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FBI Failed To Break Encryption of Hard Drives
benoliver writes to let us know that the FBI has failed to decrypt files of a Brazilian banker accused of financial crimes by Brazilian law enforcement, after a year of attempts. Five hard drives were seized by federal police at the apartment of banker Daniel Dantas, in Rio de Janeiro, during Operation Satyagraha in July 2008. (The link is to a Google translation of the original article in Portuguese.) The article in English mentions two encryption programs, one Truecrypt and the other unnamed. 256-bit AES was used, and apparently both the Brazilian police and the FBI tried dictionary attacks against it. No Brazilian law exists to force Dantas to produce the password(s).
is waterboarding next to get the info?
I thought this was not just a sound idea but a law.
Great stuff though, but expect some new laws by government that make it illegal not to provide your password/keys to the government upon a court order and if you don't provide it, expect an assumption of guilt and some extra punishment. I am not saying it's right, just saying that's probably going to be one of the outcomes of this.
Of-course the problem is that they got the drives physically (not that I am necessarily on the side of a allegedly corrupt banker, but I am not automatically assuming he is guilty of anything either.) Here is a good application for the 'cloud' (yikes) - keep your encrypted data so that nobody can even know it exists in the first place.
You can't handle the truth.
Other agencies such as NSA can probably crack that encryption with ease if not instantaneously
Stop believing in spy movies.
Presumably, they're looking for evidence, and based upon the effort they're going to, I suspect that they might not have a case without whatever is on the disks. Assuming that there's something on there that incriminates him. Which is why the 5th amendment protects the key.
How will you get out of jail though?
Give them the password? You can't since it is random data.
Tell them it was random data? Sure... we believe you! Now give us the password @#&*$!
This does show though that proving that something is not random data would be very important before they try waterboarding a password out of you :)
How will you get out of jail though?
Give them the password? You can't since it is random data.
Tell them it was random data? Sure... we believe you! Now give us the password @#&*$!
This does show though that proving that something is not random data would be very important before they try waterboarding a password out of you
It depends on what your goal is. If your goal is to hide your secrets to stay out of jail, this may be a bad way to do it, especially if they torture you.
If your goal is, however, to keep your drug lord employer's secrets, otherwise they'll torture and kill your entire family, that's another thing entirely.
... if I were the FBI and I could decrypt TrueCrypt, I'd not admit it and hope everyone keeps using it.
If there is ever a case along the lines of: "Well, m'lud the prosecution have not proved there are any encrypted files - it's just a block of encrypted data, so there is no case to answer" then I suggest we all follow it very closely.
politicians are like babies' nappies: they should both be changed regularly and for the same reasons
The FBI can't crack it, true, but crypto is rarely the weakest link. Can you prevent the FBI from installing a keylogger on the computer you use to access the drives? Can you prevent them from installing a camera somewhere that records your keystrokes, or records your computer screen? It sounds like they moved on this guy too soon. If you need a brick of encrypted data to make your case against a white collar criminal, that's just lazy police work. If you build enough of a case against him beforehand, he'll give you the key as part of a deal to reduce his jail-time. Then you can use that data to go after the next leve of baddies.
No, AES has been independently vetted and attacked by multiple security organizations. The only flaws that have been discovered in the algorithm are minor and inconsequential.
That only matters if the implementation used doesn't have any important flaws. And a password wasn't stored anywhere by accident or 'overlooked mechanism' (caches etc). And the chosen keylength was enough to make brute-force attack unfeasible. And nobody else has/leaks password.
They don't have to crack a tried & tested algorithm, they only have to find the weakest link. Surely there's many links, most of those weaker than the algorithm itself.
If the passphrase has more than 256 bits, brute-forcing it is less efficient by a fair margin, than direct guessing. On the practical side, passphrase guessing likely becomes very expensive for something like 50+ bits of entropy with a good key-setup. Keep in mind that the key-setup may make you work for, e.g., 1 sec of CPU time per guess. With 50 bits, that is (assuming an EC3 small unit for simplicity) around 25 Billion USD for the crack. For every 10 additional bits, add a factor of 1000. With this money, you can built special-purpose hardware, but incidentally, that is likely only going to be faster but not cheaper.
Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
Not never. Given enough time and CPU cycles, anything stored locally can be cracked. It's just a matter of how long you want to wait.
Wrong. There is a finite amount of matter and energy (and hence computing power) in the universe. With AES 256 these limits are already very close and possibly exceeded.
Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
A password based on a phrase where you substitute 3-4 letters for a few special characters and insert 1-4 extra characters into the middle of a word as to mess with the length, would be about has hard to break as the AES key itself. This would be an easy to remember password that would only take a few seconds to type and would render dictionary attacks useless.
"a large distributed attack should be able to 'crack' it with much less difficulty than reversing the AES itself"
Of course brute forcing a 256bit key could take 1,000,000,000,000 computers that could do 1,000,000,000,000 AES comparisons per second(aka, about 32,768 cores at 3ghz) about 1.8e+42 millennia. So, by "much less", so you mean to reduce the effectiveness to 1/10^42(0.00000000000000000000000000000000000000001%) would only take those 1 trillion 32k core 3ghz super computers 1000 years to break.
Assuming this person used a semi-decent password, the only way to get around this would be torture, key got cached/written down, bugged his keyboard, or general luck.
Fun fact told to me via a PHD in encryption. A 256bit symmetric algorithm that has no work around (AES has flaws that reduces its effectiveness) and using computers so efficient that it takes the theoretically smallest amount of energy to flip a bit, would on average consume most of the energy in the known universe to break a single key. (Think consuming all the stars in the Milkyway galaxy just a start)
"It is not crazy to think that the NSA could have this capability." I would say overly optimistic.
and then under threat of water boarding, hand out the duress password.
But what about the third password they want? What do you do then?
Turtles.
My God, it's Full of Source!
OUTSIDE_IP=$(dig +short my.ip @outsideip.net)