The Desktop Security Battle May Be Lost
Trailrunner7 writes in with a Threatpost.com article that begins: "For years, security experts, analysts and even users have been lamenting the state of desktop security. Viruses, spam, Trojans and rootkits have added up to create an ugly picture. But, the good news is that the desktop security battle may be over. The less-than-good news, however, is that we may have lost it. Jeremiah Grossman, CTO of WhiteHat Security, said Thursday that many organizations, particularly in the financial services industry, have gotten to the point of assuming that their customers' desktops are compromised. And moving forward from that assumption, things don't get much prettier." It goes on to speculate about home routers being targeted and infected.
The Desktop Security Battle May Be Lost
No, you must have hope! We just need to hold them off a little longer until Gandalf the White Hat shows up on Shadowfax Machine.
My work here is dung.
The fundamental security model of Linux is no better than that of Windows. The main reason Windows gets nailed is that it's more profitable to write malware for Windows than for anything else. If Linux had the market share of Windows, it would have as much, or nearly as much, malware.
In either Linux or Windows, being able to run any code at all gives you essentially complete access to the user's data, plus almost unlimited access to system resources, plus the ability to talk to the network. Who cares if you're not running as root if everything interesting is owned by the user's account?
There are ways to make systems more secure, starting with strong containment. How strong? Strong enough that your program can't even express the desire to, say, open a file that the user hasn't given it a capability for. Strong enough that the user has to jump through hoops to give certain programs access to certain data. Especially programs with network access... which need to be only the programs that actually need it. Strong enough to subdivide lots of functions that people are used to putting together in the same process. Strong enough that you can forget about most of the APIs you're used to coding with. And, if you're going to run apps out on the network, that whole system has to extend out into the network as well.
On top of that, people ought to be using tools that make it a lot harder to express common security bugs, and that help you to notice when you've created others.
If this is to be fixed, users and programmers are going to have to change the ways they do things. I'm not super optimistic.
Linux helps not at all. Even OpenBSD wouldn't help much.
We need to assign responsibility to those who can do something about it.
Every day, my firewall emails me a list of port scans against it, sorted by IP address. Most days that list is just under 100 different IP addresses scanning me, some days it is in the thousands of IP addresses - from all over the Internet (i.e. not just local addresses). This is on a residential DSL connection that offers no services to the world, isn't linked to by any web sites, and does not respond to any unsolicited traffic.
It seems reasonable to assume that most if not all of those IP addresses represent infected machines. Were there some way to get them shut down, imagine how much cleaner the Internet would be. However, there IS no way to do so: the ISPs hosting those machines don't provide any meaningful or automated way to report them, there is no way to contact the owner of those machines, so they just keep on spewing and infecting the rest of the system.
Nor will ISPs ever provide an automated way of reporting such machines as things stand now: a reporting mechanism is an internalized cost, and there is no reason for an ISP to internalize that cost when they can externalize it to the rest of the Internet.
This is one of those rare cases where "there ought to be a law" is a reasonable response: were ISPs required by law to investigate abuse reports and disconnect infected clients until those clients are cleaned up, the number of infected machines on the Internet would be reduced, the profit margins of the bot-herders and spammers wiped out, and the system would clean itself up. However, such a law would be fought most vigorously by all ISPs precisely because it would be internalizing a currently externalized cost, and it would be worth vastly more to ISPs to prevent such a law than the cost of lobbying against it.
(NB: "repeatedly submitting false abuse reports" is itself abuse, and should also result in the source of the false reports being shut down).
"Trojan/Worm/Virus" credits, anyone?
www.eFax.com are spammers