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Security Industry Faces Attacks It Can't Stop
itwbennett writes "The takedown of the Mariposa botnet and so-called advanced persistent threat attacks, such as the one that compromised Google systems in early December, were hot topics at the RSA conference last week. What both Mariposa and the Google attacks illustrate, and what went largely unsaid at RSA, was that the security industry has failed to protect paying customers from some of today's most pernicious threats, writes Robert McMillan. Traditional security products are simply not much help, said Alex Stamos, a partner with Isec Partners, one of the companies investigating the APT attacks. 'All of the victims we've worked with had perfectly installed antivirus,' he said. 'They all had intrusion detection systems and several had Web proxies scan content.'"
the "victims" were all running MS Windows...
Donald 'Duck' Dunn: We had a band powerful enough to turn goat piss into gasoline.
The "security industry" is NOT interested in putting itself out of business by selling WORKING products.
That's why the "perfectly installed antivirus" gets daily updates and STILL CANNOT TELL A GOOD FILE FROM A BAD FILE.
Here's a radical new concept. How about an antivirus program that BLOCKS file writes to the operating system UNLESS that file can be confirmed to be "good"?
It's far easier to identify the files that SHOULD be allowed than it is to identify a possible threat.
This is a terribly ignorant statement. The security has actually succeeded in protecting paying customers from all but the most pernicious threats. IT security is about reducing risk, and that's what it does--successfully.
A slashdotter who didn't build his own computer is like a Jedi who didn't build his own lightsaber.
The Microsoft operating system has been, always will be insecure. No amount of anti this, anti that or how update date your windows box is; it is not safe to use for any kind of sensitive data.
My karma is not a Chameleon.
Kittens don't have hands. They have paws. But yes, I agree with you. Maybe seeing a few pictures like that would get people to stop clicking the links.
The dark side of computer "security" pays far better than the good side. I was contracted to setup a number of servers for a company, and as it turned out, they were part of this "dark side." I told them I had an ethical conflict, and decided to remove myself from the situation about 2 hours into it.
The problem is, other than the coders and the boss, many people do not know they are working for these companies. This particular company had about 15 people. 3 were in the know, the other 12 were support for shipping, gathering information, making contacts, and advertising, etc. When dealing with spyware/malware, there is a lot of butt covering, and evasion.
The programmers in particular were amazing coders, some of the best that graduated at the same university I went to. This is how I got contacted to help. Only after we started talking did I realize what they were all about. The pay was almost double what they would have made at a legitimate company.
How about an antivirus program that BLOCKS file writes to the operating system UNLESS that file can be confirmed to be "good"?
Who has the authority to confirm, say, your shopping list as good? Or, if you're considering only files marked executable, a shell script that your co-worker wrote?
There is no perfect security, offline or online.
I like to say there are 3 main types of attacks:
We have mechanisms that are pretty good at class 1. We can shore up our defenses enough to not be the low hanging fruit to get some protection against level 2.
Level 3 is only starting to enter the public eye. There is no defense that will withstand a well funded targeted attack. The best you can do is make it too difficult for most attackers, and monitor and clean up after the really good ones.
This is true for airline security, concert security, bank security, web site security, and network security. There is no impenetrable defense for any of these. You minimize the risk as much as you can, then build your systems so they can be effectively monitored and rebuilt/restored in case of attack.
Blessed are the pessimists, for they have made backups.
That's what makes "spear-phishing" so ridiculously dangerous - if the attacker is spending his entire day on you specifically, you're going to need a little more than an off-the-shelf unmonitored solution. And if you're a "high visibility target" then you are going to need even more, defense in depth and a dedicated team for your security. It's not reasonable to expect "but I installed Norton!" to come from a CEO of a big company for example. Bigger assets require better, customized defenses.
Bigger targets attract more than script kiddies and people that are buying hacking kits. They attract entire groups and organizations of highly skilled and specialized hackers that know how to analyze your defenses, have experience getting around all but the industrial grade security tools, and can customize their work and cover their tracks.
It's no different than complaining that neighborhood security is a mess because your padlock didn't keep your bike from getting stolen. If you have a really nice bike, and a smart thief really wants it, you'd better have something better than a crappy $7 masterlock on it. You can't blame the lock if the bike gets stolen. You were using the wrong tool for the job and the outcome should come as no surprise. You were expecting way too much (security) from way too little.
I work for the Department of Redundancy Department.
The problem is that they haven't even hit the 50% mark. They cannot even, reliably, detect threats that are over a year old.
Exactly. Which is why that needs to change. Instead of trying to chase the latest variant of a threat, why not save time and effort and identify the LEGITIMATE files? Then, if something is trying to write a file to the OS portion of your drive, and that file is not recognized, it should block it (and MAYBE allow the user to override it after a few hoops and maybe online comparisons with the latest threat databases).
I think it is different. The "security industry" depends upon the ignorance of users and the continuation of those users being infected.
It is not in the "security industry"'s best interest to commit to real improvements in security.
e (damn /. and its short subject field).
Our state CISO was fired when he got back from the conference because he spoke about a hacking incident to the state's DOT site which allows one to schedule driver's exams. Apparently, it was initially presumed the attack came from Russia but was later found to have come from Philadelphia where a driving school had exploited a vulnerability in the web site to schedule more driving tests than there were allotted slots.
By exploiting this vulnerability, the driving school was able to close all available slots EXCEPT for the school so everyone else had to wait up to 6 weeks to schedule a test.
He was a scheduled presenter with over 24 years in IT in both the public and private sector. He was recognized, according to the RSA schedule, as "one of the most high-profile experts in the field of securing the data of American citizens today."
As you read the comments after the article, it's clear that some folks with knowledge of the subject insist he went out of bounds on the subject while others consider what he did to be a normal part of the IT security process.
I'm only posting this as it does relate to the overall RSA conference. Note that the web site indicated will probably prevent reading the article after a certain time has passed so read it now. In addition, here are two other sites which talk about the firing:
Site one
Site two
Further, here is an article which talks to the firee after he became the state's first CISO and what he had to contend with.
We will bankrupt ourselves in the vain search for absolute security. -- Dwight D. Eisenhower
No? Then it isn't an issue.
Now, if you're trying to store your shopping list on c:\windows\system32 ... then the anti-virus app should block you.
As for who has the authority ... that would be the anti-virus vendor. The same people who you've given the authority to tell you what is a virus today.
A side benefit of this would be that the anti-virus app could also tell you that you have vulnerable, unpatched apps on your system.
you don't need to click any more. Most of the malware I'm cleaning up these days is delivered via Flash, and distributed by advertisement servers that have been hacked. All you have to do is visit a site that gets paid to serve random ads, and you can get infected.
You could at least try to not sound like an idiot.
Which is why I am staying out of this conversation ... except for that ... and that ... oh, never mind.
There are some problems that you have to pay money to have.
True, but Windows OS isn't one of them. It costs just as much to buy a PC for a home or small office without preinstalled Windows OS as it does to buy one with preinstalled Windows OS. The common explanation for this is that major shareware publishers subsidize the cost of a Windows OS license by paying PC makers to include unregistered versions of their products in the default install.
You are asserting that the costs of a computer end at purchase, they do not. With Windows, the purchase price is only the beginning of your costs. Anti-virus, maintenance, upgrading, rebooting, these costs dwarf the purchase price.
Not automatic, but whitelisting security systems like that exist. Core Force is the one I know of. It has some sort of system for sharing whitelists for specific applications among users.
Centralization breaks the internet.
Your mom.
Possibly mine also ...
It takes 40+ muscles to frown, but only four to extend your arm and bitchslap the motherfucker
In a whitelisting system, how do ISVs get their products and updates to their products into the major antivirus companies' whitelists? Sure, a business's IT department should handle that in a business situation, but home users often don't have a competent IT department.
Or we could do true layered defenses in security and redesign the OS to support them. Don't put crap into ring 0 just for "performance" purposes. Use micro-kernels and use messaging systems for interprocess communications. Place OS files into their own, protected partition and control access rigorously. Sign them. Allow unsigned drivers if need be, but sandbox them. Limit "shared" libraries and directories (hello Microsoft and Adobe). Drop legacy application support unless seriously sandboxed in a virtual environment. Heck, sandbox current applications the same way. And so on.
Today's processors and multi-core systems are fast enough to handle the overhead. Drives are huge. Allocate a full 10% of the processor budget to security. Why should we not sacrifice a few FPS in Quake or Unreal for hardened systems that are much, much, much more resistant to tampering and infection?
We know what we need to do. Just do it.
Any sect, cult, or religion will legislate its creed into law if it acquires the political power to do so.