Can You Trust Chinese Computer Equipment?
Ian Lamont writes "Suspicions about China slipping eavesdropping technology into computer exports have been around for years. But the recent spying attacks, attributed to China, on Google and other Internet companies have revived the hardware spying concerns. An IT World blogger suggests the gear can't be trusted, noting that it wouldn't be hard to add security holes to the firmware of Chinese-made USB memory sticks, computers, hard drives, and cameras. He also implies that running automatic checks for data of interest in the compromised gear would not be difficult." The blog post mentions Ken Thompson's admission in 1983 that he had put a backdoor into the Unix C compiler; he laid out the details in the 1983 Turing Award lecture, Reflections On Trusting Trust: "The moral is obvious. You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself. (Especially code from companies that employ people like me.) No amount of source-level verification or scrutiny will protect you from using untrusted code. In demonstrating the possibility of this kind of attack, I picked on the C compiler. I could have picked on any program-handling program such as an assembler, a loader, or even hardware microcode. As the level of program gets lower, these bugs will be harder and harder to detect. A well installed microcode bug will be almost impossible to detect."
This is just another reason for me to not want to buy Chinese made goods. Unfortunately, so much is made in China that it is nearly impossible to completely avoid the country.
I don't like Linux. This doesn't make me a troll.
Considering where a lot of this stuff comes from, it should probably read, "Can You Trust Computer Equipment?"
Freedom is drinking a beer in the park when you're supposed to be at work.
It is a rather simple military rule that you create your own information networks. You don't let your enemy or even your ally. Using Chinese made equipment for any military equipment is a bad idea. This is a no-brainer.
excitingthingstodo.blogspot.com
While the USB memory key (in this example) could have low level software to snoop your data, how are they going to get it? Is the USB key going to open a TCP/IP or UDP connection back to their servers without tripping my firewall that a new application is trying to connect? Is my virus scanner going to get tripped that something suspicious is coming out of the key without my interaction?
Most decent virus scanners and firewalls will pick up on this. In a lot of corporate networks USB Mass media is disabled. I'd love to see a proof of concept that can get around these common checks... If anyone has a USB key that can do this, please let me know :-) I'll happily test it.
Looks completely made up to me. Why just think about the times that the consumer has ran across hidden malware such as the Sony Rootkit incident. Experts saw unusual traffic and traced it back to a CD. Same thing would happen if a piece of equipment had hidden malware in it, someone would notice the suspicious traffic and trace it back to the source.
Don't know something? Look it up. Still don't know? Then ask.
and before thinking that "this is crazy, a U.S. firm wouldn't possibly do that" bear in mind that i've already had some experience of receiving a very weird series of SPAM messages, following which my machine started acting very very weird.
my guess is that simply by receiving that SPAM message, there was encoded within it some power-fluctuations or signal fluctuations which the CPU could pick up and "activate" whatever it was that was wanted to be activated by whomever it was that sent the SPAM message.
To be fair, the "Troll" mod is also used as a substitute for "Batshit-Crazy".
WARNING! This post is encoded with power and signal fluctuations that which will cause your machine to start acting very very weird. Again, if your computer starts acting very very weird after you read this it is because of this post.
Now that I think about it, I'm pretty sure everything I just said is completely wrong.
I was a gung-ho CS student when this article came out, and we spent a LOT of time hashing it over. He specifically did not say that he had done this, and while I don't remember him making an outright denial, we concluded that he hadn't. After all, the C compilers of that day were still small enough to be understood by a single human, and comparing C code to the assembly code generated from it (or comparing that assembly code to generated machine instructions) was not very challenging.
Maybe the Jargon File entry is right, and he did implement it as a proof-of-concept, but it wasn't widely distributed. It was easy enough for an interested (and bored) undergrad to check out over a weekend, but hard enough that compiler distributions weren't routinely examined.
With today's optimizing compilers and layers upon layers of abstraction, though, it seems like there's more than enough room for plenty such exploits. Pham Nuwen can still have his backdoor into the localizers.
The ultimate hinge point in WWI was when Germany executed a war plan that called for a two front war when their treaty obligations only called for a one front war. Simply because the plans called for them to invade Russia and France simultaneously they did so even though Russia was the only one that had declared war (and France wasn't even involved). The generals at the time in Germany couldn't even imagine diverging from the war plan and the war plan called for invading France. Rather than stand up to his Generals the Kaiser caved and allowed the invasion of France (I believe he uttered the phrase "rolling the iron dice").
This is the entire reason France and the UK blamed Germany for the war and imposed all the war's costs on Germany (thereby causing WWII). The mindset in WWI Germany is incomprehensible today but the reason WWI happened (a much smaller war could have happened) is because there was a plan that wasn't applicable but the people in charge couldn't imagine deviating from the plan and the guy in ultimate charge wouldn't stand up to the ones tasked with fighting the war. The German/Russian/Austrian front of the war was minuscule in comparison to what happened on the French/German/Dutch border where entire armies (and two generations of French/German/English) were ground into hamburger in modern warfare. The greatest lesson of WWI is plans are great to have but they aren't the blueprint for the war that must be followed, iron adherence to a plan regardless of situation is suicide.