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Why Tor Users Should Be Cautious About P2P Privacy
An anonymous reader writes "I went across your post a few days ago saying that a machine connected to the Internet was all one needed to spy on most BitTorrent users of the Internet. I followed the link to find out that those researchers from INRIA claimed their attacks also worked for BitTorrent users on Tor. I didn't believe it at first, but then today I found this link on the Tor Project. It seems their attacks don't only link your real IP to your BitTorrent files on Tor but also to the web pages that you're browsing! Tell me it's a joke." No joke, but according to Jacob Appelbaum (a Tor developer), the security flaw is more nuanced — and the fault of software outside of Tor. Read on for his explanation of how the privacy benefits of Tor can be easily lost.
Appelbaum writes "This isn't a failing of Tor, it's a failing of BitTorrent application designers and a privacy failure of their users too. The BitTorrent clients don't appear to double check the information that's ripe for tampering. When combined with common BitTorrent applications that aren't designed for privacy, it's possible to cause a BitTorrent client to leak information about their actual source IP. The BitTorrent protocol is difficult to anonymize with a simple proxy.
Ironically, one of the best points of the paper is that those BitTorrent clients also harm the anonymity of the users' web browsing. The user's browsing will often leave the same Tor Exit Node as their BitTorrent traffic; the user is using the same circuit for browsing as they are for BitTorrent. If the user isn't practicing safe browsing techniques, they're probably going to reveal some more of their traffic to the authors of the paper. This is just like the normal internet too. If you browse unsafely, people can observe you or tamper with the data in transit. So in conclusion, this paper isn't about busting anonymity networks as much as it is about busting BitTorrent client privacy."
Additionally, he says, "Tor can't keep you anonymous if you don't actually use Tor for your connections. ... The real key is that if they had done transparent proxying (that failed closed) and they had a privacy-aware BT client, the user would probably be fine. Please don't use BitTorrent and Tor together."
Pardon my ignorance, but using Tor for P2P stuff is at best abusive, at worst highly destructive. Tor wasn't designed for high bandwidth applications. It was designed for Web browsing and ensuring that packets from an exit node would be very hard to trace back to the sender as the first priority.
Of course, even with the best anonymization methods, if someone has cookies, Flash shared objects, or shared objects stored by add-ons that positively identifies their Web browser, their browsing history can be linked together, and some sort of profile be built.
Tor is half the battle. The second half is making sure your Web browser is anonymous. I prefer running it in a VM which rolls itself back, and has as little customization as possible, so it fits in with the millions of other people running IE with standard XP installs.
There's really only one way to do it - run it on a freshly-installed (probably virtual) machine (so there's no personal data on the system) with a non-public IP address, and then firewall it off so it cannot make any non-Tor network connections. Then apps can leak all the data they want, but they have no useful info to leak.
Anomos' Key Features:
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1)UNLIKE BITTORRENT, NO PEERS DIRECTLY UPLOAD/DOWNLOAD TO OTHER PEERS.
Every peer relays to other peers just like Tor. This makes it more difficult for the prying eyes.
2)The more peers connecting to the same tracker, the stronger the anonymity for everyone.
3)runs on windows, mac os x, and linux
4)Based on the original python-based bittorrent sources
5)Tweaked to be tor-friendly
For more information:
http://anomos.info/
Anomos torrent sites are on their way. Seek and you shall find.
FYI, cartoons are not real life.
Wow, you realize at some point it becomes easier to just buy the content you're trying to hide transfering than what you're doing right?
By the time your transfer is complete, the copyright will have expired, even at lifetime + 75 years.
Persistent Volume manager for Kubernetes - https://github.com/dwimsey/openshift-pvmanager
True. Problem with Tor is that it is LOW LATENCY network. There is no way to hide traffic by adding hops on low latency network, if all connections are monitored. And even if there are some unmonitored nodes, traffic can be still easily monitored.
That's why all links between peers should use constant bandwith method. Every link need to maintain same utiliation level, even if no traffic is being passed. This is very old method, but rarely being used with P2P.