VPN Flaw Shows Users' IP Addresses
AHuxley writes "A VPN flaw announced at the Telecomix Cyphernetics Assembly in Sweden allows individual users to be identified. 'The flaw is caused by a combination of IPv6, which is a new Internet protocol due to replace the current IPv4, and PPTP (point-to-point tunneling protocol)-based VPN services, which are the most widely used. ... The flaw means that the IP address of a user hiding behind a VPN can still be found, thanks to the connection broadcasting information that can be used to identify it. It's also relatively easy to find a MAC address (which identifies a particular device) and a computer's name on the network that it's on.' The Swedish anti-piracy bureau could already be gathering data using the exploit."
it's also relatively easy to spoof an IP address or MAC address.
has not been using pptp for vpn for quite some time. IPSEC (AES) anyone? Just sayin.
You don't need PPTP if you're using IPSEC and IPv6. Even Microsoft clients don't need it any more.
"You're right," Fisheye says. "I should have set it on 'whip' or 'chop.'"
The Tor nodes themselves are actually quite identified, as you can see by the hostnames/IP's of the nodes themselves. The clients are the ones who are anonymous, as is intended.
The conference video apparently.
Somebody who listens to your tor traffic at your end has absolutely no way of telling who you are communicating with. so who you are talking to is just as hidden as what you say. All packets in the tor network are encrypted in such a way that the contents are only ever known by the exit node. There is little point in using SSL if sending a file to wikieaks via tor, since only wikileaks and the exit node would see the plaintext even over plain old http, and neither would be able to determine who or where the sender was. If wikileaks is going to publish what you sent anyway, so the exit node could see it upon publication, there is little reason to hide anything, unless there is identifying information in your submission that wikileaks has agreed not to republish. In that case using SSL over tor to talk to wikileaks makes good sense.
You would use SSL over Tor only if there was some reason why the it would be undesirable for the exit node to hear what you are saying, and you also want to hide your identity or perhaps only your location from the server you are talking to.
Stylish sheet to fix many problems in Slashdot's D3: https://gist.github.com/801524
The exit node might know that there's an SSL connection going through his computer that terminates at wikileaks. If everything is configured properly he should be unable to determine where that SSL connection originated.
Give me Classic Slashdot or give me death!