Slashdot Mirror
Design and Evaluation of Central Control Room Operations
brothke writes "In aviation today, technically advanced airplanes present a unique paradox. Technically advanced airplanes, in theory, have more available safety, and the outcome should be that there are fewer accidents. But without proper training for their pilots, they could be less safe than airplanes with less available safety. The FAA found that without proper training for the pilots who fly them, technically advanced airplanes don't advance safety at all. The reason is that technically advanced airplanes present challenges that under-prepared pilots might not be equipped to handle." Read on for the rest of the review.
Human Factors in the Design and Evaluation of Central Control Room Operations
author
Neville Stanton, Paul Salmon, Daniel Jenkins, Guy Walker
pages
446
publisher
CRC Press
rating
10/10
reviewer
Ben Rothke
ISBN
978-1439809914
summary
Invaluable reference that can be used for the design, assessment, evaluation an operations of NOCs and SOCs
In the IT world, staff members are often expected to install, configure, maintain and support technically advanced software. Companies often buy huge infrastructure software, such as CRM, ERP, PKI, identify management, intrusion detection and more, without first understanding how to make them work in their complex environment. Management often is oblivious to the fact that just because they can buy and install the software that it will not work on its own. The reason why so many large software deployments fail miserably is that the IT staff often doesn't have the proper training, support and assistance that they need.
Human Factors in the Design and Evaluation of Central Control Room Operations is a fantastic book that shows what it takes to ensure support staff work and operate together, in a formal and efficient manner. The book integrates the topics of human factors and ergonomics to create an incredibly valuable tome. The book details the interactions between people and their working environment, and shows in depth how the work environment can and must be designed to reduce errors, improve performance, improve the quality of work, and increase the work satisfaction of the workers themselves.
While the book was written primarily for control room settings, it is relevant for those in IT if they have any involvement in remote support, security operation centers (SOC) and network operation centers (NOC).
While the book is of value to anyone involved in operation, those who will find the most value are those charged with the management and operations or large groups or operations. If they have management support to deploy the formal methods detailed in the book, they will find that they can create significantly higher levels of customer and end-user satisfaction.
The authors note that all SOC and NOC's have a common feature in that the people operating them are often remote from the processes that they are monitoring and controlling, and the operations function on a 24/7 basis. The many demands of remote and continuous operation place special considerations on the design of the SOC and NOC. The output of the book is that it can be used to effectively to design these operating centers.
The books presents a comprehensive and all-inclusive on the topic of human factors on the following 14 topics: competencies, training, procedures, communications, workload, automation, supervision, shift patterns, control room layout, SCADA interfaces, alarms, control room environment, human error, and safety culture. Each chapter includes extensive diagrams and flowcharts to show how the processes develop.
The book also provides a highly analytical approach to each topic. It details the required processes and procedures necessary to make each subject area work. The book is not only based on the four author's expertise; they quote heavily from other experts and their research.
Chapter 2 opens with the observation that the safe and efficient operation of operating centers and control rooms is dependent upon the competence of the operators working within them. It details how to create competence assessments to ensure that staff is capable of carrying out their tasks safely and efficiently by assessing their skills and knowledge. The authors stress that it is not acceptable for organizations to assume that their staff are competent based on only their exposure to training and experience. They suggest that organizations create a program to determine those competence levels.
Chapter 3 goes into detail about how to create effective training programs to ensure worker competence. The benefit of a trained worked is that they can yield higher productivity and provide better service. Well-trained workers often have better morale and produce less errors. The chapter details the importance of a training needs analysis to properly determine what needs to be in the curriculum.
Chapter 4 is on procedures and is particularly important to those working in a SOC or NOC. If consistent and repeatable procedures are created, staff can provide much a more effective and dependable levels of service. Even with the benefits of well crafted procedures, its development process is a complex one involving the identification of all of the tasks that require procedures, a judgment on the level of assistance required, identification of the type or format of procedure required, writing and reviewing the procedures, and obtaining approval for them.
The importance of procedures is underscored when the book notes research that 70% of accidents and incidents within the nuclear power companies occurred when workers failed to properly follow procedures. In the petrochemical industry, 27% of incidents were caused by situations for which there were inadequate or no procedures available.
The percentage of failed IT projects and large software rollout catastrophes is both staggering and appalling. No other sector but IT would tolerate such failures. A book like as Human Factors in the Design and Evaluation of Central Control Room Operations goes a long way to stop that. The book is a rare one in that it both provides all of the factors involved in the problem at hand, and then provides all of the details needed to obviate those problems.
Ben Rothke is the author of Computer Security: 20 Things Every Employee Should Know.
You can purchase Human Factors in the Design and Evaluation of Central Control Room Operations from amazon.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
Human Factors in the Design and Evaluation of Central Control Room Operations is a fantastic book that shows what it takes to ensure support staff work and operate together, in a formal and efficient manner. The book integrates the topics of human factors and ergonomics to create an incredibly valuable tome. The book details the interactions between people and their working environment, and shows in depth how the work environment can and must be designed to reduce errors, improve performance, improve the quality of work, and increase the work satisfaction of the workers themselves.
While the book was written primarily for control room settings, it is relevant for those in IT if they have any involvement in remote support, security operation centers (SOC) and network operation centers (NOC).
While the book is of value to anyone involved in operation, those who will find the most value are those charged with the management and operations or large groups or operations. If they have management support to deploy the formal methods detailed in the book, they will find that they can create significantly higher levels of customer and end-user satisfaction.
The authors note that all SOC and NOC's have a common feature in that the people operating them are often remote from the processes that they are monitoring and controlling, and the operations function on a 24/7 basis. The many demands of remote and continuous operation place special considerations on the design of the SOC and NOC. The output of the book is that it can be used to effectively to design these operating centers.
The books presents a comprehensive and all-inclusive on the topic of human factors on the following 14 topics: competencies, training, procedures, communications, workload, automation, supervision, shift patterns, control room layout, SCADA interfaces, alarms, control room environment, human error, and safety culture. Each chapter includes extensive diagrams and flowcharts to show how the processes develop.
The book also provides a highly analytical approach to each topic. It details the required processes and procedures necessary to make each subject area work. The book is not only based on the four author's expertise; they quote heavily from other experts and their research.
Chapter 2 opens with the observation that the safe and efficient operation of operating centers and control rooms is dependent upon the competence of the operators working within them. It details how to create competence assessments to ensure that staff is capable of carrying out their tasks safely and efficiently by assessing their skills and knowledge. The authors stress that it is not acceptable for organizations to assume that their staff are competent based on only their exposure to training and experience. They suggest that organizations create a program to determine those competence levels.
Chapter 3 goes into detail about how to create effective training programs to ensure worker competence. The benefit of a trained worked is that they can yield higher productivity and provide better service. Well-trained workers often have better morale and produce less errors. The chapter details the importance of a training needs analysis to properly determine what needs to be in the curriculum.
Chapter 4 is on procedures and is particularly important to those working in a SOC or NOC. If consistent and repeatable procedures are created, staff can provide much a more effective and dependable levels of service. Even with the benefits of well crafted procedures, its development process is a complex one involving the identification of all of the tasks that require procedures, a judgment on the level of assistance required, identification of the type or format of procedure required, writing and reviewing the procedures, and obtaining approval for them.
The importance of procedures is underscored when the book notes research that 70% of accidents and incidents within the nuclear power companies occurred when workers failed to properly follow procedures. In the petrochemical industry, 27% of incidents were caused by situations for which there were inadequate or no procedures available.
The percentage of failed IT projects and large software rollout catastrophes is both staggering and appalling. No other sector but IT would tolerate such failures. A book like as Human Factors in the Design and Evaluation of Central Control Room Operations goes a long way to stop that. The book is a rare one in that it both provides all of the factors involved in the problem at hand, and then provides all of the details needed to obviate those problems.
Ben Rothke is the author of Computer Security: 20 Things Every Employee Should Know.
You can purchase Human Factors in the Design and Evaluation of Central Control Room Operations from amazon.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
The authors note that all SOC and NOC's have a common feature in that the people operating them are often remote from the processes that they are monitoring and controlling, and the operations function on a 24/7 basis. The many demands of remote and continuous operation place special considerations on the design of the SOC and NOC. The output of the book is that it can be used to effectively to design these operating centers.
You need a big fridge, and a microwave.
Another common feature is at least of all NOCs I've seen is marketing wants the most stylish looking facility they can get, which is often/always completely at odds with the goals of an effective facility.
Common noc mistakes:
1) Everyone crammed in like sardines so "we can work together". Except that no one noticed that we don't work together. All it makes is a lot of noise and interference. No space to open a stack of manuals, closely related to no space for usable computer monitors (as opposed to the ones used only for show). Even worse, designers seem addicted to adding "static noise" masking generator, crappy elevator music, and/or a PA system for other departments blaring away. Thru careful work, its possible to include features to make it look like its ideal for cooperation, yet make actual cooperation impossible due to noise level etc.
2) Extraordinarily expensive big screen TVs / monitors / projectors on all the forward facing walls, that no one actually uses. Too small, too low res, no actual business purpose. This is a killer two ways, first of all its a huge capital expense that could have paid the salary for extra techs for years, which would have a measurable positive effect. The other way its a killer is you'll actually take people off productive work to "fix" the big screens so marketing is happy. Would anyone in the NOC have a problem doing their job if all the projector bulbs burned out? No, but marketing would freak out.
3) Second class citizen status. "Real" employees can have family pictures in their work area. The dogs of the "noc", not so much. This attitude flows thru the organization in many other ways, producing discontent. Promotion out of the noc becomes a goal, not to "advance" but just to get the hell out.
4) Constant over the shoulder monitoring. No matter if its marketing, or management, there seems an utterly desperate desire to perch over the NOC workers shoulders, either physically or virtually. A great employer-employee attitude if you are 17 years old and working at taco bell. Not a great attitude in a professional noc environment. There seems something inherent in all NOC management that makes them distrust their employees, that you generally don't see in most other departments. Kind of like having the ability to treat them as serfs inevitably makes it a requirement to treat them like serfs.
5) You know those 1970's "sunken livingrooms"? alive and well in the nocs of the world. How about the 1960s original star trek theatre in the round concept with a bridge in the middle? alive and well in the nocs of the world. Remember the set of "wargames" from 1983? Why can't a noc be designed that doesn't look like a throwback or parody? At least try something different, like a medieval dungeon or something?
"Science flies us to the moon. Religion flies us into buildings." - Victor Stenger
My late Grandfather used to tell me stories all the time of stuff that happened in the air traffic control tower at Charlotte-Douglas airport (he was the chief of the tower for 20 years). 99% of the time, human error is to blame, for stuff like military pilots trying to land at the wrong airport and not listening to comms to stuff like poor pronounciation over comms to pilots causing close calls. By the end of his career, he found that work ethic was more important than credentials, because laziness was the cause of a large majority of mishaps. It is difficult to train work ethic, and easy to impart knowledge.
Rewarding diligence and establishing a culture of consistency was their solution. I've seen it work in other industries over the years as well. But, when you think about it, isn't it just common sense to do it? Why do you need a book to explain that?
Yes, this is hardly unique to aviation.
I drive a manual transmission car that possesses a simple key. Should my accelerator go apeshit on me (whether this was a stuck floor mat or a software problem in the accelerator), I have several options to stop the engine from pouring speed into the chassis. Among others, I can push down the clutch pedal (resulting in the engine possibly revving itself to death, but with me able to bring the car to a controlled, if very noisy and probably engine-fatal, stop), and I can turn the key to the Accessory position (which will disable my power steering and the power assist on the brakes, but I can also let up on the clutch to use the engine as a brake and give me back some hydraulic assist). Turning the key into the OFF position locks the steering wheel, which is bad mojo, but at least if I overreact on that one I can get the car slowed down before I hit whatever is in front of me.
The Lexus involved in the much-discussed incident had safety features galore, and was driven by an experienced driver. However, some of the safety features certainly contributed to the accident. Setting aside the likelihood of noticing that a floor mat was stuck under the go pedal and having the time and clarity of thought to reach down and pull it out while the car is accelerating wildly into traffic... an experienced driver knows that in a battle between engine and brakes, the engine will win, so it's utterly vital to get the engine out of play early on.
I've had this happen, and in my case it was a poorly-wired cruise control (aftermarket, that was installed by an idiot apparently). So my first instinct was to tap the brakes, which disengaged the cruise and all was well, I pulled over and physically disconnected the cruise control from the throttle. Obviously, that wasn't the problem here, so the driver probably moved on to another logical step.
In my case, that would be taking the car out of gear. Safety feature #1 comes into play. The car was an automatic, and the interlock prevented the transmission and/or engine from being damaged. It ignored NEUTRAL and REVERSE settings while at speed and under heavy acceleration. If the driver had been able to idle the engine, NEUTRAL would have worked. But he couldn't, and the interlock (a safety feature) worked against him. So on to the next attempt...
I'd continue by turning off the key, which will cause sudden deceleration, a certain amount of loss of control, but will get the engine out of play. However, in this case the starter mechanism was a button that you'd normally push to turn the engine off at idle, but to keep some idiot from pushing the button at speed and shutting down the car, the car ignored all but a 3-second push to the button when the car was in operation. Unless you had (trivial but necessary) specialized training in how that button worked, you might not think about doing that.
I suppose if it was one of those "key must be present" cars with the fancy starter button, he could have thrown the keyfob out the window and hoped the engine would shut itself down once the keyfob was out of range, but I expect another safety feature would have prevented that from happening. :)
So, there are at least two cases where safety features built into the controls of the car made the car paradoxically less safe, at least under these specific circumstances.
"This post contains words, known to the State of California to cause thought. Wash brain thoroughly after reading."