Gravatars Can Leak Users' Email Addresses
abell writes "Gravatar offers a global avatar service, using an MD5 hash of the user's email as avatar ID. This piece of information in some cases is enough to retrieve the original email address. Testing a simple attack on stackoverflow.com, I was able to determine the email addresses of more than 10% of the site's users."
The attack doesn't rely on MD5 itself or MD5 collisions. It would work no matter what hashing algorithm was used.
Not really, since the salt would need to be publicly known for Gravatar to work (and it would break any backwards compatibility to add it in now). This was a 'social engineering' attack, not a rainbow table lookup – it pieced the name together with common providers to find a matching MD5. Salt would just add a single extra step.
I believe it's exactly the same problem/attack as was brought up about MicroID in the past. The idea of Pavatar is a much better way to do this sort of avatar-finding (though the decentralisation comes with its own problems), since it relies on a public web address instead of a semi-private e-mail address.
1) register as a website with gravatar, find out how long the salt is
2) register on stackoverflow with your email address
3) enumerate the possibilities until you find the hash of your own address and therefore the salt
4) extract 8000+ emails from stackoverflow
5) repeat for other sites
There are places where the networks are not touching,and there are places where they are-Boeing's Lori Gunter