A Reflection On Sun Executive Payouts For Failure

With the Oracle/Sun merger finally completing at the end of January, one former Sun worker has taken the time to reflect a bit on the extravagant compensation and golden parachutes that the former executives at Sun are receiving for failing at their jobs. "I think it's fair to say that, for all the miscues that eventually led to its demise, the company created many products and technologies of value along the way, enough so that Oracle thought it was worth it to acquire them and try to keep them going. However, I think that it's equally fair to conclude that, after years of running losses, including about $2 billion in fiscal 2009, so that a buyout was necessary to avoid looming bankruptcy, Sun's executives did nothing to deserve lavish rewards, by any conceivable meaning of the word 'deserve.' But what actually happened is by now a familiar story. [...] And here's a prediction that I feel quite certain of: if, against expectations and my hopes, Ellison drops the ball and things start going south for Oracle, it's the employees who will suffer for it, and he'll be doing just fine."

Comments

American companies are unique in this respect.

[reporter]

With regards to highly compensated senior management, American companies are relatively unique. Among Japan, Europe, and the USA, the ranking from highest relative compensation for the CEO to lowest relative compensation is the following.

1. USA

2. Europe

3. Japan

Here, "relative" means dividing (1) the annual income of the chief executive officer by (2) the average annual income of the employees who are not part of the management structure.

Table 2 on page 6 of an interesting document analyzing the financial compensation of American CEOs is instructive. For the sake of this discussion, we can reasonably assume that figure in the aformentioned category #2 is approximately the same throughout the West.

Table 2 then, in effect, gives us the relative compensation of the CEOs in the West. The typical American CEO in 2003 received annual compensation that is worth $2.2 million. The typical European CEO received $700,000. The typical Japanese CEO received $460,000.

Was the American CEO worth his pay? American neoconservatives answer, "Yes." They say that such compensation enables American companies to be top-notch competitors in high-technology.

On 2009 November 5, "The Economist" issued a startling report. It asserts, with plenty of evidence, that Japanese companies are the sole manufacturers of numerous components that are critical to the operation of high-technology devices ranging from tiny disk drives to huge nuclear reactors.

So, who is telling the truth? American neoconservatives or the "The Economist"?

Wow, you just don't understand any of this, do you

[Estanislao Mart�nez]

I was half-right. Chase bought WaMu, paid off their executives handsomely (one guy who'd been there three weeks got $18M), and then somehow said, "We're buying all the assets, but not the liabilities."

All three parts of your claim there are wrong, which makes you completely wrong, not "half-right." From :

"On September 25, 2008, the United States Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) seized Washington Mutual Bank from Washington Mutual, Inc. and placed it into the receivership of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The OTS took the action due to the withdrawal of $16.4 billion in deposits, during a 10-day bank run (amounting to 9% of the deposits it had held on June 30, 2008). The FDIC sold the banking subsidiaries (minus unsecured debt or equity claims) to JPMorgan Chase for $1.9 billion, which reopened the bank's offices the next day as JPMorgan Chase branches. The holding company, Washington Mutual, Inc. was left with $33 billion assets, and $8 billion debt, after being stripped of its banking subsidiary by the FDIC. The next day, September 26, Washington Mutual, Inc. filed for Chapter 11 voluntary bankruptcy in Delaware, where it is incorporated."

To understand that passage, it's important to know that publically-owned banks in the USA are structured as a public holding company, which privately owns a bank. This is important because what you bought was shares of Washington Mutual Inc. (let's call it WMI), the holding company for Washington Mutual Bank (WMB). WMB failed, so the OTS seized it away from WMI and gave it to the FDIC, which then disposes of the assets and liabilities of WMB in order to make insured deposits and secured debtholders whole. At that point, WMI is bankrupt, so your stock investment is not really worth nothing anymore.

But the more important thing to note is that Chase didn't buy WMI from the shareholders; they bought from FDIC the WMB assets and obligations that the FDIC was on the hook for.

You're also wrong about the "buying all the assets, but not the liabilities part." From the FDIC statement on the closure:

"Subsequent to the closure, JPMorgan Chase acquired the assets and most of the liabilities, including covered bonds and other secured debt, of Washington Mutual Bank from the FDIC as Receiver for Washington Mutual Bank. Any claims by equity, subordinated and senior unsecured debt holders were not acquired." [my emphasis]

This is a standard FDIC bank closure; the FDIC takes care of insured deposits and secured debt of the banks it takes over, and only if there's anything left over from the bank's assets, then unsecured creditors and shareholders get some (in that order). Chase bought the WMB's assets and all the liabilities that the FDIC is on the hook for. The liabilities that Chase didn't get are the ones that the FDIC doesn't normally cover. So basically, the folks who are owed those debts were wiped out by the FDIC takeover, not by the sale to Chase.

And thirdly, the WaMu executives that you claim got paid off handsomely were not paid by Chase. They were paid by WMI, the holding company that went bankrupt. Though the $17.5 million guy actually declined it:

"Chief executive Alan H. Fishman was flying from New York to Seattle on the day the bank was closed, and eventually received a $7.5 million sign-on bonus and cash severance of $11.6 million (which he declined) after being CEO for 17 days."

So basically, you made a bet on a bank that was about to fail, without understanding even a single iota of what happens when banks fail, and then you failed to learn how your investment failed. I can certainly understand and sympathize the part about making the bet on something you don't understand, if you hedge your bet accordingly (which you certainly seem to have done). What I can't understand is your inability or refusal to actually learn how your investment failed.