BP's Gulf Spill Report Shows String of Failures

eldavojohn writes "News is out of BP's report on the gulf spill that shifts some of the blame on to other companies like Transocean that worked with BP in erecting the Deepwater Horizon rig. If you were affected by the spill, you might find the video, executive summary and 193-page report an interesting read. The summary outlines six or seven major failures in safety and engineering that all built up to the deaths of eleven workers and widespread contamination of the gulf. From incorrectly using seawater instead of drilling fluid to misinterpreting pressure test results, this report is just BP's side of the story as the blowout preventer has been pulled up and is still on its way to NASA where it will be analyzed by government investigators who will be able to compile their own report."

Comments

Re:Bad link

[ColdWetDog]

This is nice tear down of the executive summary. The Oildrum has had an excellent running commentary on the Macondo Spill. It's primarily a 'Peak Oil' site but it is done quite well. My favorite quote from some apparently ancient oil guy named 'Rockman' who's major failing in life seems to be a horrible addiction to Blue Bell ice cream:

Here's what I saw as critical aspects of the executive summary from the BP report. "Indications of influx with an increase in drill pipe pressure are discernable in real-time data from approximately 40 minutes before the rig crew took action to control the well. The rig crew's first apparent well control actions occurred after hydrocarbons were rapidly flowing to the surface. The rig crew did not recognize the influx and did not act to control the well until hydrocarbons had passed through the BOP and into the riser."



"Well control response actions failed to regain control of the well. If fluids had been diverted overboard, rather than to the MGS, there may have been more time to respond, and the consequences of the accident may have been reduced."

And a viable excuse offered: "The explosions and fire very likely disabled the emergency disconnect sequence, the primary emergency method available to the rig personnel, which was designed to seal the wellbore and disconnect the marine riser from the well.

Given a number of highly questionable decisions, BP appears to volunteer to take a few arrows themselves: "The team did not identify any single action or inaction that caused this accident. Rather, a complex and interlinked series of mechanical failures, human judgments, engineering design, operational implementation and team interfaces came together to allow the initiation and escalation of the accident. Multiple companies, work teams and circumstances were involved over time."

So BP may claim a collective blame but I go back to their lead off position: ""the crew... did not act to control the well". If you followed the debate between syn and I you can see how I take BP's report: yes...BP and others made mistakes. BUT the TO drill crew "did not act to control the well". And that lack of action allowed the kick to turn into a blow out that killed 11 hands and wrecked the GOM.

Opinions will vary, of course. And in the end there will be legal judgment rendered. But each person, including the surviving participants, will come to their own conlusions.

Summary of the Summary: BP did a bunch of stupid things, but it was TO's (Trans Ocean - the rig owner) responsibility to control the well even if BP purposely designed the rig to fail. They didn't do that. And Boom. IMHO this is not a shot across the bow of Transocean...it's an arrow aimed straight at their heart: "the crew... did not act to control the well".

Re:Complex environment, complex causes

[alfredos]

It is the same with aviation accidents. Sometimes it's just an individual screwing up, but that's the exception.

No, it's the norm if not always the reason

I agree a bit with that. But I also think that while NTSB investigation and reports are top notch, they suffer from being (unavoidably) within the same environment.

I'll give you an example. You can easily support, NTSB reports in hand, that flying by eye in meteorological conditions that are too hard for that (visual into IMC for you pilots out there) is one of the leading causes of accidents in light airplanes. That is too bad. Anybody can get some additional training and learn instrument flying. Well, if it's that easy why isn't it done in the first place? Why does not everybody get at least basic instrument training so that they can keep their act together when the shit hits the propeller? From there you can easily jump to a politics debate but keep with me for a moment. I'll give another example.

Another leading cause of light aviation accidents is loss of engine power. Now loss of power can be due to a number of reasons: You can run out of gas, for example. Or you can forget to adjust the mixture as you go up or down. Or your carburetor can get ice. There exists technology enough to eliminate or greatly reduce the danger in most of these causes. Why isn't it done? Well, firstly because a fully computerized control system for an aviation engine costs as much as a new car. Now you can argue that the pilot is putting his/her life to risk because of economical considerations, or you can look at the reasons why everything is so damned expensive in aviation. I'll leave it to you, but yes, it's as easy as it seems.

My point is that it's worth the effort to dig a bit more. You can't expect everybody to be fully proficient at everything they get into. Instead, however, helping environments become safer by promoting safe ideas, technologies, training and norms pays much more than blaming the individual and leaving it there.

Re:Bad link

[UnknowingFool]

Summary of the Summary: BP did a bunch of stupid things, but it was TO's (Trans Ocean - the rig owner) responsibility to control the well even if BP purposely designed the rig to fail. They didn't do that. And Boom. IMHO this is not a shot across the bow of Transocean...it's an arrow aimed straight at their heart: "the crew... did not act to control the well".

That's not how it works in the oil and gas business and I have many friends in the industry. The ultimate responsibility is in the hands of the well owner, not the rig owner. In this case that is BP because BP called all the shots. And that is the company people will sue. There are a number of things that BP did to bypass Transocean's safety protocols. While it appears that Transocean may have damaged the BOP before handling control to BP, you don't know if BP knew that. There is evidence BP pressured Transocean to finish off the well their way. Transocean wanted 3 concrete plugs with finishing mud in between. In order to save time, BP did not want the finishing mud. Professor Robert Bea who was asked to investigate the incident by the White House says if the mud had been left, there may have not been a blowout even if the BOP was damaged.