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NSA Develops USB Storage Device Detector
Hugh Pickens writes "Bob Brewin writes on NextGov that the National Security Agency has developed a software tool that detects thumb drives or other flash media connected to a network. The NSA says the tool, called the USBDetect 3.0 Computer Network Defense Tool, provides 'network administrators and system security officials with an automated capability to detect the introduction of USB storage devices into their networks. This tool closes potential security vulnerabilities; a definite success story in the pursuit of the [Defense Department] and NSA protect information technology system strategic goals.' The tool gathers data from the registry on Microsoft Windows machines (PDF) and reports whether storage devices, such as portable music or video players, external hard drives, flash drives, jump drives, or thumb drives have been connected to the USB port. 'I have a hunch that a bunch of other agencies use the detection software,' writes Brewin."
It'll be a pretty short race, for all but a fairly dedicated hard-core.
In order for the USB device to do anything, the host OS has to load the appropriate driver. Until it does so, you aren't getting anything other than 100ma at 5V(higher amperages quite possible, depending on the situation).
Getting the OS to load a driver without noticing that it has loaded a driver(and without the benefit of exploit code, since you don't get to access that until the drive is mounted) would be quite a trick. Assuming this monitoring software isn't completely braindead, the fact that a USB mass storage device has been inserted, along with any interesting ID strings, will have already be sent to a monitoring server before your filesystem is even mounted. Any tampering you do at that point will just introduce suspicious discrepancies.
Now, there is(for instance, I'm sure the suitably creative can think of others) nothing stopping a truly dedicated exfiltrator from obtaining the USB device and vendor IDs and so forth for the brand of keyboard used at that particular establishment, then building a USB device(using one of the common and inexpensive USB-capable microcontrollers) that presents exactly those IDs, and is thus detected as a USB-HID keyboard, rather than a USB-MSC device. They could then use the fact that the keyboard LEDs are under software control as a method of getting data off the system. At least on a unixlike, anybody with some basic script-fu could probably be piping arbitrary files off the system with xset led in about 10 minutes. Your custom USB device would have a slab of flash, which it would fill according to the LED commands it received. I don't know if there is anything equivalent on Windows.
Using tricks like that, you could probably get something of an arms race going(though, still, anything that involves doing suspicious program/script execution is going to get your ass busted in any reasonably paranoid environment); but for USB MSC stuff, it is only the pure apathy of the administration, or the fact that they recognize that mass storage devices are extremely convenient and beloved by users, that lets you get away with it.
That's not the point. The reason for this software is to add one more layer of security to an already extremely secure network, and mostly to detect friendly accidental use by tech-clueless intelligence analysts (yes, most intelligence analysts are experts on geopolitics or military tactics and not Windows). This is not designed to prevent true espionage attacks by insiders who are technology experts, there are a lot of other layers of security for that.
Just because I can hook a shark from a boat, I do no offer to wrestle it in the water.
If anything, USB is less dangerous because it is less capable. Firewire can do DMA. Which, unless you are on modern, high-end hardware(where the I/OMMU will stop you) or on a 64 bit system(where the fact that Firewire DMA is only 32 bit will limit you some) a malicious firewire device can snarf or modify your memory space at its pleasure.
USB just makes it easy to copy files off the system(assuming your environment hasn't already disabled that). Most modern corporate-issue computers let you shut off USB ports at the BIOS level, if you want, and you can block the loading of Mass Storage drivers or the mounting of unauthorized filesystems in any modern OS.
Well, since they are in the espionage business, maybe they want to trap whomever does it by making it possible to mount the drive but triggering a silent alarm.
Not quite, the NSA can really be seen as two groups. The Data Processing NSA and the Anti-Network-Intrusion/Espionage & Policy NSA. But you are correct that they probably want the ability to determine and track before simply blocking all access.
I'm quite sure on the computer I'm at right now I could go hog-wild and do all sorts of things. Things that would be logged and flag my account/use as one to watch.
Out of modpoints but really liked a post? 1BDkF6TtmmeZ3yqXbz9yhdYVqRYnwFoXDj
If you manage to do this you then need a dope slap because you can always use ssh or even plain email to get files out. Then what about the occasion where you need usb drives.
This is almost certainly aimed at preventing classified information leaks. Machines with classified information are not connected to any network containing unclassified machines, and definitely not the internet. Even if it were connected, sending that e-mail leaves a record of the transmission, meaning the spy can be easily identified.
USB drives are the most likely way to get info off a classified machine, which is precisely why they're forbidden. There is no legitimate occasion where a USB drive is needed in this case.
Write your representatives! Repeal the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics!
It's trivial to re-enable a serial port that has been disabled in the bios. You can use debug to write to the bios data area under windows, or you can write a small program to do it for you. I used to reassign serial ports on the fly that way - 4 ports and 2 interrupts is not a good situation, but 4 ports and 1 shared interrupt IS good.
Your "bios blocked with an unremovable admin password" is also bs - while you sometimes have to open the cover and short out a couple of pins for a few seconds, sometimes it's possible to do it entirely in software as well - but you miss the point - the bios is read at startup, but I can monkey with it as much as I want afterwards.
also, serial cards are cheap. So are ethernet cards. So plug all the ports you want with epoxy, and people will still get the data out. Or they can just take a picture with their cell phone.
A notebook - even if you plug all the usb AND the card reader, my mini philips screwdriver will have the hd out in seconds - it's a LOT easier to remove and replace than a desktop. I'll also reconnect the wireless (it's just one wire, after all, and nowadays even if you rip it out it's field-serviceable and replacements are cheap). Pop the hd into the second drive bay on my laptop, make an image of it with dd, and I'm good :-)
If someone has physical access, you cannot stop them from getting the data if they really want it.