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More Gas Station Credit-Card Skimmers
coondoggie notes a Network World piece on credit-card skimmers found installed in gas pumps, this time in Florida. Like the similar wave of attacks in Utah earlier this year, the latest crop uses Bluetooth to transmit the illicitly collected data. Does this mean an accomplice has to hang around within 3m of the pump? "The Secret Service has indicated there's a crime wave throughout the Southeast involving the gas-station pump card skimmers, and it may be traced back to a single gang that may be working out of Miami... St. Johns County in Florida has also been hit by the gas-pump card skimmers. [A local sheriff's department spokesman] says criminals wanting to hide the credit-card skimmers in gas pumps have to have a key to the pump, but in some cases a single key will serve to get into many gas pumps." Here's an insight from the banking industry on the skimming fraud.
Does this mean an accomplice has to hang around within 3m of the pump?
No. What it means is that there's no need for there to be a wire that leads to the skimmer's recording device... which now can be hidden in the next pump over. This also means the mag reader could be placed in the pump without a recording device, therefore requiring the pump to be taken apart for inspection, adding to the cleanup costs.
Remember, once a fraud becomes so expensive to clear up that the expenses are greater than the total loss, then it's almost allowed to continue unchecked.
Does this mean an accomplice has to hang around within 3m of the pump?
No, a Class 1 Bluetooth device has a range of up to 100m.
Since none of the articles linked to by the summary felt it was relevant to mention what these skimmers actually look like, here's an article from Consumerist.
Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored. -Aldous Huxley
The system relies on the chip to tell the terminal that a valid PIN was used, rather than the terminal+chip+PIN creating a cryptographic message to the bank so the bank can verify that a valid PIN was used. End result: All you need is a fake chip that always tells the terminal a valid PIN was used.
http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/security-threats/2010/02/11/chip-and-pin-is-broken-say-researchers-40022674/1/
I used to write code that talked to gas pumps, and I can tell you that most pumps take the same key for the printer door, a different same key for the terminal (Gilbarco CRIND/Wayne CAT) door, and I think another same key for the pump control door. That's the same keys for the entire model run of a pump, and maybe for more than one model, unless maybe a big oil chain installs a different same key. Even then, they're those round locks like the ones that some laptop cables use that can be picked with a part from a Bic pen. (Presumably they're better made than the laptop cable locks.)
The card data is sent up to the station's control computer directly, usually both track 1 and track 2 data. I don't think it would be hard to insert a skimmer behind the door, whether a second mag reader head, or just splice the wires from the card reader. Or even rig the station control computer if you have access to that. (For that matter, all the card numbers may end up in a log file on that computer.)
There's not much danger of a pin pad skimmer, however, because in the US, PINs are protected by each pinpad having a master key injected into RAM before shipping to the site. They are potted in epoxy and have a memory kill switch if you attempt to open them. This works differently from the European system, which is why the US hasn't had to go to "chip and pin". The PIN is encrypted in the pad, the pinpad's serial number is attached, and the result is only decrypted by the card clearing house computers, which have a list of all the decryption keys. Even if the guy who ran the station was doing the skimming, debit PINs couldn't be skimmed and still work properly. But that's just debit. Credit cards don't have a PIN.
So unlike ATM skimmers, they could definitely hide the skimmer behind the door, but they would still need a camera of some sort to capture the PINs. Fortunately most gas pump terminals have a relatively flat front, so they can't just hide the camera on a different part of the panel.
#naabhaprzrag, #sverubfr-000, #agi-fcbafberq, negvpyr[pynff*=' negvpyr-ary-'] { qvfcynl: abar !vzcbegnag; }
Not since November 2009. The banks are now required to prove the customer was at fault.
"A week in the lab saves an hour in the library"
The local paper (Gainesville Sun) had a picture of the skimmer on the first day it was found:
http://www.gainesville.com/article/20100707/ARTICLES/100709681
Basically it looks like a thin bundle of electrical tape attached to the wire between the magstripe reader and the circuit board inside the gas pump -- completely hidden inside the pump cabinet unlike ATM skimmers.
-Esme
A link http://www.networkworld.com/community/blog/newest-attack-your-credit-card-atm-shims?t51hb&hpg1=mp in the original story, entitled "Newest Attack on your Credit Card: ATM Shims" has some interesting information:
"The shim needs to be extremely thin and flexible. In fact it must be less than 0.1mm"
"The shim is inserted using a "carrier card" that holds the shim, inserts it into the card slot and locks it into place on the internal reader contacts."
"Once inserted, the shim is not visible from the outside of the machine. The shim then performs a man-in-the-middle attack between an inserted credit card and the circuit board of the ATM machine."
"flexible shims are recently being mass produced and widely used in certain parts of Europe"
"Diebold released five new anit-skimming protection levels for its ATM devices june 1st 2010...Unfortunately, none of these helps with the shim skimming attack. That problem has yet to be solved mechanically yet."
Where you live (some place in Canada) is not the same as everywhere in (Canada). In Toronto and likely most of Ontario, you only have to prepay when it's late at night or a bad area of the city (or both).