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NSA Develops USB Storage Device Detector
Hugh Pickens writes "Bob Brewin writes on NextGov that the National Security Agency has developed a software tool that detects thumb drives or other flash media connected to a network. The NSA says the tool, called the USBDetect 3.0 Computer Network Defense Tool, provides 'network administrators and system security officials with an automated capability to detect the introduction of USB storage devices into their networks. This tool closes potential security vulnerabilities; a definite success story in the pursuit of the [Defense Department] and NSA protect information technology system strategic goals.' The tool gathers data from the registry on Microsoft Windows machines (PDF) and reports whether storage devices, such as portable music or video players, external hard drives, flash drives, jump drives, or thumb drives have been connected to the USB port. 'I have a hunch that a bunch of other agencies use the detection software,' writes Brewin."
"USB Detect detects the use of removable drives"
"Shadow Drive evades detection by the following products"
"Latest USB Detect detects Shadow Drive use!"
"New ShadowDrive 2.0!"
Shit, the parent company of both products could make a killing! Hey wait a minute, is this another lame
attempt to bring money in off the books for illegal ops?
-Steve
"I opened my eyes, and everything went dark again"
"The NSA says the tool, called the USBDetect 3.0 Computer Network Defense Tool"
So if this is 3.0 can I assume they have had the tool for some time. Why are bothering to tell anyone at this point?
I judt got a nre Kinesis keybiartf so please excusr ant egregiou typos.
It relies on information from the OS. The OS is too easy to circumuvent. For example, it doesn't report on whether or not the system has been booted from a USB device. Given that they are the NSA, maybe they have the luxury of making the assumption that USB boot is disabled and the BIOS is password protected?
...because the Windows Registry is a secure source of information...
No kidding. I seem to remember using some open-source utility that did exactly this like 5 years ago.
I judt got a nre Kinesis keybiartf so please excusr ant egregiou typos.
I like how some of our tax dollars fund bloated agencies to come up with solutions that unshaven hackers in their mom's basements figured out years ago.
Because clearly the NSA started numbering this program at 3.0 just for the hell of it.
Because DOD got pwned back in November 2008 when some schmuck used a thumbdrive to transfer files between the NIPR and SIPR networks, and they still haven't figured out how to fix the vulnerability.
!#@%*)anks for hanging up the phone, dear.
Because they want to integrate it with theyre security suite or theyre logging solution, because they have over 9000 machine using it. If they want to spend the budget they could buy fancy new chair instead of wasting programmer and consulting time coding a app. Don't forget that gouvernement is big and app deployement, monitoring and security is not free.
Management eventually figured out that if you couldn't trust the guys you hired, you were screwed from go. More effective to treat your employees fairly in the first place. We stopped installing the service on new machines.
Fun to write though.
Please do not read this sig. Thank you.
Oh, please. Like nobody else has ever created duplicate software before.
Yes, there are probably other utilities that do this. Maybe the NSA was unaware of them. Maybe they were incompatible with their legacy tools or infrastrcture. Maybe they didn't do what the NSA needed.
And even then, sometimes it's worth a rewrite, just to make things better.
The intent here is to make it more difficult for insiders to surreptitiously export data without going through proper security controls. This kind of argument always puzzles me. It's like you're saying that because there is no perfect security, we should therefore do nothing.
In a locked-down environment, a user with physical access to a machine may still have difficulty exporting large gobs of data. Transfer over the network may be difficult, and certainly is monitored. Data can be printed out, but this requires a printer, and a way to smuggle paper out of the facility without suspicion. A cell phone with a camera could be used to photograph a computer screen, but this is very low-bandwidth, and certainly looks strange to anyone happening to observe. A USB stick is easily hidden, easily plugged and unplugged, and can have a very large capacity. It's an important vector of attack.
Even without malicious intent, a user might decide for some reason that transferring data via USB stick is more convenient than another method. They may have good intentions, but the data still leaks onto the USB stick and you lose control over it. Just because something could be defeated doesn't make it worthwhile. And software which monitors connected machines for insertion/removal of media is not exactly hard to design. It doesn't cost you a billion dollars.