Gmail Moves To HTTPS By Default
clone53421 writes "Although Gmail has long supported HTTPS as an option, Gmail announced their decision yesterday to switch everyone to HTTPS by default: 'We initially left the choice of using it up to you because there's a downside: https can make your mail slower since encrypted data doesn't travel across the web as quickly as unencrypted data. Over the last few months, we've been researching the security/latency tradeoff and decided that turning https on for everyone was the right thing to do.' I wonder if this has anything to do with the reports of Chinese users having their accounts hacked? 'Only two Gmail accounts appear to have been accessed, and that activity was limited to account information (such as the date the account was created) and subject line, rather than the content of emails themselves,' said David Drummond in that blog update. That does sound like it perhaps could be a result of insecure HTTP traffic being intercepted in transit between the users and Gmail's servers."
For the moment Google's own gadget for for iGoogle doesn't support HTTPS access to gmail.
Google couldn't really tell if there was sniffing going on in their users' connections. They could, however, figure out exactly what sort of activities someone using POP or IMAP or the web UI (or some compromised internal Google tool) ended up doing, based on logs.
The World Wide Web is dying. Soon, we shall have only the Internet.
Great move by Google, although TFA points out that there are some problems with offline gmail and HTTPS, kudos to them for coming straight out and saying it may be a problem, while posting a link for some workarounds: http://mail.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=172697
Q.E.D.
Actually, I read somewhere that hackers gained access to a system designed to give law enforcement access to people's emails, presumably under warrant. [sarcasm]Who could have ever imagined the same loopholes intended for use by law enforcement could possibly be exploited by hackers as well?[/sarcasm]
"In prison you just have to shut your eyes and take it. Here you have to shut your eyes and give it."
1. Encrypted data generally has a percentage overhead
2. Encrypted data, if the algorithm doesn't suck, is not easily compressed.
Routers don't know whether your data is encrypted or not.
Neither does your browser, or the server. HTTP is a stateless protocol. Every encrypted request requires setting up the encryption all over again.
3. Encrypted data has two processing phases, one at each end of the connection that do not apply to unencrypted data: encryption and decryption. By "not as quickly" they were probably referring to end-users' perspective more than network transmission time.
I found the source. It's from PC World:
"In prison you just have to shut your eyes and take it. Here you have to shut your eyes and give it."
Might as well scoop up the mod points if someone's going to get them. This, moron.
Apparently the two compromised accounts were because of "access a system used to help Google comply with search warrants by providing data on Google users." I've blogged about this. And my source for all of that is from an article in Computer World.
Prime numbers are exactly what Alan Greenspan says they are -S. Minsky
No, if that were the case they would have been able to see *everything* the user received as part of the data response, including message bodies.
Omeganon
...if you begin with the right URL.
Thank you, Edward Snowden.
"Arguments from authority are worthless." —Carl Sagan
If you're using keep-alive at the HTTP layer you're most certainly not closing and re-opening the underlying SSL socket -- in typical implementations the HTTP code is only vaguely aware that SSL even exists.
Now not every server or client supports or uses keep-alive. But if you do then SSL is only negotiated once per session, not once per HTTP request.
the man in the middle would have to have a valid mail.google.com certificate for the attack to be seamless.
yes, we know how effective "invalid certificate" prompts are, but this is not a failure of the encryption mechanism.