The Trial of Terry Childs Begins
snydeq writes "Opening arguments were heard today in the trial against IT admin Terry Childs, who was arrested 18 months ago for refusing to hand over passwords to the San Francisco city network. InfoWorld's Paul Venezia, who has been following the case from the start, speculates that the 18-month wait is due to the fact that 'the DA has done no homework on the technical issues in play here and is instead more than willing to use the Frankenstein offense: It's different, so it must be killed.' On the other hand, the city — which has held Childs on $5 million bail despite having already dropped three of the four charges against him — may have finally figured out 'just how ridiculous the whole scenario is but is too far down the line to pull back the reins and is continuing with the prosecution just to save face,' Venezia writes. The trial is expected to last until mid-March. San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom, to whom Childs eventually gave the city's network passwords, will be included in the roster of those who will testify in the case — one that could put all admins in danger should Childs be found guilty of tampering."
Surely you mean all admins who refuse to provide passwords when asked by an authorised official at the company they set the passwords for?
The owners of the network are the public. An employee should act in the best interests of the employer at all times -- even if doing so conflicts with the views of immediate superiors.
Why was the network designed so that one single account (or password) held the keys the kingdom? That's just stupid.
"Administrator" groups for Windows machines
Multiple root SSH keys and/or Kerberos logins for Unix boxen
TACACS user-based authentication for routers.
If the dude just left and said "I'm done with you folks, no I'm not handing over my passwords", then fine...go into the user admin system, nuke his passwords and get on with your life.
If the dude deliberately went in and reset passwords and changed network access before walking and then tried to blackmail the city, then that's sabotage/blackmail/downright illegal and should be punished.
If the dude walked out without giving passwords to anyone and the system was poorly designed so that admin passwords had to be forcefully recovered via single user mode or the like, then the city should just eat crow, lick their wounds, and install a real network AAA system.
What would have happened if the dude had been run over by a beer truck on the way to work? Would the city have been screwed as well?
Dude.
This guy denied access to the owners of that network. Just because there isn't a law to fit the crime doesn't mean he is innocent of wrong doing. Hell, it's not a stretch to say that for a time, before they recovered it, he had stolen the entire network from them.
Take your word smithing and semantics and stick 'em where the sun don't shine. What he did was wrong for it, and he needs to be punished.
What do you mean "Just because there isn't a law to fit the crime doesn't mean he is innocent of wrong doing." That's exactly what it means. If there's no law to fit his "crime," then by definition there is no crime committed. Perhaps he's guilty of being an asshat, but doesn't mean he's criminally liable according to your definition.
It's quite a stretch to say he had stolen the entire network. In fact, it's absolutely false. They could have done a hard admin reset on the routers and affected systems and been back in complete control of them. They chose not to, for various legitimate reasons, but the network remained in the possession of the legitimate owners.
You complain about word smithing and semantics yet that's exactly what you are doing. What he did may be wrong, but the question as to whether any laws were broken is far from a given. To punish him for breaking no laws would be absurd and your assertion that he should is equally absurd.
> the people this guy works for asked for the passwords
My impression was, that in a nice show of cluelessness, they decided to fire this guy first, and then ask him for the passwords which they didn't have (i.e., they didn't have any plan of action if he got run over by a bus or otherwise dropped dead).
So what you're saying is that because he was accused of something, he is automatically guilty even though the accusations where later withdrawn?
I sure as hell hope that you never wind up on a jury for *anyone*.
Nah, more like the chauffeur refusing to give the keys of the Rolls to the empty headed daughter. He did hand them over to dad.
Heh, that's nearly a car analogy.
I worked for a company that performed services for companies that had a lot of personal information. Our systems were kept pretty tight.
For a while, I was the only IT person in the company. I had the primary passwords for much of the company's infrastructure, and the policy manual that was worked up allowed me to give those passwords to two other people on request - the President and my departmental Vice President of the company. The VP was three rungs up the ladder from me.
Neither had the chops to do anything with the passwords, but of course they could easily have hired someone who did. I also had to keep the current passwords in an offsite lockbox at a local bank and only the three of us had access to that box. That way, if I got hit by a bus (or terminated for cause, quit under suspicious circumstances, or whatever) the company could continue operations smoothly.
My boss's boss walked in my office one day and asked for a password for one of the main systems. After a long, involved, and rather unpleasant conversation, I was threatened with termination if the passwords were not handed over. As I started to pack my crap up, the President walked in the room and thanked me for my diligence in following security protocol. It was a surprise audit. I don't think I would have been terminated if I had handed over the passwords, but I'm sure my clearance to possess them would have been revoked in a very large hurry. And that would have been the correct action to take.
There are circumstances where you DO NOT have the authority to give information to your boss. If there is a policy against it, the policy trumps your boss's ability to ask you for the information.
I don't know for sure the policies in place at this particular department, but it is very possible that the boss was not authorized for that information. Passwords and security information do not necessarily follow the chain of command - they follow a chain of responsibility and/or trust, and that isn't always perfectly aligned with the chain of command. If Childs' boss was not authorized for the information, he did the right thing in insisting that the information be turned over to the people his security protocol manual specified.
If Childs' boss WAS authorized for the information by policy, and Childs honestly felt the boss would misuse the information for something illegal and/or was gunning for Childs, then his actions may or may not be justifiable in this case - he's going to have to produce some proof that his boss had an illegitimate purpose. That could be tough.
"This post contains words, known to the State of California to cause thought. Wash brain thoroughly after reading."