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Open Source Voting Software Concept Released

filesiteguy writes "Wired is reporting that the Open Source Digital Voting Foundation has announced the first release of Linux- and Ruby-based election management software. This software should compete in the same realm as Election Systems & Software, as well as Diebold/Premiere for use by County registrars. Mitch Kapor — founder of Lotus 1-2-3 — and Dean Logan, Registrar for Los Angeles County, and Debra Bowen, California Secretary of State, all took part in a formal announcement ceremony. The OSDV is working with multiple jurisdictions, activists, developers and other organizations to bring together 'the best and brightest in technology and policy' to create 'guidelines and specifications for high assurance digital voting services.' The announcement was made as part of the OSDV Trust the Vote project, where open source tools are to be used to create a certifiable and sustainable open source voting system."

26 of 121 comments (clear)

  1. Programmer Thinking by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Once again, programmers thinking software will change the world.

    Elections are not based on trust of software, it is based on trust of the PROCESS.

    Don't trust the PROCESS, and it doesn't matter how trustworthy your software is.

    I want an PROCESS that has ACCOUNTABILITY. A "Bug" in your software means someone goes to jail for negligence, or pays for the cost of a reelection.

    Here in the great white North, we have a paper ballot. A simple "X" inside a circle. Human verifiable, countable, no switches, electrons, software, etc. Weeks or months after the election I can see the recounts.

    Software can solve a lot of problems, trust is not one of them.

    1. Re:Programmer Thinking by Darkness404 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Yeah, but honestly I trust a properly programmed machine a lot more than I do humans. Why? Humans make errors, lots of them. Sure, most of us could count 50 votes with 100% accurately, but 500? 1000? If you are volunteering to count votes chances are you are politically involved, after all what is the harm in adding a few votes here and there... The problem results from how various companies have screwed up something as simple as if vote = yes then add 1 to variable Yes, if vote = no add 1 to variable No and then print the variables. Obviously its not that simple, but it shouldn't be that hard.

      That isn't even going into the fact that I don't even trust our election system because it doesn't give equal representation to people with different political views....

      --
      Taxation is legalized theft, no more, no less.
    2. Re:Programmer Thinking by loteck · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Why can't open-source, verifiable software be part of your hallowed PROCESS? It can. And ought to be. Software engineers have a legitimate seat at this table.

    3. Re:Programmer Thinking by agnosticnixie · · Score: 2, Insightful

      That's why votes are counted by groups of people who make sure they are valid and, in some cases, will have counters making sure the counting remains politically balanced. Not by a single person.

    4. Re:Programmer Thinking by camperdave · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Ballots are counted by a number of people. There are scrutineers from the various political parties watching. Also, the number of ballots collected needs to match the number of ballots issued. You can't just add some.

      --
      When our name is on the back of your car, we're behind you all the way!
    5. Re:Programmer Thinking by joshuaheretic · · Score: 2, Interesting

      I personally prefer paper ballots as well, and you're right that it's all about trust in the process. However, the fact is that many areas are rolling out electronic voting whether we would like it or not. And in a narrow field of options, I would like more than just a buggy, black-box Diebold piece of shit. If they can provide an OSS solution that works and can be audited for security and reliability, that would be infinitely preferable to the proprietary options with a poor track record. Just make sure there are paper receipts!

    6. Re:Programmer Thinking by Walkingshark · · Score: 2, Informative

      Or, you could just do it the obvious way that no one ever talks about:

      1) You fill out your ballot electronically (on a touch screen or whatever)
      2) Ballot box prints out a human-readable ballot.
      3) You check over to make sure there are no mistakes
      4) You carry your ballot over to the ballot box and drop it in, where a scanner scans the ballot in and counts your votes.
      5) Later, if there is a problem, humans go back and count the votes by hand (as they do now)
      6) There you go, all the benefits of electronic voting AND all the benefits of paper and pen voting all in one easy to understand system

      Problem: it doesn't leverage the power of electronic information technology to make it ridiculously easy to steal an election. Thats why it will never happen in this country.

      --
      The world you experience is only a close approximation of reality.
  2. Mostly Works by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

    Early reports are now in on the software. Though it runs faster than proprietary rivals, the power management doesn't work, its not yet configured to work with touch screens, and it can only be administered by grumpy self righteous technicians who insist that voters read the man pages before voicing questions.

  3. Can it run on Diebold hardware? by Ungrounded+Lightning · · Score: 2, Interesting

    If so it could let a lot of counties currently stuck with that PoC switch to the open source code without buying extra hardware. Just load the free software in the existing hardware (and maybe add a printer).

    The Diebold machines are essentially PCs with touchscreens so they shouldn't be a tough port for Linux and the apps.

    Using the existing hardware could save a bundle.

    --
    Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way
  4. I don't get... by Darkness404 · · Score: 4, Interesting

    I really don't understand what problem electronic voting using computers is supposed to solve. Why not just make scantron ballots (some places already use them) they are paper so they are verifiable, easy to understand (who didn't have to do a multitude of these in high school?), and a machine can calculate them. About the only glitch is you can't change your mind without getting a new ballot, but its honestly not that hard.

    --
    Taxation is legalized theft, no more, no less.
    1. Re:I don't get... by TubeSteak · · Score: 2, Insightful

      I really don't understand what problem electronic voting using computers is supposed to solve.

      Handicap accessibility, ballot complexity, but mostly hanging chads.
      The ability to almost instantly compile election results is just a bonus.

      Scantron ballots are a good idea, but people are stupid &/or prone to mistakes and will screw it up.

      --
      [Fuck Beta]
      o0t!
    2. Re:I don't get... by myspace-cn · · Score: 2, Interesting

      election terrorists?
      Complete psyop propaganda.

      Brad Friedman - http://bradblog.com/
      Bev Harris - http://blackboxvoting.org/

      These two people are as far from election terrorists as you can get.

      The one thing you purposely leave out of this discussion is the broken chain of custody which electronic signals representing votes create.

      Your software runs on hardware, hardware which is not checked, because to check such hardware you would have to destroy it by reverse engineering it under an electron microscope.

      If you on slashdot listen to this idiot AC, our country is going to keep screwing up down the same path. Officials KNOW electronic voting is rigged, that's why in conjunction with corporate media they can never be held accountable.

  5. Re:Sweet! by Brian+Gordon · · Score: 2, Insightful

    No it's not. Slashdot was up in arms against electronic voting when it was closed-source. Open-source doesn't make much of a difference.

    And Ruby? Linux? What. Assuming they compile Ruby into java bytecode or something to sidestep the FEC regulation against interpreted code in voting machines, Ruby still isn't a great choice. It should run absolutely as close as possible to bare metal to make sure a JVM bug or a Ruby bug doesn't affect the results. Anyway, why Ruby? Not that I have anything against it but really why did they pick Ruby?

    Linux wouldn't be my choice for a kernel either. It's too experimental and rapidly changing for me to feel great about asking 300 million people to trust it, at least while we have OpenBSD lying around.

  6. Computers should count votes by symbolset · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Once they've been granted suffrage. Not before.

    I post this same post every time we have a computerized vote counting thread. My objection to this has nothing to do with whether it's a secret proprietary process or a totally open FOSS solution. With each generation of computer technology we gain the opportunity to go wrong with greater speed than ever before. Yes, proprietary solutions are horrid and there's some evidence that they've been used to steal votes and they're truly evil. Unfortunately, FOSS tools can be abused too.

    I guess my point is that the process of counting votes using humans is an important part of representative democracy because it doesn't just achieve the goal of "counting the vote". It also impresses on the participants the importance of sanity and trust and impartiality in the process, without which constant reinforcement we can expect democracy to rapidly go off the rails. Compared to that social good, the importance of getting same-day results fades in importance.

    --
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  7. Re:Sweet! by Darkness404 · · Score: 3, Insightful

    No it's not. Slashdot was up in arms against electronic voting when it was closed-source. Open-source doesn't make much of a difference.

    While I still think we should use paper ballots (what exactly does e-voting gain us?) it makes a world of difference if the code is open or closed source. Voting is all about trust, if I can see the source and verify that it doesn't have any major bugs in it that is a step in the right direction compared to closed source. Secondly open source is cheaper, I don't want my tax dollars wasted on proprietary software, especially if there is an open source alternative. If we are going to have e-voting, it had better be open source, closed source is unacceptable.

    Ruby still isn't a great choice. It should run absolutely as close as possible to bare metal to make sure a JVM bug or a Ruby bug doesn't affect the results.

    Sure, but it does provide more readable and testable code while reducing the risk of hardware dependent errors. I think most people can say with certainty that the Ruby interpreter is reasonably stable as is the JVM.

    Linux wouldn't be my choice for a kernel either. It's too experimental and rapidly changing for me to feel great about asking 300 million people to trust it

    Does Linux change? Yes. Does that affect the stability of a certain kernel version? No. If they stick with 2.6.31.5, it doesn't matter if 2 months from now if 2.6.32 comes out because 2.6.31.5 will still run with no problem (outside of some serious bug), everything in voting machines should be static, no new hardware, no new software, just configuration changes. Linux has been running in embedded systems just like what I described for years now with no problems.

    --
    Taxation is legalized theft, no more, no less.
  8. Solving the problem wrong by ComputerSlicer23 · · Score: 5, Informative

    Come back when it is not written in an interpreted language, in a language capable of driving hardware, and it has "real" functionality. I looked quickly, and the tabulation code is virtually empty. Both the Python and the Javascript will be non-starters and the code rejected out of hand the first time reviewed (and none of the VSTL's will have anyone capable of reviewing Python). Java passes because of the bytecode. Python might pass because of the .pyc files. The Javascript will be a problem. The lack of type declarations will likely also be a problem in Python. It will be hard to follow the documentation rules that require all of the types to be documented.

    None of this code stands a chance of VVSG compliance (the Federal Election standards which code must pass to be certified if any Federal funds are used to purchase the hardware or software). The list of blatantly obvious things wrong with the code base in the one file I looked in:

    • The code files does not have a valid modification history for the file.
    • The code does not have per function comments.
    • The code uses multiple returns inside of a single function.
    • Repeatedly use the same values without having them be assigned to a constant.
    • Have single variable letter names that are not used for array indexes.
    • Usage of numerical constants other then -1, 0, 1 without a comment explaining the value.
    • Not all control flows decision points are documented.
    • It has lines longer then 80 characters.

    Or at least those are the obvious things I found in one example file in the 2 minutes it took me to scan it quickly. Remember, the coding guidelines are written by people who have never written a line of code, and are designed to protect against common mistakes from the mid-80s. So the fact that the entire system is in version control is irrelevant. Even if you give them all of the version control, you must document the changes to the code at the top of the file. You must document the changes per function. Even though no one would ever do it in this day and age, your code must be printable on a standard 8.5" wide paper.

    All of the rules required to follow are obscene. You can't have function or variable names that differ by a single letter. It took 3-4 years to get an exception to that rule to allow the usage of "getFoo", "setFoo", because they differ by a single letter. You can't use 0x80 to represent the MSB of a byte, if you call that PIN_8, and had PIN_1 those differ by a single character, so we had to do PIN_EIGHT, PIN_ONE. It's just archaic. Oh, and you get to document every function a function calls. Because they couldn't possible use a compiler that would build a call list automatically.

    The rules don't explicitly mention exceptions, so it depends on who is reading the code if they treat an exception as having multiple entry/exit points. So it is generally easier to get the code past compliance without exceptions, even if it does lead to buggier code. The other rule they invoke is that you are only allowed to use the control flow structures documented in the VVSG (they have flow charts for the allowable forms of if, if/else, for, while, and switch statements. They specifically state that if the language you are using does not have those, you must simulate those flows of control in the language used.

    Oh, and if LA thinks it has the hardest jurisdiction because they have 7 languages, I believe NY has at least 20-30 languages or dialects just in NYC, they have several election districts (they'd be called precincts anywhere else in the country, but in NY, the word precinct is only used for the NYPD and maybe the NYFD) that have more then 7.

    I've written code that has been used to count ballots in both state and federal elections. Trust me, this code base will have to be re-written from scratch to meet the 2002 or

    1. Re:Solving the problem wrong by fandingo · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Great post. I was thinking the exact same thing as soon as I saw Ruby was being used. It gets even worse than that: they are using Ruby on Rails. Slashdotters start foaming at the mouth thinking about how insecure Diebold code is; they should be furious that something as god-awful as RoR is being used for elections. RoR has its uses, but not in any kind of security sensitive situation.

      The project does seem to be interesting because they are trying to get the FEC to update some of its certification requirements.

      The only thing I want interpreted in my elections is hanging chads; keep that damn python and ruby to your selves. And get off my lawn!

    2. Re:Solving the problem wrong by dogzilla · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Wait a sec...step back. Take a deep breath and think this through.

      All those rules you described are there for what purpose exactly? Because as far as I can see, those rules have not made existing voting software (which presumably meets these guidelines) any more reliable or trustworthy. If the only reason these rules exist is to make the software secure and trustworthy, and if they create what appears to be a huge burden for developers of voting systems, then perhaps we need to throw out this particular set of guidelines *along with* the existing crappy voting software.

      Am I the only one to whom this is obvious? These rules don't exist for their own sake - they exist to achieve a goal. If they're not achieving that goal, the rules need to be rewritten before you even touch a single line of this code.

      --
      The crimes of eBay are a disgrace to it's pig latin heritage!
    3. Re:Solving the problem wrong by FlyingGuy · · Score: 2, Informative

      I was thinking the same thing, then I went and looked at the code and saw this:

      import os
      import json

      from django.template import Context, loader, RequestContext
      from django.http import HttpResponse, HttpResponseRedirect, HttpRequest
      from django.shortcuts import render_to_response
      from django.conf import settings
      from django.contrib.auth import authenticate, login, logout
      from django.contrib.auth.decorators import login_required

      Just as soon as I saw that, it was like, Ahh HELL NO!

      I mean lets just throw in the entire kitchen sink! There is not a snowballs chance in hell of this EVER getting certified. JUST the holes/kludges in http & css will get you laughed out of the running!

      --
      Hey KID! Yeah you, get the fuck off my lawn!
    4. Re:Solving the problem wrong by ComputerSlicer23 · · Score: 2, Informative

      I completely and totally agree with the notion that those rules are stupid. However, most states use Federal Funding for the purchase of hardware for elections. Once that is done, you must be certified by the FEC, and you must follow the above guidelines. Unless your state officials want to break Federal laws, or can find all the money for it from non-Federal sources, those rules will have to be followed. It's not like you can use an off-the-shelf computer, and the hardware is only good once maybe twice a year. You'll need one that refuses all external input except for the types of storage you plan on using to transport the votes from a machine. Even if all of the software is secure from this Open Source code, they will still need to get secure hardware. The problem is you send everyone to a place alone with the machine where they have total access. Securing the machine is actually, extremely difficult.

      From what I know of the state and counties, they all use Federal money. Everybody who took HAVA money has to follow both those and ROHS rules for the hardware (ROHS, I might have the acronym wrong, but it's the environmental friendly hardware when you go to dispose of it, so no using lead, etc, etc). Even most states defer to the FEC to set testing guidelines, and most states will refuse anything that does not pass the VVSG hardware and software guidelines.

      You can't run an election without a scanner of some sort. You'll need a scantron type solution for a state wide vote. You can't run those any other way. If you say "DRE", I'm going to smack you. Even one's with paper trails are stupid. Scantrons to count, and paper ballots are the only way, unless we hand count (which I've got no problem with, but the computers generally do a better job, especially if you want to do accurate stats for funding of parties). Once you start doing scantrons it will require custom hardware, and the state will be incapable of dealing with it.

      I think it would be great to require a security review from real security folks. The problem with most of the VSTL employees I've dealt with, is that they aren't capable of getting a paying programmers job. That's why they review someone else's code. We tried fairly hard with the stuff I worked on. We used Linux, and used a "known" Live CD to boot from, and had a completely scripted build from source code. With the exception of the RSA Crypto library and the JDK/JRE (because we couldn't prove OpenSSL's was FIPS-140.2 compliant on our OS and hardware), everything was built in from of an Election official. We built the entire toolchain that would then build the absolutely everything that was installed on the firmware. For a "real" security review, we had almost everything. If OpenJDK had been released at the time, we would have built the JDK/JRE from scratch also.

      The stuff I worked on could have been hacked, especially if the source code ever leaked. Not that it was blatantly insecure, but like most code written, it has bugs and flaws that more eyes would catch. We generally did a good job using constructs that avoided buffer overflows (we avoided most C in favor of C++ where possible). The problem was the size of the programming team (I'm guessing that maybe 5-6 full time programmers worked on the system that counted a significant fraction of the votes in the 2000 and 2004 elections). I left because of the dysfunction inside the company due to dealing with Federal crapola. I just hated the code I had to write. I hated how old and antiquated the rules I had to follow were. It was a fun gig, and I liked that I got to contribute to cleaning up some of the problems folks have with electronic voting. I took it very seriously.

      I agree with you, the solution is to update the rules to involve actual security. The problem is you most literally can't. There are lots of "rules of thumb", but if there were actual rules to follow, we wouldn't have security professionals we'd just write a compiler that understood the rules. These rules exis

  9. In Ruby?! Shirley you jest by FlyingGuy · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Oh for fucks sake, you have to be kidding me!

    You want the Federal Election Commission to trust a voting machine written in a language used by script-kiddies?! That is utterly laughable in light of the DIEBOLD VB/Access debacle

    This needs to be a completely stripped down Linux core, NOTHING in it except what is EXACTLY need to do this. It needs to be written in C, not C++, and I mean COMPLETELY documented ( to the point of inanity), PLAINLY written, VERBOSE code and if you want a better chance write it in ADA, that is what the government is used to dealing with and the code MUST be open source

    You need to go as far as stripping down the standard C libraries to ONLY the functions called by the SINGLE program that makes it work

    EVERY buffer, EVERY array must be bounds checked. There can be NO POSSIBILITY of ANY kind of a buffer overflow attack.

    If you are going to use an off the shelf MB any open slot and or connector not used by a component SPECIFICALLY required to make it work must by PHYSICALLY disabled ( cut the traces/wires or whatever ). The BIOS must be custom,designed and coded to do ONLY those functions require to boot the machine, further that BIOS must be OPEN SOURCE.

    As others have pointed out the PROCESS must be VERIFIABLE, it must be RELIABLE, it must be PREDICTABLE 100% of the time. There can be NO race conditions, there can be NO un-handled exceptions, and EVERY exception must have a reliable, repeatable, reproduceable result, in other words "Kernel Panic" is NOT an option.

    In short it must be a totally custom machine, and created by people 100% NOT interested in getting rich.

    --
    Hey KID! Yeah you, get the fuck off my lawn!
  10. Re:Sweet! by Plunky · · Score: 2, Insightful

    if I can see the source and verify that it doesn't have any major bugs in it that is a step in the right direction compared to closed source

    You do know though, that the source is not the code that is running on the machine iself, right?

    How do you propose to verify that the source code has not been altered before or during the compilation process? I guess, since the source is available you could compile it yourself and write down the checksum to compare with the voting machine binary checksum. Wait, how do you get that, some program running on the voting machine? Also, you know that the voting machine counts a certain number of votes but that count must pass through an indeterminate number of machines upstream, any one of which could be tweaking the figures. Who do you trust?

    No, you were right the first time, paper ballots and manual counting is best. Yes, it is labour intensive and slow but IMO the real benefit of that is secondary in that lots of people must participate in the voting process and they may come to realise that the political process is not about what politicians want but is run by and for the people. I don't want to see a streamlined political process, extended discussion and well thought out arguments are vital! Moreover, I think election day should be a national holiday and it should be illegal to operate any non essential business. All citizens should be required to attend voting stations for a certain minimum time, not just to vote but to participate in the process.

  11. Re:OK, why Linux, why Ruby? by Dhalka226 · · Score: 3, Insightful

    lso curious about the choice of programming language, Ruby, when Python is known to be more readable, and more easily audited

    Known by whom? Python fanbois?

    I'm honestly not trolling and I'm honestly not trying to start a Python/Ruby flame war, but let's not try to hide opinions behind worthless statements like "Python is known to be," particularly when the metric is as subjective as "readb[ility]."

    Aside from the enforced nature of Python whitespace, I don't find there to be much of a difference between the two in terms of readability. I prefer specified ending blocks, whereas Python seems to merely use a blank line and the indentation. What jumps out at me (as a Ruby fan) more than anything is how stupid and unintuitive '"""' is as a commenting option. Eesh. But all of that is personal preferences, as it should be. There's no substantive differences and certainly nothing measurable enough that we should bandy about statements like Python being known to be more readable.

    Chances are, by the way, that's your answer. Why Ruby instead of Python? The authors likely preferred it and were more familiar with it. It needn't be any more complex than that.

  12. They're missing the point... by Pembers · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Voting machines are inherently untrustworthy. Publish all the code you like. Have it inspected by Donald Knuth. The voters have no way of knowing that that code is what's actually running on the machines in the polling stations, or that the hardware will execute it in the way that the language spec says it should. Attempts to give them a way to know are a sticking plaster over a gaping wound - there are too many things about the machine that are invisible to the naked eye, and too many ways in which the machine can be made to lie.

    Paper-based elections need a lot of people to run them. This is a good thing, because someone who wants to rig an election has to bribe or threaten a lot of people. The more people are in that position, the more likely one of them is to blow the whistle. Someone who wants to rig an election that's run by voting machines has to influence far fewer people. That's the whole point of computers - they do work that would otherwise have to be done by people. If you want to bring in lots more people who are hard to bribe or threaten, you might as well have them run the election and leave the computers out of it.

    The argument that voting machines will give us the result of the election faster than paper ballots is true but irrelevant. Do you want the wrong answer in half an hour, or the right answer in two days? A politician, once elected, will serve for three to five years, and unless he drops dead or gets a blowjob from the wrong person, it's very hard to remove him before the next election. You'd better be damn sure that the guy you put there was the one the people actually wanted.

  13. Solves paper ballot management problems by jjo · · Score: 2, Insightful
    Paper ballots, either hand- or scanner-counted, have a few management issues that are made easier and cheaper with electronic voting:
    1. the polling places must be sure that they don't run out, so election officials must print ballots based on their guess of the maximum possible turnout. This makes for almost certain wastage of ballots.
    2. In many places, mutliple versions of ballots must be maintained in inventory for multiple languages and/or multiple jurisdictions, each version having the same problems listed above.

    These problems are, of course, completely manageable, but at a cost. Election officials would welcome a cheaper alternative balloting system, provided it worked just as well as the best ones in use now. That the the crux of the issue.

  14. Re:Sweet! by TBoon · · Score: 2, Insightful

    While I still think we should use paper ballots (what exactly does e-voting gain us?)

    e-voting gains the ability to know the results instantaneously the moment voting ends, and saves lots of man-hours counting them. The former is pointless, as any hand-over of power never happens until days/weeks/months later, and neither are worth eliminating the possibility of a recount.

    Machine-readable paper-ballots seems to be a decent compromise. Instant results with recount possibilities. A smallish number of humans can double-check some samples to ensure the machine results are correct, and trigger larger manual recounts if there is reason to believe the machines malfunctioned or were tampered with.