re:Biometrics by John+Hasler · · Score: 5, Funny

    Anything to avoid a secure OS eh?

    --
    Warning: this article may contain humor, sarcasm, parody, and perhaps even irony. Read at your own risk.
  15. Run a Virtual Machine by popo · · Score: 1

    And browse / log in using the VM. Done.

    --
    ------ The best brain training is now totally free : )
    1. Re:Run a Virtual Machine by Eudial · · Score: 1

      What's changed in that? If a Trojan can get into your host machine, it can get into your emulated machine (since it obviously has Internet connectivity), and vice versa. Doesn't really matter if it catches real or emulated key presses.

      --
      GAAH! MY PRINTER IS ON FIRE!!! PUT IT OUT! PUT IT OUT!
    2. Re:Run a Virtual Machine by mjwx · · Score: 1

      And browse / log in using the VM. Done.

      A VM can fall victim to the same vulnerability.

      Virtual Keyboard (preferably a browser based one) is a better defence, still poor compared to stopping malware at the gateway before you infect your machine. If you don't trust\have the virtual keyboard just make one by writing out A-Z, 0-9 and all the special characters into a text editor and copy and paste each one as you need it. Yes this takes time but it is less vulnerable to key loggers.

      Banks implementing two factor authentication is a better idea however.

      --
      Calling someone a "hater" only means you can not rationally rebut their argument.
  16. Too late by dandart · · Score: 1

    This message means your browser has been exploited with a known hole causing black hat crackers to receive what you type!

  17. Yo dawg by dandart · · Score: 0

    I herd u liek browser. Tis MINE NAO! Im in ur b0x0rz stealin ur keystrokes! All your cardz are belong to us!

  18. RSA SecurID by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    From TFS:

    "Most significantly, they are now undeterred by systems that create temporary passwords, such as RSA's SecurID system, which involves a small gadget that displays a six-digit number that changes every minute based on a complex formula."

    The RSA SecurID tokens generate a unique code that is only valid for ONE logon transaction. As soon as it's used, it becomes invalid, no matter if it's still within the one-minute window of validity or not, so you can't log on twice with the same code. The only chance the real-time hackers would have is to grab the code and log in in the few moments between when the user finishes typing in the passcode and them pressing enter.

  19. Anonymoys Coward by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Real time key logger, that reports back visited web sites? Isn't that how Google Chrome address bar works?

  20. Doesn't work by FranTaylor · · Score: 1

    VMs can break into their host machine.

    Read the paper presented at the recent BlackHat Conference.

    1. Re:Doesn't work by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Knoppix boot disc. Read only. Done.

  21. Well I agree but by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

    Its not like we don't know what countries most of this Cracker crap is coming from. We need to deal effectively with the nations that are lax on this stuff. They are lax because it serves their political interest. Eastern Europe is a big place but rather authoritarian. This stuff could would stop over night if they wanted to stop it.

    1. Re:Well I agree but by Eudial · · Score: 3, Insightful

      It's hard to motivate to your voters why you need to spend huge amounts of tax money chasing down cyber criminals that mostly operate abroad, thus not affecting your country in the slightest, when that money could go to catching criminals that do, or to education, health care, whatever.

      --
      GAAH! MY PRINTER IS ON FIRE!!! PUT IT OUT! PUT IT OUT!
    2. Re:Well I agree but by younata · · Score: 0

      I like not having my money stolen. That would be reason enough, right?

    3. Re:Well I agree but by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

      Most of these crackers operate with the full knowledge of the "governments" of the countries they reside in.

    4. Re:Well I agree but by selven · · Score: 1

      Voters are generally emotionally biased toward fighting crime even when it isn't very useful - there was an experiment done where people were asked to choose between spending money to combat thing A and national parks destroyed by [deer/poachers]. The group that got poachers was much more likely to choose that over thing A than the group that got the deer.

    5. Re:Well I agree but by Keeper+Of+Keys · · Score: 1

      I imagine their activities do affect their country - for the better, as they effectively bring money into the economy. Isn't it odd that these activities are largely concentrated in poor countries? We could probably alleviate the problem by raising living standards in Eastern Europe, Africa, China, etc.

    6. Re:Well I agree but by Keeper+Of+Keys · · Score: 1

      Seems to me like quite a good thing that people value fairness highly.

    7. Re:Well I agree but by Ironica · · Score: 1

      Seems to me like quite a good thing that people value fairness highly.

      It's not as simple as people valuing fairness. People actually place a negative value on unfair behavior, such that they are willing to pay an out-of-pocket cost to punish it. Even when the punishment doesn't change the behavior.

      If it was just people valuing fairness, they'd be willing to put money into systems that keep people honest. Instead, people are more willing to put money into punitive systems to deal with people who were unfair.

      --
      Don't you wish your girlfriend was a geek like me?
  22. For once I'm glad... by Iphtashu+Fitz · · Score: 1

    ... that I'm still a Bank of America customer. I've grown to like their 2-factor authentication mechanism. You can set up your account so that whenever you try to log in they send a random 6-digit number to you via a text message to your phone. You then enter that number into the website as you're logging in. Since it's truly a one-time-use number sent out of band from the way you're logging in it's about as secure as you can get.

    1. Re:For once I'm glad... by caluml · · Score: 1

      I remember suggesting this years ago, and the responses I got at the time were "but I/my mother/granddad/aging relative doesn't have a mobile phone", or "I don't want to have to carry around my mobile to use my online banking" - all very strange retorts. Glad to see a bank using its noddle.

  23. I type with my brain by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Who uses a keyboard anyway ?

  24. Re:Execute them? No. Catch them. by commodore64_love · · Score: 1

    >>>Given the present one in 100 million risk of being caught...

    And since our lazy leaders, who don't even bother to read the bills they pass, are unlikely to change this statistic, I'm going to go close my online bank account right now. The last thing I need is some asshole swiping my half-million life savings. I'll just drive to the bank instead.

    --
    "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." - historian Evelyn Beatrice Hall
  25. Re:Execute them? No. Catch them. by schon · · Score: 3, Insightful

    We just need to catch them. Given a 50% risk of being caught a one year prison sentence would provide more than adequate deterrence.

    Your post displays a lack of understanding of the criminal mind. Don't feel too bad though, because most people (especially lawmakers) have the same lack of understanding.

    The thing about criminal sentences is that they don't work as deterrents - because criminals don't believe they'll be caught. Career criminals believe that only idiots get caught, and since they're smarter than everyone else (thanks to the Dunning-Krueger effect), they won't be caught.

  26. Likely known by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I am pretty sure they know who the "cyber criminals" are mostly.

  27. News? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Wait, aren't ALL keyloggers real time?

  28. The problem is service provider sloppyness by Animats · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Bank of America used to have a good system for authenticating their site. At login, you input your ID, and the B of A site gave you back a photo of your own choosing to tell you that you were on the real Bank of America site. Only then did you input your password.

    Last Friday, B of A broke this feature. I'm now getting a password prompt without seeing the photo I'd chosen. My first thought was that there's was a security problem. I checked the SSL cert info, which looked OK. I reinstalled Firefox. No change. I called Bank of America. They wanted me to remove Flash, which I did. No change. They advised me not to log in. Then they passed me off to tech support, which hasn't called back yet.

    Then I took out a Linux-based Eee PC 2G Surf that had been unused for months, powered it up, plugged in an Ethernet cable, and saw the site doing exactly the same thing. So it's probably not a client side problem.

    What I think happened is that someone at B of A did a partial site redesign and broke something. They introduced some Flash (something called "/sas/sas-docs/html/pmfso.swf") on the password page (a terrible idea, given Flash's history of security vulnerabilities) and along with that, broke some part of the login process.

    If, in fact, they've had a break in on the server side, the main login of Bank of America has been compromised for at least three days now. I'm not seeing any indication of that, though; just general ineptitude.

    (The page HTML is awful. It's clearly been modified over and over for years without a cleanup. It has Flash, Javascript, CSS, single-pixel GIFs for formatting, and comments like "July maintenance OLB timeout inactivity update starts". The "enter password" page has 966 lines of HTML and JavaScript, not including external files. That's too much flaky machinery for such a security-critical function.)

    1. Re:The problem is service provider sloppyness by langelgjm · · Score: 1

      FYI, I just looked at the BoA site and I don't see the problem you describe. Maybe it's a regional thing? Also, ING has a similar picture based system.

      --
      "Anyone who [rips a CD] is probably engaging in copyright infringement." - David O. Carson
    2. Re:The problem is service provider sloppyness by noidentity · · Score: 1

      Bank of America used to have a good system for authenticating their site. At login, you input your ID, and the B of A site gave you back a photo of your own choosing to tell you that you were on the real Bank of America site. Only then did you input your password.

      My credit union used this for a while, but stopped recently (or maybe not! *eerie music*). I don't see how it helps me verify that I'm really connecting to their site, though, since a middleman site can just as easily act as a proxy to the real site, relaying my account number to it and relaying the verification image back to its fake page, making me think it's the real page. Then when I enter my password, I'm screwed.

    3. Re:The problem is service provider sloppyness by Igmuth · · Score: 2, Insightful

      How does this provide any security? All the fake site needs to do is get the picture from the BoA site. (Heck a well written script could cause your machine to do it for them.) Once that happens you are no better off than you were before, and likely worse (Since you are training people to assume that "picture means legit", instead of other more secure methods.

    4. Re:The problem is service provider sloppyness by red_blue_yellow · · Score: 1

      When a machine accesses the site for the first time, you're required to answer extra questions (mother's maiden name type of thing); after answering these questions correctly, you can specify if you want to skip this process the next time that you try to login. After all of this, you can enter your password.

      If there were a MITM, you would see these questions which you should not need to answer from your computer any more. Granted, most people would just assume that something had expired, and it was time to answer the questions again; but, I suppose if you were security-minded, you might suspect something was up.

      --
      A neutral communications medium is essential. It is the basis of science, by which humankind should decide what is true.
    5. Re:The problem is service provider sloppyness by Jainith · · Score: 1

      Your talking about Passmark (bought by RSA in 2006). As some other posters have metioned the security provided is questionable. It is also typically sold as "Multi-Factor" Authentication. It includes a computer fingerprint generated with JS and Flash. There was a major push for all banks to buy this software in 2007/2008. If any cares for more infomation I was responsible for supporting MFA (Passmark) at a $1B community bank for around a year.

    6. Re:The problem is service provider sloppyness by Quirkz · · Score: 1

      Is this the same Bank of America that used to insist your password be exactly four characters, no more, no less? Admittedly it's been a few years since I used them or their site, but as recently as 4 years ago they wouldn't *let* me put in a password with any more than 4 characters. Glad to see they're finally catching up with the times.

      ING also has this same feature, showing you a picture you picked at account creation, plus a word.

    7. Re:The problem is service provider sloppyness by Cr4wford · · Score: 1

      I still see the "Site Key" picture you speak of.

      --
      Freelance Web Designer - Portfolio
  29. Exactly right. by brunes69 · · Score: 2, Insightful

    How many of these stories do we have to see before people wake up and realize that the login and security method is irrelevant if the OS itself is compromised?

  30. Second data channel needed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    As long as everything needed for a successful bank transaction is done through one line (e.g. your Internet connection at home) and a malicious hacker is able to control your endpoint of that connection, he will be able to attack any transaction, no matter how complex the security is (all secure communication schemes are based on the assumption that the endpoints are secure)

    A good solution is to require communication over a second channel, e.g. telephone calls or SMS for confirmation of transactions (bank sends SMS with transaction data, client sends SMS with "authorize"). This is done by some banks already.

  31. Re:Execute them? Immunology by mindbrane · · Score: 1

    The human immune system is in part adaptive. It learns, or, acquires a repertoire of effective actions against invading antigens. The black hats drive PC and Internet security. In a sense their critical doubt run amok, but, as such, push innovative responses. In the late 90's the Internet was alive with crackers and script kiddies. There was a one time a community of reverse engineering that "boasted" a University. I'm not saying they're good. There a bad pain in the ass but I'd rather give their kind enough room on the Internet to allow white hats to keep the best possible eye on them. How lame would PC security be without being incessantly tested?

    --
    ideopath @ play
  32. yeah but by scarboni888 · · Score: 1

    will it run on Linux?

  33. Utter Bullshit by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Realtime keyloggers have been around since botnes have been and then some. Utter Bullshit.

  34. You know you're being real-time keylogged when... by philibob · · Score: 2, Insightful

    ...Your router's activity light blinks every time you press a key on the keyboard.

    I assume it's trivial to detect this type of keylogging.

  35. 2-factor, 2-path authentication, source auth. by davidwr · · Score: 1

    Assuming your phone isn't being compromised, the bank could just call you on your telephone-number-of-record. Of course, you'd need to make sure the bad guys couldn't change that number.

    Also, banks should be on the lookout for things like "he used his ATM card at home yesterday, he's in Eastern Europe today" and react accordingly.

    These won't stop all such attacks, but they will help.

    Another technique is to require inter-bank transactions over a certain amount to be held until they can be affirmed "in person," such as by the customer going into any cooperating bank, ATM, grocery store, etc. and smiling for the camera as he affirms the transaction.

    Attack-the-consumer bank fraud cannot be completely stopped but by making it not worth the effort, criminals will try other ways of getting rich, perhaps even honest ones.

    --
    Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
    1. Re:2-factor, 2-path authentication, source auth. by mysidia · · Score: 1

      Assuming your phone isn't being compromised, the bank could just call you on your telephone-number-of-record.

      Isn't phone compromise just as plausible as computer compromise?

      If you are a VoIP user, the hacker may use control of your computer to inspect packets to your VoIP handset, and intercept certain phone calls (specifically: ones from your bank).

      There's also a (hopefully faint) possibility that a determined attacker who somehow got your personal identity details could signup for an account with an online VoIP provider like vonage (using a CC number stolen from you), get your number moved or ("ported") to their system, so the attacker now controls your phone number, get your phone company to assign you a new number, and perform a man-in-the-middle attack against your home phone.

      Naturally, this just depends on how much of your information the criminal has stolen, before they can effectively impersonate you and get resources of yours temporarily under their control.

    2. Re:2-factor, 2-path authentication, source auth. by SL+Baur · · Score: 1

      Also, banks should be on the lookout for things like "he used his ATM card at home yesterday, he's in Eastern Europe today" and react accordingly.

      I've had that happen to me s/Eastern Europe/Southeast Asia/ when I was buying my wife a Macbook after a looong plane flight. Most unpleasant, though I appreciated the thought.

    3. Re:2-factor, 2-path authentication, source auth. by Pete+(big-pete) · · Score: 1

      Also, banks should be on the lookout for things like "he used his ATM card at home yesterday, he's in Eastern Europe today" and react accordingly.

      This is what my bank does, and it annoys the hell out of me. I do a lot of foreign travel, and I also mainly live outside the country where my bank is based.

      If my bank sees overseas transactions (including internet transactions with a source IP outside the bank's country), then they block the transaction and the card, until I call them to have the block removed. The block is then removed for all transactions for 30 days.

      This is quite embarrassing as almost (unless within the 30 days) every time I try to use my card to pay a hotel bill, book a flight, or buy something moderately expensive then I need to call the bank because the transaction fails.

      Due to my situation I asked the bank to remove this "security feature" from my account, but they refuse. The inconvenience reached such a level that I now have a credit card with another bank that I use when possible instead...

      -- Pete.

    4. Re:2-factor, 2-path authentication, source auth. by Ironica · · Score: 1

      Better implementations of this type of fraud protection detect unusual use specific to the account. i.e. if you do the majority of your transactions in a particular county, and suddenly do one from halfway around the world, they'll flag it... but if you travel frequently, they won't. And *really* good ones will notice that you usually use your card to pay for hotels, rental cars, plane tickets, etc., and you're suddenly trying to buy several thousand dollars worth of consumer electronics from a site you've never used before WHILE your other activity shows you seem to be far from your home address, and will flag that transaction.

      --
      Don't you wish your girlfriend was a geek like me?
  36. Re:Biometrics by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

    First of all, RSA SecurID has nothing to do with the algorithm RSA (besides being created by the same people).

    Second, biometrics won't help at all since they can simply transmit the biometric data back and have *permanent* access to whatever system uses it.

    Finally, RSA SecurID is actually *not* vulnerable because the passwords it generates are *one time* passwords. If the hacker tries to log in to the system using the same password the victim just did, he will be rejected since that password was already used. If he keeps trying to do this, they will probably detect the attack and remove the trojan (not to mention that a single event where the same password is used twice from two different locations is already suspicious enough). If he somehow manages to get the password and log in with it before the victim does (even though at this point the victim has already entered his password), the victim will not be able to log in and quickly detect the problem.

  37. No single "criminal mind" by davidwr · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Your post displays a lack of understanding of the criminal mind. [snip] The thing about criminal sentences is that they don't work as deterrents - because criminals don't believe they'll be caught.

    There is no single "criminal mind."

    True, many criminals grossly underestimate the chances of getting caught or suffering significant consequences.

    Some, those who who protest against governments in violation of the law or who steal from the rich to give to the poor, do so for a real or imagined higher purpose.

    Others are aware of the consequences but get some benefit out of it, such as the thrill of "getting away with it," the thrill of showing they are, at least this time, more powerful than their victim or society, the thrill or other benefits of a drug high, or simply for financial gain.

    I can give you a USA-based example with misdemeanor speeding tickets: Many people spend their entire adult life speeding 5-10% over the speed limit on the highways even when it is safe to go the speed limit, knowing they will get caught a few times a decade. For them, it's simply a matter of cost-vs-benefit. In some parts of the world or for people with certain political connections, the cost-benefit equation for fraud favors the criminal.

    --
    Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
    1. Re:No single "criminal mind" by commodore64_love · · Score: 1

      U.S. speed limits are also set artificially low.

      How else can you explain an engineering report that lists 120mph as the designed maximum limit for an interstate, and an 85mph recommended limit for travel, but somehow gets signed at 65? The only reason I can conclude why politicians ignore engineers' recommendations is because the politicians view the twenty mph gap as an opportunity - to increase tax revenue.

      And of course the Bernie Madoff-like scammers we call insurance companies also benefit because they can double or triple your rates if you get speeding tickets, even if you are a perfect driver who's never wrecked.

      --
      "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." - historian Evelyn Beatrice Hall
    2. Re:No single "criminal mind" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I can give you a USA-based example with misdemeanor speeding tickets: Many people spend their entire adult life speeding 5-10% over the speed limit on the highways even when it is safe to go the speed limit, knowing they will get caught a few times a decade.

      Uh, do you live in the US? Every single person everywhere drives 5 MPH over the limit and that's almost always at least 10% over (40 in a 35 is 14% over). I have never known anyone anywhere to get a speeding ticket for 5 over. I have known people to get stopped for 5 over but it was always because the cop just wanted to check them out for some reason (suspected drunk driving or whatever) but even they never got a ticket for it.

      The people that drive 7 MPH over the limit are the ones that will get a ticket once in a blue moon. 10 over and you're going to be getting them all the time.

      People do not do this to "get away with it" or whatever, they do it because they like going faster. Most people will go as fast as they can just because you get where you're going faster and it's fun. In no way is it because of some feeling of getting away with a crime. That's ridiculous. Some people maybe but they are rare.

    3. Re:No single "criminal mind" by SL+Baur · · Score: 2, Insightful

      How else can you explain an engineering report that lists 120mph as the designed maximum limit for an interstate, and an 85mph recommended limit for travel, but somehow gets signed at 65? The only reason I can conclude why politicians ignore engineers' recommendations is because the politicians view the twenty mph gap as an opportunity - to increase tax revenue.

      Something like that. For those of you young'uns who don't remember Dick, his administration flooded TV with advertisements that said "55 saves lives", then violated the 10th amendment to force states to comply with it.

      Lowered speed limits had *nothing* to do with fuel efficiency. And for those of you who think that is the case ... get off my lawn!

    4. Re:No single "criminal mind" by SL+Baur · · Score: 1

      Uh, do you live in the US? Every single person everywhere drives 5 MPH over the limit and that's almost always at least 10% over (40 in a 35 is 14% over). I have never known anyone anywhere to get a speeding ticket for 5 over.

      Obviously you have never been to, or driven in California (USA). My home town hired its first motorcycle cop explicitly for ticketing things like this.

      See if you can find some old ca.driving Usenet archives. That's probably the most central place you can go for details.

    5. Re:No single "criminal mind" by commodore64_love · · Score: 1

      Since +5 mph falls within the error of the radar gun, that ticket would quickly be voided by the courts.

      --
      "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." - historian Evelyn Beatrice Hall
    6. Re:No single "criminal mind" by CastrTroy · · Score: 1

      For those that want to take the day off work to go down to court and fight it.

      --

      Anthropic principle: We see the universe the way it is because if it were different we would not be here to see it.
    7. Re:No single "criminal mind" by Ironica · · Score: 1

      How else can you explain an engineering report that lists 120mph as the designed maximum limit for an interstate, and an 85mph recommended limit for travel, but somehow gets signed at 65? The only reason I can conclude why politicians ignore engineers' recommendations is because the politicians view the twenty mph gap as an opportunity - to increase tax revenue.

      Actually, there are a lot of reasons. Some of them have been listed below, such as fuel economy. However, another reason is a combination of safety and efficient use of the road. Given human reflexes, maximum safe throughput occurs at about 45 MPH. At higher speeds, the following distance required for the trailing car to be able to stop in time causes sufficient overhead that the positive effect on throughput gained by increasing the speed is nullified.

      In practice, however, people don't generally leave adequate following distance. Still, maximum throughput in real-life scenarios occurs at about... 65 MPH. Coincidence? I think not.

      Now, they *could* make the speed laws change with the time of day or heaviness of traffic, but that's excessively complicated.

      --
      Don't you wish your girlfriend was a geek like me?
    8. Re:No single "criminal mind" by theaveng · · Score: 1

      >>>another reason is a combination of safety and efficient use of the road.

      And don't you think the *highway engineers* already took that into account with their recommended 85mph travel speed? Who the hell are the silk-suited jokers in the legislature to overrule a carefully-studied recommendation by several engineers??? Why even bother having engineers if you're not going to listen to them? (Yes I'm exasperated with my idiot non-engineer boss - can you tell?)

      >>>maximum throughput in real-life scenarios occurs at about... 65 MPH. Coincidence? I think not.

      Then how come the western states have limits of 75 mph? Or in the case of Montana, no daytime limit? I'd like to hear your justification since you claim 65 is the "ideal". Why are these states allowing speeds above the ideal? POINT: I suspect 65 is not ideal, and you just pulled it out of your ___. The actual ideal is 85 just as the interstate engineers routinely recommend in their reports.

      --
      FOX NEWS.com should be BANNED from television and internet. Have the Congress take it over and give us Truespeak.
    9. Re:No single "criminal mind" by Ironica · · Score: 1

      Actually, I learned all this from transportation ENGINEERS in a transportation ENGINEERING class. It wasn't required for my planning degree, it was totally optional, but I thought it would be a good idea.

      First of all... 85 is not the OPTIMUM speed. It's the design speed, true. Roads are engineered with the assumption that they *will* have to accommodate drivers who are 70 years old, drunk, driving at night in the rain. That's how they determine curvature, lane width, shoulder width, sign placement, etc. So, once you've made the road navigable by a senior alcoholic in the wet & dark, it turns out that a sober driver with average reflexes, good visibility and dry traction can safely drive it at 85. Is it safe to assume that all, or even most, drivers, all, or even most of the time, meet all those criteria? Hell no.

      The fact that maximum throughput occurs at 65 MPH was discovered in a CalTrans data analysis project in San Diego County. They looked at the actual traffic during peak times, based on the sensor network on the freeways. They were expecting to see max throughput around 45 MPH, but they found instead that it occurred at 65 MPH. Further analysis showed that this happened because people were following much closer than recommended, given human reaction times. It makes pileups more likely, but increases throughput in the meantime.

      As for why, then, do some states have higher speed limits... what's their traffic like? Does Bozeman have hour-long traffic jams on a daily basis? Is Cheyenne suffering for lack of lane miles? In California, the speed limit is 65 in the urbanized areas, but 70 on the open highway... where the extra throughput isn't needed.

      --
      Don't you wish your girlfriend was a geek like me?
  38. Put everything in Greasemonkey scripts by rduke15 · · Score: 1

    When the first part of the authentication is done by a Greasemonkey script, keyloggers don't see that. Or do they?

    This may sound like a joke, but in fact I do have one part of the authentication scripted in Greasemonkey. That gets me directly to the next step with some sort of challenge-response system involving a calculator-like gadget with my bank card inserted in it.

    Of course, if your bank requires nothing else than an account number and a password which you have in a GM script, I would be glad to borrow your computer...

    The systems I know are the ones of the swiss post (pdf) and of UBS (pdf). I do wonder if these can be attacked by such instant keloggers.

  39. Why? by KneelBeforeZod · · Score: 1

    Why is there a "GoogleWave" tag? I don't get it.

  40. Banks do not widely use 2-factor authentication by mysidia · · Score: 2, Informative

    They use wish-it-was two-factor

    Two-factor authentication is when authentication requires two different factors of authentication. Some possible factors of authentication are something you know (PIN numbers, passwords, usernames, secret answers to questions arranged in advanced), something you have (smart card, key fob, pass-card, a special piece of hardware, a SSL certificate loaded on a device that you can't read), something you are (biometric identification, facial, voice, fingerprint recognition, hardware that reads your GPS position to verify you are at home, a phone number that checks your ANI caller ID information)

    Most banks only require something you know. The security question/answer dialogs that are commonly used are equivalent to a second password, granted: a second password that is likely to be a lot less secure.

    Issues like the 'temporary passwords' on your key fobs being discovered when you use them can be defeated, by only allowing the password to be used once. If an attempt to use the temporary password is used again, or an attempt is made to use any incorrect temporary password, then all active sessions should be logged out.

    In addition both sessions should be warned about the attempt, and that their computer station may be compromised, they should update their antivirus and antispyware scanners, disconnect from the internet, and perform a full scan.

  41. I have to ask by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Do these real-time keyloggers affect Linux?

    My wife is really comfortable with her WinXP software and I'll never get her to change to Linux (I've tried, but it's hopeless). Still, I have given her a Linux laptop for doing her on-line banking and she does not use the WinXP machine for any financial transactions. I was thinking that I only had to deal with Firefox exploits that way

  42. Re:You know you're being real-time keylogged when. by mysidia · · Score: 1

    Escaping that sort of detection is easy by not transmitting each individual keystroke in real-time. Maybe once every 4 or 5 keystrokes, or when you click, press enter, submit, space bar, or do something else that indicates a "text break".

    In addition, they can attenuate this by sending a constant low-bitrate stream of data when you aren't typing anything, so your router's activity lights are always blinking.

    E.g., they might transmit a 56-byte packet every 2 to 3 seconds, say something innoculous like a port 80 ping to windows update servers (or your distro's update servers for Linux users).

    Needless to say, all the keystroke log transmissions would be encrypted and random fuzziness generated to make it hard for adversaries and network-based IDS to identify generated packets as keylogger traffic.

  43. Nothing New by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Me and my friends have been using this in the USA since uhm... ever. It's pretty easy.

    sock.send(keypressed);

    Or something to the effect of that.
    On the other end:

    sock.recv(keypressed);
    cout keypressed;

  44. Re:Execute them? No. Catch them. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

    "Your post displays a lack of understanding of the criminal mind."

        Who the fuck do you think you are? Axel Foley? Your post displays a lack of open-mindedness and foresight.

        So you're saying that an increase in the number of arrests (by percent) would not deter criminals, or - to give you the benefit of the doubt - enough to make a difference? Why don't you take a look at the statistics. With respect to that, it seems that perhaps an increase in probability of arrest would be something of a deterrent. Needless to say, making those arrests, that is, not ignoring them as you would do, would also keep those who disregard the law entirely from repeating their offense. Here is a nice chart indicating percent change of crimes from one year to the next.

        There will always be people who don't care about the consequences of their actions, and those actions will always be the more damaging when the "unthinkable" occurs (i.e. 9/11, Columbine, and so forth), but one thing that the threat of punishment can do is deter the would-be criminals with weaker motivations or morals that are not completely skewed. This wont prevent the "unthinkable," but it will keep more people from committing most crimes. The main problem with trying to prosecute international cyber-crimes is jurisdiction, which would likely cause a larger bureaucratic mess than the crime itself.

        Punishment is supposed to be about demotivation, though the Us doesn't have a great track record on demotivating those convicted of their crimes. The threat however, is likely a more powerful demotivator to those who would be susceptible to being talked out of committing the crime.

        Statistically speaking, if it were possible to find and prosecute a sizable enough number of any group of criminals, it would seriously deter enough of them to represent a decrease in the volume of acts committed.

        To get back on topic, one time pads and other methods should have been implemented by financial institutions to begin with. This sending of unencrypted bank information - especially to cell phones - to and from clients is ridiculous.

    - Spades

  45. Learn some history by davidwr · · Score: 3, Insightful

    The speed limit was set to 55mph in the mid-70s to conserve oil.

    Even with today's fuel-efficient cars, going 65 saves money over going 85.

    This is for at least two reasons:
    * atmospheric drag
    * engine efficiency

    The former you can't do much about save driving with a tail-wind: You will get more drag at 85 than 65, and more drag at 65 than 45, more at 45 than 25, and more at 25 than at a dead stop.

    The second is determined by the car's engineering. For cars sold in America, most have maximum engine efficiency somewhere in mid-RPM range, corresponding to somewhere in the 50-70mph range in top gear. Any faster than that and you'll lose efficiency.

    As long as people are focused on pollution, don't expect wholesale speed-limit reductions, especially in urban areas.

    Oh, there is also the safety factor: Even on a road designed for 85mph travel, that's with a given level of traffic and with a given driver behavior pattern. If the traffic is lighter and the drivers behave "better" the ideal speed may be higher, if the traffic is heavier or you have someone weaving in and out of traffic, or even adverse weather or night driving, the ideal speed may be lower.

    Speed limits need to be set on a case by case basis for each road segment, taking into account typical actual traffic patterns including typical actual speeds, the accident and near-accident history of the road, pollution levels in the region and downwind, and other factors. The national maximum of 80-ish mph may be too low, but there are very few places near cities where anything higher than even 70mph makes sense.

    --
    Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
    1. Re:Learn some history by commodore64_love · · Score: 1

      >>>The speed limit was set to 55mph in the mid-70s to conserve oil.

      By that reasoning the national speed limit should be set to 40mph, which is the *most* efficient speed for most cars (1900-2000 rpm is the engine's sweet spot). Obviously I think the "saves oil" argument is flawed, because while it may save oil, it defeats the purpose of having a car in the first place (to travel long distances in as short a period of possible). Now maybe for you an extra 15 minute per day commute is no big deal, but I do a lot of travel to distant cities like Minnesota, Baltimore, Oklahoma City. Slowing me down from the current 70-75 limits to 55 literally adds hours to my trips.

      Yeah I know - "take the plane" - well an airplane burns a heck of a lot more fuel than driving a car. Let's not handicap a perfectly-good technology like the modern internal combustion engine with stupidly speed limits..... else we might as well dump our cars and get horses instead, like our 1800s ancestors.

      BTW:

      My Insight gets around 80mpg and is ULEV qualified, so I'm doing my part to conserve. You can be clean without sacrificing the vehicle's usability.

      --
      "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." - historian Evelyn Beatrice Hall
    2. Re:Learn some history by commodore64_love · · Score: 1

      P.S.

      >>>Speed limits need to be set on a case by case basis for each road segment, taking into account typical actual traffic patterns including typical actual speeds,
      >>>

      Which is not what happens. The State legislatures set an arbitrary maximum limit. Even if the engineers designed a new strip of road for 120mph (max) and 85 (recommended), the signs would still read 65 due to an arbitrary decision by out-ouf-touch politicians that 65 will be the max allowed across the whole state.

      I think 65 makes sense in areas like Philadelphia or Washington, but when I find myself driving down an empty road in rural Virginia or Pennsylvania, it quickly demonstrates the hypocrisy. These isolated rural insterstates could easily be raised to 85 if the "max limit law" did not exist.

      --
      "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." - historian Evelyn Beatrice Hall
    3. Re:Learn some history by dekemoose · · Score: 1

      Minnesota is not a city. It is a collection of cities typically referred to as a state. Ya sure, you betcha.

  46. !First Time !New by Eightbitgnosis · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Yes this "new" ability! Oh wait, Sub7 has had a real time keylogger on it for almost 10 years. Oh no, that doesn't sound very new at all.

  47. Let me guess... by gillbates · · Score: 2, Interesting

    "Made possible by Microsoft(TM)"

    Right?

    TFA says nothing about the OS involved, which usually means a Microsoft Windows PC. I suppose the NYT is able to sell more advertising if they keep it ambiguous.

    Now, to be fair, Linux recently patched a root-privilege bug that went unnoticed for EIGHT years. But, to be just as fair, there are several orders of magnitude more compromises available courtesy Redmond, and due largely in part (as Djikstra quipped...) to their poor reinvention of UNIX.

    I have family that use Windows. What am I supposed to do? This is getting ridiculous. Sure, they get the OS they deserve. Sure, my employer gets the security compromises they deserve. But some part of the blame has to be shared by the company which made all of this possible.

    Programmers have always written buggy software. But it took Microsoft to create security flaws *by design* - that is, to deliberately architect software in an insecure an unreliable manner. It took Microsoft to disregard the lessons learned in UNIX, (as Djikstra would say) "To reinvent it poorly."

    I know, I know, ./ers will say, "Don't use Windows". Okay, I don't. But you have to understand that not everyone is a geek. The folks at corporate *BUY* Windows licenses because they don't know any better. My relatives use it because it came with their computer, or, their department at the university uses word, or they want to play games, or they want something familiar.

    What about them?

    Is it really acceptable for us to ignore the needs of the average user? Is it really acceptable to blame the victims?

    Or, should we hold Microsoft accountable to the same standards adhered to by everyone else in the industry?

    --
    The society for a thought-free internet welcomes you.
    1. Re:Let me guess... by SL+Baur · · Score: 1

      due largely in part (as Djikstra quipped...) to their poor reinvention of UNIX.

      That's a very odd spelling of Henry Spencer.

      Is it really acceptable for us to ignore the needs of the average user? Is it really acceptable to blame the victims?

      In this case, no. Let Microsoft clean up their own mess. The approach that Microsoft took to the internet in their Microsoft Windows 95 ("ActiveX" and auto executing stuff from across a wire or from removable media) had already been discredited for a decade.

      If you really wish to reinvent something, you can at least do a decent job of it.

  48. Useless with my bank by Der+PC · · Score: 1

    Since my bank requires the gadget to be used not only at logon time but also whenever I request a transfer of money to a new entity, as well as a 4-digit pass code puched in via mouse, I'd say the hackers may have a rather tough time trying to dig me debt-trench deeper than it already is.

    Although they may have a laugh browsing my accounts, that won't help them a bit.

    --
    This signature is DRM protected. By the DMCA, you are not allowed to counteract or oppose to it.
  49. Re: IT'S MADONNA'S BIRTHDAY TODAY! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    FUCK YOU; Madonna rocks. Any guy would do Madonna.

  50. Mod Parent Up by flyneye · · Score: 1, Funny

    I think that the parent needs heard.
    There are certain facts I believe everyone can agree on.
    1. These are thieves that both steal money and Constitutional rights (or if not a u.s. citizen a human right to life liberty and the pursuit of happiness which we may agree are all fueled by money won by our sweat,talent and wits)
    2. Law enforcement is no where near to bringing any of these to justice nor will they be in the foreseeable future.
    3. Any human may defend themselves especially in the event where there is a lack of , or insufficient police protection .
    4. To call on others ,likeminded and in danger of the same abuse to erradicate the predator is natural human and perfectly acceptable.
    5. Since incarceration hasn't deterred black hattery since before Mitnik , it has been seen that something stronger than incarceration is in fact warranted.
    6. Black hatters like others of their ilk lack the survival instinct necessary to form moral barriers that protect them from their own behavior and to allow this to continually muddy the gene pool is not in the interests of humanity.

              So an international treaty providing sanctions of first castration/sterilization for underage offenses and wretched horrific public execution complete with sadistic experementation should actually be manditory.
    I have thought long and hard about this and considered that there are absolutely no other ways more peaceable or humanitarian to have an acceptable outcome.

    --
    *Repent!Quit Your Job!Slack Off!The World Ends Tomorrow and You May Die!
  51. SecurID - Incorrect by endus · · Score: 3, Interesting

    When you authenticate successfully with a passcode the passcode is immediately invalidated and cannot be used again. You cannot complete a login then use the same passcode again. At my old company we had to request special 30-second fobs for this reason. People would connect to a machine using their passcode and then need to su to root, but had to wait for the code on the token to change before they could authenticate again. If an attacker captures your passcode after you use it to successfully log in it's not going to do them any good at all. I feel like I'm missing something because none of the comments that I read above mention this fact. Pretty basic stuff to anyone who has administrated the system before.

    1. Re:SecurID - Incorrect by Qzukk · · Score: 2, Insightful

      If an attacker captures your passcode after you use it to successfully log in

      That's the point of it being in real-time. The person on the other end of the keylogger has already logged in by the time your mom has gotten her hand back on the mouse, wiggled it around to find where the pointer is on the screen, moved the pointer to the login button and clicked on it. No, not that mouse button, the other mouse button.

      She gets the usual useless error message and decides she must have mistyped something.

      --
      If I have been able to see further than others, it is because I bought a pair of binoculars.
    2. Re:SecurID - Incorrect by sparkyradar · · Score: 1

      If an attacker captures your passcode after you use it to successfully log in it's not going to do them any good at all. I feel like I'm missing something because none of the comments that I read above mention this fact. Pretty basic stuff to anyone who has administrated the system before.

      hehe... here's the thing: with a *real time keylogger* they catch your password/passphrase/passcode *before* you hit ENTER. Then, they use your info, and hit ENTER *before* you manage to... effectively stealing your session right out from under you. YOU are the one that is now locked out.

  52. Re: IT'S MADONNA'S BIRTHDAY TODAY! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Speak for yourself. She's probably as diseased as ex-babe Pamela Denise Anderson.

  53. Ribbed by bobbuck · · Score: 3, Funny

    I couldn't find any ribbed for "his" pleasure so I had to turn them inside out and tell her I bought the plain ones.

  54. Re:Execute them? No. Catch them. by SL+Baur · · Score: 1

    And since our lazy leaders, who don't even bother to read the bills they pass

    We could do real reform to the whole system if we sunset every law in effect now and require new laws to be read aloud in full before they are allowed to be voted on. That's supposed to be the law (at least in the Senate) ...

  55. Re:Execute them? No. Catch them. by flyneye · · Score: 1

    Well, hmmm, I don't recall them going too lightly on Mitnik and incarceration wasn't the only punishment necessary to sit on him til he was considered somewhat harmless. These clowns have no regard for their victims lives,property or money. If you don't believe that money is fuel for life, just try living without it.
    Granted in some countries the government guarantees banks for up to $100,000 dollars as in the U.S. but this isn't universal and kind of irrelevant when you consider this is still an attack on those who work hard for their money at minimum to buy food shelter clothing for themselves and dependants. Since this $100k insurance is still money taxed from the same people and could've gone to other ways to further these tax payers it is still robbing life liberty and the pursuit of happiness from them. When law enforcement fails, humans may only rely on themselves for protection from predators. As I said in my post above, incarceration fails to be a deterrent to what seems to be a genetic mutation lacking human moral compass.
    This mutation should be erradicated by sterilization of the young who may still learn to be an asset to humanity and a horrible public torture and execution as a possible deterrent for those older and set in their ways ,who should know better already.
            If you can actually come up with a FEASABLE way of doing this more peacefully and actually getting the job done without regurgitating more buzz and diatribe, we would all love to hear.

    --
    *Repent!Quit Your Job!Slack Off!The World Ends Tomorrow and You May Die!
  56. Re:Biometrics by swillden · · Score: 1

    Finally, RSA SecurID is actually *not* vulnerable because the passwords it generates are *one time* passwords.

    If the attacker has trojaned your machine, he just needs to arrange for his software to block your submission of the one-time password so that he can use it. If he gives you an error page, or even what looks like a functional page, then he can proceed to drain your bank account and leave you completely unsuspecting.

    --
    Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
  57. Learn some history by SL+Baur · · Score: 1

    The speed limit was set to 55mph in the mid-70s to conserve oil.

    It was set there by Dick Nixon right after the election. Even the idiots at Wikipedia got it right.

    And it was sold as "55 saves lives", not as a consumption reduction measure.

    Get off my lawn!

    (Barry-O's spiritual forefather was Dick Nixon, not Jimmy Carter)

  58. Which Wikipedia article do you mean? by davidwr · · Score: 1

    It was set there by Dick Nixon right after the election. Even the idiots at Wikipedia got it right.

    And it was sold as "55 saves lives", not as a consumption reduction measure.

    If by right you mean even Wikipedia says the reason they changed it was due to safety, which Wikipedia article do you mean?

    National maximum speed law and Speed limit both point to fuel-efficiency as the initial reason for the 55mph Untied States speed limit in 1973.

    --
    Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
    1. Re:Which Wikipedia article do you mean? by SL+Baur · · Score: 1

      *All* of the TV ads in 1973 related to that law were "55 saves lives" ones.

  59. Read Nixon's own words by davidwr · · Score: 3, Informative

    Richard Nixon, Statement on Signing the Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act, January 2, 1974:
    "I AM pleased to sign into law H.R. 11372, an act aimed principally at helping to reduce gasoline and diesel fuel consumption during the energy crisis."

    I'm not saying you are wrong about the ads, I am saying the official reason for the change was to save energy. I am also saying that if some Wikipedia article is claiming otherwise, it needs to be reconciled with the two articles I mentioned above. Happy editing.

    --
    Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
  60. Re:Real time security by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    [citation needed]

  61. Re:Execute them? No. Catch them. by Hal_Porter · · Score: 1

    Career criminals believe that only idiots get caught, and since they're smarter than everyone else (thanks to the Dunning-Krueger effect), they won't be caught.

    That paper is the best (+1 Informative), most insightful (+1 Insightful), most disturbing (+1 Troll) and funniest (+1 Funny) psychology paper I have ever read.

    http://www.apa.org/journals/features/psp7761121.pdf

    --
    echo -e 'global _start\n _start:\n mov eax, 2\n int 80h\n jmp _start' > a.asm; nasm a.asm -f elf; ld a.o -o a;
  62. blink? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    what do you mean blink? its always on, only turns off when my pc is turned off or i have stopped all my torrents :P

  63. Re:Biometrics by dhammabum · · Score: 1

    True, he could also just run a second browser session with the already authenticated URL. But I agree with the grandparent that the article is wrong - I tried logging in twice using the same token sequence, it consistently fails on the second attempted session.

    --
    I am not a robot. I am a unicorn.
  64. Re:Execute them? No. Catch them. by commodore64_love · · Score: 1

    DEMOCRATS Speed-read Bill:

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_uxsAuY1AF4

    This is not a solution. What needs to be done is to allow time for review of the bill in private - at least a month. Why rush lawmaking, especially when these laws last decades.

    --
    "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." - historian Evelyn Beatrice Hall
  65. Re:Execute them? No. Catch them. by bconway · · Score: 1
    --
    Interested in open source engine management for your Subaru?
  66. Not always arbitrary by davidwr · · Score: 1

    I heard of a case where the locals set the speed at some arbitrary level, I think 55 or 60, but everyone was going 60 or 65.

    Either the state transportation agency or the state courts ordered the city to use rational justification to set the speed limits. They were specifically ordered to take into account prevailing actual speeds and actual accident rates. After a brief study, the speed limit went up. This was post-1995, possibly during one of the mini-oil-gluts of the past 15 years, and fuel-conservation wasn't a specific factor.

    --
    Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
  67. Technically, he didn't violate the 10th amm. by davidwr · · Score: 1

    First off, whatever he did, he didn't do alone - he had help from Congress, and help from courts who rejected 10th-amendment arguments.

    Second, this was all about money. States were free to reject highway funding, at least in theory.

    I agree though, he and Congress together violated the spirit and intent of the 10th amendment, while very obviously not violating the letter.

    --
    Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
    1. Re:Technically, he didn't violate the 10th amm. by SL+Baur · · Score: 1

      I agree though, he and Congress together violated the spirit and intent of the 10th amendment, while very obviously not violating the letter.

      I'll accept that but ...

      The same sort of 10th amendment bending was done over raising the legal drinking age to 21 uniformly across all states. That was different for a reason that you point out:

      Second, this was all about money.

      Yes. I fully agree. Keep more cars on the freeway longer at rush hour and you generate more gasoline taxes.

  68. Re:Biometrics by Lord+Ender · · Score: 1

    Does anyone produce biometric sensors which digitally sign and timestamp your fingerprints?

    --
    A slashdotter who didn't build his own computer is like a Jedi who didn't build his own lightsaber.
  69. speed traps by davidwr · · Score: 1

    There are places, usually small towns, where they will ticket you for going 1mph over. This can be enforced by means other than a radar gun, means that will hold up in court.

    There are also special situations, such as around schools, parks, and neighborhoods with a lot of children at play, where locals demand strict traffic enforcement. I once knew of a town that had an unwritten rule: "we'll give you 10mph, except in a school zone right before and right after school, where we will pull you over for going 1mph over." Not that they would actually ticket you for going 1mph over, but they would get your attention and a mini-lecture on traffic safety around children.

    --
    Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
    1. Re:speed traps by Ironica · · Score: 1

      Speed traps are explicitly illegal in California.

      Which is stupid, really. It makes more sense to ticket people for averaging over the speed limit over a distance than to ticket them for popping up over the speed limit for a moment. But, sigh.

      --
      Don't you wish your girlfriend was a geek like me?
  70. So what is the point of self-assessment? by Keeper+Of+Keys · · Score: 1

    I wasn't aware of this research before, and it seems ironic to me that it seems to have coincided with the increased use of self-assessment forms in job applications. As someone with a high degree of knowledge of my area of work (web development) I am almost painfully aware of my areas of inadequacy. I choose to answer these questionnaires honestly, but I wonder now if that means I am getting passed over for people with an over-inflated idea of their competence? Or do people set these tests in order to weed out the ones who give themselves high scores in every area?

  71. Re:Execute them? No. Catch them. by Keeper+Of+Keys · · Score: 1

    How does this "indicate otherwise"? If you receive one of these letters, you have already been caught.

  72. TC by fulldecent · · Score: 1

    Online banking security in the face of malware is an argument for TC. Which Stallman calls Treacherous Computing.

    Although, if you controlled the root keys, this would be a step in the right direction.

    --

    -- I was raised on the command line, bitch

    1. Re:TC by Fulcrum+of+Evil · · Score: 1

      You don't need full-retard TC - you can use a smart card for authentication (sessions and transfers). The trick would be getting enough info to the card so you can cut the PC out of the loop wehn doing these auths.

      --
      "We returned the General to El Salvador, or maybe Guatemala, it's difficult to tell from 10,000 feet"
    2. Re:TC by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Right, and there would be functions on the card to do and the banking features you need. And there would be a direct input and output path. Basically the computer you plug it in lto would just be a dumb connection. But this card would ave to e special and only run the code that is supposed to run on it so that there are no virii. We would have to trustthat code. It would be some form on a Trusted Card, or TC for short.

    3. Re:TC by Fulcrum+of+Evil · · Score: 1

      No, TC stands for trusted computing and implies that we are locking down your computer to only run code that MS and its designates approve of. It would also lock linux completely out of the game, as that requires the ability to change the whole system as a matter of course.

      --
      "We returned the General to El Salvador, or maybe Guatemala, it's difficult to tell from 10,000 feet"
  73. Re:Biometrics by hesaigo999ca · · Score: 1

    >Finally, RSA SecurID is actually *not* vulnerable because the passwords it generates are *one time* passwords. If >the hacker tries to log in to the system using the same password the victim just did, he will be rejected since that >password was already used.

    Actually if the person who tries to log , logs in to fake page which redirects the user all the while capturing his keylogged info, then he would have a fake unavailable page sent to him, while the attacker has his keypad info, letting him access, and by the time that the whole ordeal is down with page loads and what not, the number has changed on those securid, thereby making the failed attempt obsolete, and starting new with a fresh key, so now you would have 2 log ins attempts, if there was a sort of ip address log, as soon as 2 separate logins were active with the same credentials but different key, then it should lock that account and send an email to the admin about what just happened, any admin worth his salt would take care of this, however I have seen many lazy admins and most don't even log ips with secureids...not cost efficient !!!

  74. Easily defeated by wealthychef · · Score: 1

    This "amazing" attack is easily defeated. Only allow the six-digit number to be used once. Then it can be sniffed and used immediately -- and the attacker will be denied access as it will be the second time.

    --
    Currently hooked on AMP
  75. What are you to do? This, see inside... apk by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    "I have family that use Windows. What am I supposed to do?" - by gillbates (106458) on Sunday August 23, @09:53PM (#29168277) Homepage

    THIS:

    HOW TO SECURE Windows 2000/XP/Server 2003, & even VISTA (& beyond), + make it "fun-to-do", via CIS Tool Guidance (& beyond):

    ----

    http://www.tcmagazine.com/forums/index.php?s=e9bb2f3f527af8305dc4891065f330c4&showtopic=2662

    ----

    IT WORKS...

    How well? Ok, a testimonial, from -> http://www.xtremepccentral.com/forums/showthread.php?s=79253c5b286c472a012ff2ef7e7f2230&t=28430&page=3

    ----

    "Its 2009 - still trouble free! I was told last week by a co worker who does active directory administration, and he said I was doing overkill. I told him yes, but I just eliminated the half life in windows that you usually get. He said good point. So from 2008 till 2009. No speed decreases, its been to a lan party, moved around in a move, and it still NEVER has had the OS reinstalled besides the fact I imaged the drive over in 2008. Great stuff! My client STILL Hasn't called me back in regards to that one machine to get it locked down for the kid. I am glad it worked and I am sure her wallet is appreciated too now that it works. Speaking of which, I need to call her to see if I can get some leads. APK - I will say it again, the guide is FANTASTIC! Its made my PC experience much easier. Sandboxing was great. Getting my host file updated, setting services to system service, rather than system local." THRONKA, user @ xtremepccentral.com

    ----

    That's 'how well'... for going on 2++ yrs. now for Thronka & his paying clients, & for myself? Since 1997-1998 or so, through many machines since those days, to the present today, same results here!

    APK

    P.S.=> Enjoy - that guide, once you apply its points? It MAY "change your 'pov'" on Windows... Especially because you're such a "Pro-*NIX" type! apk

  76. Re: IT'S MADONNA'S BIRTHDAY TODAY! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    My winkie shrivels at the very thought of coming near that skank

  77. Good consumer banks are still safe... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Good consumer banks, employing sane programmers, do it in a way that is 100% foolproof, unless a major mathematical discovery rendering all cryptography useless is made...

    The correct way to do it is not only to use such a generated token for login, but also to mandate the bank account number of the person/firm you want to send money to be part of the cryptographic challenge.

    There's no "real-time keylogger" that lowlifes can use to work around that. There simply is no way. It's 100% foolproof when done correctly.

    Cryptographic challenges, once done correctly, will be impossible to defeat. There are already some consumer banks doing this.

    And it's just the beginning.

    The math is out there. The knowledge is out there. The programmers able to implement that are out there.

    Once upper management takes this seriously, the bad guys will have a *really* hard time trying to steal money from bank account by doing MITM-type attacks, or any other type of cyber-attack.

    Once again, several consumer banks already implemented this in Europe.

    Good luck lowlifes.

  78. Wait... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Real-time keyloggers? What is it, the 80s? This is new?

  79. Re:Biometrics by quetzalblue · · Score: 1

    > then he can proceed to drain your bank account

    Yeah .. the technical side of it looks like it would work for the bad guys, but this "drain your bank account" business seems a bit glib. Recently I had tried to transfer a significant amount of money between two banks I had accounts with. It was unbelievably ugly. In the end I just wrote myself a check and deposited it at the other bank .. manually; and had to wait the requisite days for it to "clear".

    I'm not saying it's not possible but I'd take a WAG that any local bank might actually get in touch with you if you suddendly volleyed most of your life's savings to a bank in lower Slobovia, and that's if you can convince the bank servers that you really, really wanted to do this.