22 Million SSL Certificates In Use Are Invalid
darthcamaro writes "While SSL certs are widely used on the Internet today, a new study from Qualys, set to be officially released at Black Hat in July, is going to show some shocking statistics. Among the findings in the study is that only 3% of SSL certs in use were actually properly configured. Quoting: '"So we have about 22 million SSL servers with certificates that are completely invalid because they do not match the domain name on which they reside," Ivan Ristic, director of engineering at Qualys, said.'"
Virtual hosts mean if you just do an IP scan you will likely run into an SSL site that doesn't match the first URL associated with an IP.
There are 4 boxes to use in the defense of liberty: soap, ballot, jury, ammo. Use in that order. Starting now.
"Only about 3.17 percent of the domain names matched," Ristic said. "So we have about 22 million SSL servers with certificates that are completely invalid because they do not match the domain name on which they reside."
If you think about it, though, all he really knows is that the certificate does not match the domain name he used to connect to the server, which may not be the domain name which is meant to be used. The obvious next step would be to attempt to connect to the name given by the certificate, which might well point to the same actual site. Of course, it might be a name that is only valid for an internal network, not on the internet as a whole.
There are also lots of contexts in which a web server includes a default (usually self-signed) certificate with a generic name out of the box - typically web servers used for management of a software or hardware device. If the users don't need SSL, there's no reason for a "valid" certificate to be installed.
In short, he's using the phrase "in use" poorly; the fact that a server responds to an SSL request with a particular certificate does not mean that the certificate is "in use" in any meaningful way.
(These figures might be more meaningful if he had excluded self-signed and locally-signed certificates, looking only at those generated by a known certificate provider. Because they cost money, the latter are more likely to have been intended for actual use, although the actual use still might use a different URL than the one you are scanning.)
No the worst is trying to use a military computer (means only IE) to hit military sites, and having to approve half a dozen exceptions each time you visit a new page.
They seem to be unable to use standard certificates or even attempt to register them with internet registries. The best is working on a classified network. And getting "WARNING!!! This page may be unsafe! WARNING!!!" notices on an entirely closed and encrypted network.
I'm too lazy to compose a creative sig.