What Can Be Done About Security of Debit Cards?
JumpDrive writes "I have been the victim of (Visa) debit card theft. I do not know where they stole or got the number, but it was used one day on the other side of the country and the next day it was used in Europe until they cleaned out my account. I had been monitoring my account online and immediately went to the bank and filed a claim. I was told at that time it would be 3 to 5 weeks for them to investigate the claim before they could return my money. Recently I tried to make a purchase with a debit card and was told that they couldn't use the card since it wasn't a Visa or MasterCard check card; this led to a discussion of why I no longer have a Visa or MasterCard check card. Which then led to the question of 'What can be done about it?' Currently I have a separate account for debit usage for my personal safety. But I also think that those producing these check cards should be required to advertise the hazards of having one of these cards (not in small print and maybe required in advertisement of these cards, similar to what is required with pharmaceutical drugs on television) and/or that if a debit or check card is issued a separate account should be required for its use, and users informed of the issues of placing all of their money in the same account that their debit card has access to. What other precautionary measures should be required or taken?"
The short answer? The banks will do nothing for you today.
The long answer: Nobody will do anything for you tomorrow, either.
Why? Because Visa does two things, only one of which makes money. First, they are in charge of defining financial card security through the PCI council, and they own and operate the secure network VisaNet, which carries authorizations from retailers to banks. Guess which one makes them money?
If Visa were to design and offer a cryptographically secure solution, one based only on smart cards for the customers and Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) at the banks, then I could safely route my charge authorizations over the plain ol' Internet. I wouldn't need to use the charge-per-transaction VisaNet. Visa would stop making money.
So instead of offering a secure solution, Visa and the PCI council say, "Merchants must lock down their systems, protect this data, follow these 12 steps, acknowledge that you are powerless over alcohol (oh wait, wrong 12 steps), and if you don't, we'll loudly blame you for allowing someone to see our non-existent security."
Visa owns the protocols used between merchants and banks. They could strengthen the protocols. They could prescribe encryption. They could require the deployment of chipped banking cards. But they do not, and have not for many, many years, despite a pathetic track record of security.
If you want the banks to be safe with your money, you ironically have to take charge of your own security. If you switch to using the green paper stuff, your losses will be finitely limited to what you carry on your person. If you want a more achievable answer in today's plastic world, DO NOT CARRY DEBIT CARDS. Debit cards do not offer you protection against loss. Credit cards are limited by U.S. law to a maximum of $50 liability to the cardholder. Debit cards losses are usually covered by the bank, but they are under no legal obligation to do so. For ATM access, most banks will honor your request for an ATM-only card instead of accepting their default ATM/Debit card. Of course, the use of credit cards requires personal discipline to always pay the debt on time, but otherwise you would see little difference.
John
But I also think that those producing these check cards should be required to advertise the hazards of having one of these cards
NO, NO, NO. No stupid, pointless warnings. Make the financial institutions solely liable for all identity theft. They're the only ones with the ability to stop it, and they should be the ones that bear the full economic incentive for managing fraud.
But I didn't say it first, Bruce Schneier did:
The actual problem to be solved is that of fraudulent transactions. Financial institutions make it too easy for a criminal to commit fraudulent transactions, and too difficult for the victims to clear their names.
[...]
It's not that financial institutions suffer no losses. Because of something called Regulation E, they already pay most of the direct costs of identity theft. But the costs in time, stress and hassle are entirely borne by the victims.
The whole article is +5 Insightful, well worth reading.
IAABG (I am a banking geek).
The rules for provisional credit on debit cards is very well established. They fall under Regulation E, section 205.11. The bank has ten days to get you a provisional refund, and can take up to 45 days in certain circumstances to complete their investigation and finalize the credit.
Make sure you get them a notice in writing! Once you do, they have ten days to credit you, and many banks will do it much faster. If the bank drags their feet, just tell them "I want provisional credit within the mandated timeline per Regualtion E".
Here's more on this topic:
http://www.bankersonline.com/technology/guru2008/gurus_tech022508c.html
http://usa.visa.com/personal/security/visa_security_program/zero_liability.html
http://finsolinc.com/Reg%20E%20EFTA%20Error%20Resolution%20Flowchart.pdf
The protection for misuse of debit cards is strong, you just need to know what to do. If your bank isn't responsive, Move Your Money to a smaller institution that cares.