Mass. Data Security Law Says "Thou Shalt Encrypt"
emeraldd writes with this snippet from SQL Magazine summarizing what he calls a "rather scary" new data protection law from Massachusetts: "Here are the basics of the new law. If you have personally identifiable information (PII) about a Massachusetts resident, such as a first and last name, then you have to encrypt that data on the wire and as it's persisted. Sending PII over HTTP instead of HTTPS? That's a big no-no. Storing the name of a customer in SQL Server without the data being encrypted? No way, Jose. You'll get a fine of $5,000 per breach or lost record. If you have a database that contains 1,000 names of Massachusetts residents and lose it without the data being encrypted, that's $5,000,000. Yikes.'"
That's pretty much already corporate policy at the last two major places I've worked for a few years now. It would be nice if the government starts treating that data the same way.
In fact, it would also be nice to mandate encryption and signatures for email so there will be no more unsolicited spam. And finally it would be great if no one was allowed to open up a line of credit without my cryptographic signature so I wouldn't have to protect my SSN, birthdate, and mother's maiden name like it was some sort of safety deposit box combination.
Now maybe if they actually enforce it businesses will get the idea that they should protect the data.
Best Slashdot Co
What is so scary about this?
With a high cost of PII, there is now an economic incentive for companies to actually give a rats ass. It's the same kind of incentive that is used to make sure companies don't just dump toxic chemicals in kindergarten sandboxes.
This seens pretty sensible. Given how many people are hurt by these things, this seems like a reasonable standard for future industry practice, and the fines hammer home the idea to the companies that "oops, sorry!" isn't the level of seriousness these things should be given. I imagine most of the time these breaches are against the privacy promises the companies make anyhow.
The only downside is that the fine is kind of daunting for people who would like to enter a relevant market, although .. perhaps it's analogous to car manufacturers being liable for poor design of their products - when they fail, it can be a big deal.
For every problem, there is at least one solution that is simple, neat, and wrong.
Sounds awesome to me. This should have been made law in every state/country a long time ago. Now if they would just make it law that all companies must provide an easy and thorough means for any individual to expunge their details from company records (I'm looking at you Facebook) then I might finally be able to stop that little bit of throwing up in my throat I get every time a company asks for my email address.
It's scarier to contemplate that such information is so often exposed as a matter of routine carelessness.
On the other hand, it's not clear what to do about the classic perimeter problem. Sooner or later, somewhere, the encrypted data has to be processed or presented in plaintext. The key and the data have to be brought together. Now we've converted the problem of securing the data to the problem of securing the key - probably many keys in practice - and the systems on which those keys reside - probably many systems.
Parity: What to do when the weekend comes.
~Article I, section 8, clause 3, United States Constitution.
"Don't meddle in the affairs of a patent dragon, for thou art tasty and good with ketchup." ~ohcrapitssteve
Encryption in transit is great. Encryption of backup tapes is great. Encryption of end-user systems which store the data is great.
But encryption of live servers and databases is a farce. Encryption without key management is itself a farce, and a servers which require keys to operate necessarily lack key management. Furthermore, server encryption is absurd because it can only protects against physical theft of the servers, not against hacking.
The only case in which server encryption would do a bit of good is if the datacenter has no physical security, and every time a system boots, someone has to walk over to it and type a 20+ character random password.
Yes, I work in IT security. Yes, I think encryption is great, but NOT ON SERVERS.
A slashdotter who didn't build his own computer is like a Jedi who didn't build his own lightsaber.
From the law, personal information is defined as:
Personal information, a Massachusetts resident's first name and last name or first initial and last name in combination with any one or more of the following data elements that relate to such resident: (a) Social Security number; (b) driver's license number or state-issued identification card number; or (c) financial account number, or credit or debit card number, with or without any required security code, access code, personal identification number or password, that would permit access to a resident’s financial account; provided, however, that “Personal information” shall not include information that is lawfully obtained from publicly available information, or from federal, state or local government records lawfully made available to the general public.
So just a first+last name isn't enough to incur the wrath of the law. It has to be that, plus SSN, Lic Number, or financial account number.
But from how I read that, it has to be the First name, Last name, Plus one of those. Does that mean I can store a list of social security numbers plus last names completely unencrypted and be off free? Odd
Typical slashdot. Have to find the buried comment to find the truth.
I'd like to see Mass. set up a website to assist small business owners to comply with this law. I'm not talking about tech support, but maybe a basic guide?
'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.' - Mao Tse-tung
I'm sorry, but I strongly disagree with your position on almost every count.
Firstly, your point about different territories with different rules is fundamentally flawed. Many places — all of Europe, for example — already have stronger data protection laws than most of the US. This causes no earth-shattering problem with compliance. Large companies keep the data they can't legally export within their European offices. Smaller companies just outsource things like payment collection to services that guarantee any personal data will be processed securely and not transferred outside of EU borders. They were going to outsource it anyway, so the only people who lose out are services that want to handle sensitive information but can't make the same guarantees as others about security, whose flawed business model just became obsolete.
Secondly, I think you (and several other DB admins and such in this Slashdot discussion) are far, far too casual about this subject. In my country, we have had a string of mismanagement or outright leaks of sensitive personal data in recent months. The number of people who have wound up losing money or suffering long-term hassle just to set their records straight is absurd, and rising every day. A $5,000 fine per leak is nothing compared to the hassle and indirect costs of someone suffering identity theft, even if they get everything put right in the end and recover their direct losses. To one side, it's several months of hell to get your identity back. To the other, it's a mere business expense, a footnote on page 172 of the annual financial statement.
In my not so humble opinion, both business and governments need to learn this lesson, and I have absolutely nothing against sending a business to the wall if it collects personal information but fails to secure it properly. We have allowed more-or-less unrestricted collection of personal data for a few years, easily long enough for the industry to gets its act together. The result has just been organisations hoarding personal information about people for reasons that are entirely self-serving, pretty much all of whom could just die and make the world a better place anyway, and the string of screw-ups I mentioned before from many organisations that do have a legitimate reason to hold that sort of data.
It is time for organisations that think this is OK to be taught otherwise, and frankly these fines are on the light side. I would have preferred an additional statutory duty of care with unlimited liability to cover the cost of putting right any damage done to an individual following a leak. Go ahead and reevaluate your security protocols and whether it is really impossible to do these things or just inconvenient/expensive, when the other side of the inequality you're testing looks like an 8 on its side instead of a $10 per person class action settlement.
If you disagree, post your argument. (-1, Overrated) isn't your personal censorship tool for views you don't like.