Linux Takes Over E-Voting In Australian State
daria42 writes "The Electoral Commission in the Australian state of Victoria has made plans to expand its use of electronic voting kiosks based on Linux in the next state election in November of this year. But it appears to be a little confused: the documentation states it will be using the '2.6 kernel/Gentoo release of Red Hat Enterprise Linux.' Huh?"
Is the software open source and based on verifiable voting, too?
I live in Victoria and as far a I know there is only one electoral commission in Australia and that is the national one. Maybe the AEC is trialing something in Victoria?
Voting here has always been manual. You write a number in the box. I write it backwards. Gun nuts get the highest number, the greens get the lowest (which is 1), but I accept that other people go about it their own ways.
I have never seen a computer of any kind in a place where we vote. The process is obsessively manual and works very well.
http://michaelsmith.id.au
Now we get to control the Oz elections, and install Linus Torvalds as dictator (benevolent, that is) for life!!!
Mwahahahaha!!
// file: mice.h
#include "frickin_lasers.h"
2.6/Gentoo RHEL is nothing compared to my Damn Small Yellow Dog DebuntuSE with FutureKernel 6.4
which is totally what she said
that's an Ubuntu BSD release!
If the rest of the software, i.e. the actual voting system, is not open source, the move is for the worse.
Religous speak to God. Insane are spoken to by God. When all shut up, one can finally hear Shostakovich in peace
New Zealand already uses Linux for voting and has done for about a decade.
Linux doesn't make electronic voting a good idea though. How can we check the published program is the one running ? It is akin to use opaque voting boxes without showing they are empty first.
Spread the word to fellow voters : if YOU can't understand how the vote is secured, refuse the voting system !
The Wise adapts himself to the world. The Fool adapts the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the Fool.
See this link on how inda votes
http://brainstorms.in/?p=309
The news was taken from tender documents published via tenders.gov.au from the Victorian Electoral Commission (VEC). The tender stated the Gentoo release of RHEL. The tender is for kiosk hardware for use with existing software and the hadware drivers must provide Linux support. The tender documents will be updated online to correct the error.
Each Australian state or territory has its own Commission or independent elections organisation. The VEC has previously run the same E-voting software on a small number of desktop PCs in 2006, running Gentoo Linux. They were made available at six locations in Victoria, only for the blind and vision impaired. This time the project will deploy more machines in tamper-evident kiosk enclosures with a receipt printer. The printer and the touch screen drivers need to support Linux.
The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) which is the federal body did run a vision impaired trial of its own in 2007, but it was not related to the Victorian pilot of the year before.
The VEC will provide a full media release for this project closer to the November State election after the Victorian Parliament has decided what groups of voters should have access to the systems. At most, any voter who would otherwise require assistance may get to use the systems. As I said, at the moment, it's just vision impaired voters until the law changes.
Converting to Linux for voting machines is a big shift from the VEC of old. Color me impressed.
I remember many years ago (1998-1999) working at the VEC. I was a system admin in my first security consultant job.
DEC/Microsoft was helping the VEC create a Microsoft-only COM+ based voting system called EMS 2000. Previously, it had taken 3+ months to organize an election, despite laws allowing the Premier to call an election within a month at any time. So they had to be prepared a long way out, which was costly. EMS 2000 was essentially a way to roll out an election within three weeks. I believe it was used in at least a few elections. I wouldn't be surprised if EMS 2000 has been maintained and is still in use - it was a lot of $$$$$$ to spend on a project.
EMS 2000 used every single part of the Microsoft stack. One thing I remember was how slowly Outlook 98 opened when it had 4000 tasks. EMS 2000 created Outlook tasks using COM+ custom queuing components over very slow modem and ISDN lines to all parts of the state. Surprisingly, this was still better than the previous system, which was primarily a manual system.
It was a full MS stack with basically every single possible MS product at the time (NT, COM+, Exchange, SQL, queuing components using pre-release NT 5.0 / Win2K, and lots of custom VB code), it hung together well and ran fairly reliably considering the shaky comms at the time.
Andrew van der Stock
the documentation states it will be using the '2.6 kernel/Gentoo release of Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
How tragic - another case of Mad Penguin Disease.
Will nobody think of the children?
Check out my novel.
We can't even run a train system properly and you expect the Govt of VIC to handle electronic Voting correctly?
Still I've had a Kennett of a day and anything's got to be better then that...
I wonder if they plan to pick GNU Free up , seeing as it's something that already, you know, exists. Otherwise I would suspect them to just use some proprietary program.
I have to be honest. In the end I don't care one bit about what operating system the voting machine is on. Not at all. What I do care about is that it works and works well. Prove that to me and I would be fine with it running on OS/2
Mod Parent into the ground, please.
It belongs in the XKCD thread.
However, I don't take back what I said.
*grumble*
--
BMO
1. as presently constituted, computer-based voting systems are NOT trustworthy on numerous levels
2. PAPER BALLOTS, HAND COUNTED, LOCALLY REPORTED is the *BEST*, most trustworthy, transparent, and auditable method of voting we have
3. INSTANT RUNOFF VOTING is the other part of reforming our voting process which will provide for TRUE CHOICES aside from the two-headed Korporate Money Party
art guerrilla
aka ann archy
eof
S/he who controls the database, controls the outcome. E-voting should not be allowed for anything more important than vacuous tv talent shows - and even those outcomes are corrupt.
Actuallly the OS & voting program and databse does not matter that much. What is important is that there is a verifiable paper trail. The voter should be able to check what he voted (on a paper). A manual recount should be possible. And remember a vote should be secret (not to be traced back to who voted what). You cannot trust that the (open) source code of the program is the same that is actually running on the voting kiosk. (And i probably am forgetting some important specs here)
Y
A open source system helps, but really is not the core of the problem.
Besides that, the way voters have to register is also important of course. If a voter can vote mulitple times at multiple locations the whole point any voting system is lost. This has nothing to do with the voting computer.
This becomes more important if people distrust their government.
Anyone noticed how the australian icon and the redhat one look so close to each other?
I don't know why everyone has such a problem with this - the act of voting, manually or electronically is rather simple and not an overly difficult task.
Have a touch screen/keyboard overlay that displays the candidates and the computer records the order you tick the boxes.
Then prints on paper in fixed locations to match the screen overlay numbers that represent the order a box was chosen (Look at a lottery quick pick, or a machine readable ticket) print a barcode at the bottom that encodes the time, date, location, etc, the options chosen and a checksum (Perhaps one of those new fangled 3d barcodes so people may even be able to verify it with their phones/etc)
Make sure the print out and the screen are displayed side by side, if they don't match the voter is to manually cross out with a specific pen (no computer crossing out at all).
Oh and make sure they can't unlock the voting booth until they confirm one way or the other :D
If the numbers in b
oxes don't match the barcode the vote is declared illegal.
Added points if after the user verifies the vote it's saved locally, sent to a central location, and uploaded to two independent bodies (which check the central location and each other to verify the vote)
Even more points if the barcodes, votes, and backup systems are checked routinely - like every hour all votes are scanned and compared.
The key here is that the humans and the machines are able to read the primary component printout - barcodes are only there as double checks.
Paper systems aren't foil proof - especially as we're given PENCILS to mark the boxes - and as much as they're under supervision a whole group of supervisors can be abusing the system...
Good God...
I see that Linus wasn't kidding when he was talking about world domination!
I would think that slashdotters would be largely against evoting simply because we have all seen how computers are routinely mauled by bad people. The stakes are way too high if bad people are the only ones who would hack themselves a win does this not almost make it certain that bad people will win. The only computerized voting I would accept would be one where the vote is taken by computer but then it prints a bit of paper that becomes the final say. This way you avoid hanging chads yet you give the voter the ability to audit what they put in the box. With any other evoting system the computer could ignore the voter and change the tally as it is told and the voter would a have no idea that they were just disenfranchised. With the stakes this high having people count some bits of paper is a very good investment.
The Australian state of Victoria is home to some of the worst IT-related projects in the history of IT.
Victoria Police Business Information Technology Services: fraud, kickbacks, blowouts, leaks... the list is long
myki: most expensive ticketing system in the world, years behind schedule, too complex, doesn't work... the list is also long
And now they want to fail spectacularly - again - with the introduction of e-voting?
I've got a special slot reserved in my "top IT project disasters" list for any e-voting system that has anything to do with the state of Victoria.
"The Australian state of Victoria is home to some of the worst IT-related projects in the history of IT. Victoria Police Business Information Technology Services: fraud, kickbacks, blowouts, leaks... the list is long .."
Apart from the myki project, do you have any citation of references to repuitable sources for this? Was myki based on Linux?
Global lessons in e-voting:
http://news.cnet.com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009-1008_3-5387540.html
The Victorian Electoral Commission (VEC) is an independent statutory authority established under Victoria's Electoral Act 2002, which conducts Victorian State elections, local council elections, certain statutory elections and commercial and community elections. Where as the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) is responsible for conducting federal elections and referendums and maintaining the Commonwealth electoral roll.
The two bodies are not the same.
OK, they chose Linux. How does help?
I mean, the point of voting is not to run some fancy software; instead the point is to unequivocally arrive to a conclusion about the opinion of a population.
Why would anyone in their sense select a Linux, or any other commercial off the shelf operating system, for a voting system has always baffled me. I find it very difficult to trust any arguments for system's dependability, if the starting point is a selection of a specific technology. After all, the system shall fulfill its requirements, not more, no less.
Hand counts are not readily auditable because they're very slow. They're marginally auditable in cases where ballots can be sorted into a very small number of mutually-exclusive outcomes (i.e. for one race) but if you can't put them into piles an audit of a hand count would be very expensive and time consuming.
Plus optical-scan systems have accuracy rates of 3 or 4 nines, which is almost certainly better than the accuracy rate of people attempting to mark their intended vote on a ballot, and close enough for all but the mostly tightly contested races even if you assume ballots are 100% accurately marked.
So if you used optical scan ballots and automated counting and demanded a hand count only when the error rate of the machine might reasonably affect the outcome of the election, you could improve speed and maintain at least as much if not more auditability.
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/appel/optical-scan-voting-extremely-accurate-minnesota
2010 is the year of Linux e-voting.
Give a receipt to all voters with: voterID random-challenge hash(voterID, random-challenge, vote option) Then create a online list with all the population hashs ordered by vote option. Only who knows the random-challenge can check that the vote was indeed accouted for that "vote option". Should I start run to go patent this? :P
Even with GNU/Linux. I prefer the old paper method, it leaves physical proof that can be recounted. Just take a look at what has been happening in the US and realize bought and paid corporations will rig the vote in favor of the highest bidder.
No surprise here. *NIX is deliberately confusing. Understanding the nuances of it are what seperates "us" from the hoi polloi.
At least they weren't confused enough NOT to choose some version of FOSS.
"I believe in Karma. That means I can do bad things to people all day long and I assume they deserve it." : Dogbert
Bingo!
But it introduces not one but several single points of failure, of which the manufacturer is just the most obvious. In addition there are, at least:
- The distribution channel for software updates (OS, voting app, ballot configuration entry, ...)
- The hardware itself. (For instance, NO voting machine should EVER use a chipset that supports Intel AMT, which is a hardware back door that is invisible to the software running on the machine and can completely take it over.)
- Anyone who can crack into them - opening the covers, injecting information through ports, wireless, or interface bugs, hacking their communications if they're network enabled, etc. (The people who handle and transport them, the people who update their software or load the ballot, the poll workers who operate them, the voters who have their hands on them in shrouded conditions, anybody nearby with some electronics if they're radio-crackable, ...)
- Bugs in all that software and hardware.
and ditto for the central servers that collect and summarize the results.
Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way