Why Anonymized Data Isn't

Ars has a review of recent research, and a summary of the history, in the field of reidentification — identifying people from anonymized data. Paul Ohm's recent paper is an elaboration of what Ohm terms a central reality of data collection: "Data can either be useful or perfectly anonymous but never both." "...in 2000, [researcher Latanya Sweeney] showed that 87 percent of all Americans could be uniquely identified using only three bits of information: ZIP code, birthdate, and sex. ... For almost every person on earth, there is at least one fact about them stored in a computer database that an adversary could use to blackmail, discriminate against, harass, or steal the identity of him or her. I mean more than mere embarrassment or inconvenience; I mean legally cognizable harm. ... Reidentification science disrupts the privacy policy landscape by undermining the faith that we have placed in anonymization."

Comments

Where are all the GameLock Specialists?

[TaoPhoenix]

This decade is seriously becoming a game with all the types of rules we used to play for fun 10-15-20-25 years ago.

Does anyone else notice that a Patent Turbo-Troll who offers to report you to a legal thug, deliberately making data easy to steal, and "descrubbing" anonymous data all in the same few HOURS?

Come on gang, that's the TimeTwister Combo from MTG.

RIAA got grumpy because record data (songs) was "easy to (infringe)". Phish emails are ... (your verb here) your digital data from the less savvy types.

Someone appoint Richard Garfield as Special Consultant to the President so when stupid new "calls for X" show up on he President's desk, Garfield can take a 30 minute look at it and abuse the hell out of it so bad that it makes Goatse looks like a Victorian Picnic.