Stuxnet Worm Infected Industrial Control Systems

Sooner Boomer writes "ComputerWorld has an article about the Stuxnet worm, which was apparently designed to steal industrial secrets and disrupt operations at industrial plants, according to Siemens. 'Stuxnet has infected systems in the UK, North America and Korea, however the largest number of infections, by far, have been in Iran. Once installed on a PC, Stuxnet uses Siemens' default passwords to seek out and try to gain access to systems that run the WinCC and PCS 7 programs — so-called PLC (programmable logic controller) programs that are used to manage large-scale industrial systems on factory floors and in military installations and chemical and power plants.' If the worm were to be used to disrupt systems at any of those locations, the results could be devastating."

Comments

deserved

[Anonymous Coward]

If they still use default password, they deserve to be hacked and face total havoc.

Industry`s security is still so crappy.

Re:deserved

[thegarbz]

If they still use default password,

Having experience with a few of these systems from various vendors I say it would be great to have a choice in the matter. The is a lot of investment in the configuration of a large logic controller and vendors often provide themselves a back door such as a hidden admin password to come in and fix things when the system goes tits up. On top of that they often recommend not changing the default passwords of systems that are hooked directly to process control because the machines themselves are often under lock and key and behind firewalls and thus presumed to be "safe".

We were infected with the Stuxnet worm at our plant, and it spread all around the machines on the business network but never made it to the process control systems. Although it was still disruptive. The firewall was shutdown and the control network isolated for days so they could do a complete virus scan. A little network management and physical security can go a long way. Frankly if any virus gets onto the process machines, default password or not, and not even targeting the software for the control systems there's potential for a real "game over" event.

Wow

[0123456]

So people not only leave the default password on their industrial controllers, they put them on the same network as Windows PCs... Wow.

Re:Wow

[gmuslera]

Probably the network is behind a firewall, so they think they are safe from outsiders. The problem is when insiders have both windows and no clue.

Re:Wow

[Mr. Sketch]

Having worked in that industry, it's very common for them to be on the same network as Windows PCs. As for the default passwords, that's their own fault.

The reason they have to be on the same network as PCs is both:
1) The software to program and monitor PLCs are on Windows (made by Siemens, Rockwell Software, WonderWare, were the big names when I was in the industry 10 years ago), so it makes sense to have them on the same network so they can communicate with the PLC while it's online and see the logic operations in real time.
2) The biggest reason is that PLCs communicate with visualization software that runs on Windows (also made by the same companies as above), that can be viewed from a central location. This allows the production line manager to visually see the operations of the machines in a nicer format than looking at the raw logic bits. The visualization software can display shapes, colors, diagrams, animations, etc of the production line with real-time data about what's happening.

So yes, these PLCs are usually on the same network as Windows PCs. Ideally it's a private network with just the PLCs and the visualization/programming/monitoring PCs, but many places are not that strict about the network separation.

Re:Wow

[jofny]

You can't change the Siemens passwords in this case (and have things keep working).

Re:Wow

[hairyfeet]

The real problem is NOT the OS, since it is pretty obvious this attack has been specifically designed to hit a very small niche target, which means no matter what OS you were running the malware writers would have simply written to that target.

No the problem is something I run into all the time in my little shop, I call it magical thinking. It is the classic "we have A, therefor we never have to worry about security!" problem. in this case too many are thinking their firewall will magically make the problems go away, not realizing the user is often the weak spot. I've seen the exact same thing at a SMB where the owner had bought Macs based on magical thinking, then his kid wanting to look at pron ended up infecting the network with that DNS Changer trojan.

The problem as we are witnessing here is there is NO magic bullet, be it Windows, OSX, or Linux, be it a firewall or other piece of hardware, be it any other piece of tech. The ONLY way to secure a network is a top to bottom approach that runs everything on absolute least permissions and no network access to anything that doesn't absolutely need it. But sadly that takes real planning, real effort, and a dedication to keeping the security level up, and most companies would rather buy into "this magic box will save us!" because it is cheaper and easier. Sadly it also never works.

Re:Wow

[Jurily]

People are lazy. Why change the password on these machines? You'd have to write it down somewhere because remembering things is tough.

I blame management. With all the chaos around a factory (at least the ones I've worked in), the default password is more reliable than the people who are supposed to know them when they're needed.

Add in the fact that factory workers don't really get paid enough to care about anything, and you have to start wondering why this this kind of attack isn't more common. Hell, we've played Minesweeper on the monitoring terminal of a >$100M production line :)

Re:Wow

[denobug]

Our past experience indicate the IT staff does more damage to the stability of the system than anything else could. Most IT and network personnel has zero understanding of reliability of a system. The architecture they design are simply too complex and not robust enough. So before anybody can hack in, the system itself becomes unstable, crashed, and end up causing dangerous situation.

One of the most common mistake observed is a super complicated VLAN scheme that link multiple network together under the name of "ease of management" or "security", while in fact the first thing they need to do is to completely seperate the control network with corporate network, and then flatten the control network with air-gap from the corporate network. Also make sure you have zero wireless network access to the control network would be a wise choice not only in security but also improves each component's availability in general.

Again, common sense goes a very long way.

Re:Wow

[networkBoy]

This is manifested in the door security where I work.
We have RFID badge readers.
My boss recently wanted to add one to a lab he controls. When he found out the bill was $10K he balked. We told him it was for the security conduit (intrusion detection conduit, I assume gas charged & detect pressure drop in a leg?).
His response? We don't need the conduit, just run the wire.

Luckily security said F off and use a key lock, we're not installing it without the conduit. But that same attitude is why these machines still have the default passwords.

-nB

Re:Wow

[thegarbz]

You clearly don't work in the process industry, nor have an idea of just how bullet proof a proper setup actually is despite there not being an airgap.

The ability to quickly and easily read values from the PLC remotely (one way only is the key) is paramount to not only the efficiency of running the plant, but sometimes the safety of the plant itself. Sometimes it goes a step further to even be a legal requirement. If a plant is levelled by a huge explosion you don't want to be the one standing in front of congress telling the people that the reason you have no idea what happened is that you didn't log every process value on a computer offsite in realtime.

Air-gaps are like the idiots guide to security. Yeah it helps, but it's impractical and there's so many other ways a competent person can secure a process network from the outside world. If you actually worked in the industry the lengths you see many companies go to will blow you away.

Re:Suxnet

[Wyatt Earp]

Israel, not American.

Israel has always been an industrial spy on the US and Western Europe, but their big focus is Iran right now, so they test it on the US, UK and Korea but the main focus is Iran.

Wouldn't be surprised to find it in Saudi systems too

Damn-you, skynet!

[SethJohnson]

Skynet just inched us one-step closer to the apocalypse by establishing its ability to assemble T1000 robots via CnC machines controlled by this botnet.

Seth

Re:What the?

[luca]

Do you know that when you set a password on a siemens plc, it isn't enforced by the plc itself but by the step 7 programming software?
Use something else (e.g., libnodave) and access is wide open.

Full ICS-CERT advisory on Stuxnet

[jofny]

is here: http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICSA-10-238-01B%20-%20Stuxnet%20Mitigation.pdf Probably a little more accurate than crappy media reporting.

Not about "default passwords. Worse.

[Animats]

This has nothing to do with "default passwords". It's worse than that. The Windows-level part of the attack was signed code signed with a Microsoft-issued key. The signing keys involved has been revoked. US-CERT isn't saying who had them.

At the controller level, Siemens has issued a bulletin: Previously analyzed properties and the behavior of the virus in the software environment of the test system suggest that we are not dealing with the random development of one hacker, but with the product of a team of experts who must have IT expertise as well as specific know-how about industrial controls, their deployment in industrial production processes and corresponding engineering knowledge. ... The behavioral pattern of Stuxnet suggests that the virus is apparently only activated in plants with a specific configuration. It deliberately searches for a certain technical constellation with certain modules and certain program patterns which apply to a specific production process. This pattern can, for example, be localized by one specific data block and two code blocks. This means that Stuxnet is obviously targeting a specific process or a plant and not a particular brand or process technology and not the majority of industrial applications.

So this is an attack on a specific industrial plant. But whose? Neither Seimens nor US-CERT is saying.

This is cyber-warfare. Someone is trying to sabotage a specific plant somewhere.

Re:Not about "default passwords. Worse.

[sapphire wyvern]

There are indications that the target may have been the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran, with the Russian contractor's USB drives being the attack vector into the plant's control systems. (Which are not on the Internet, despite the smug assumptions of so many posters earlier in this comments section.) There's enough information out in the wild now that anyone with access to the target's PLC code could verify the target. Obviously this means the attack targets will be able to prove that the trojan was targeting them, but I doubt they'll be announcing the fact to the world - unless they can trace the attackers and gain political advantage through an announcement.

It seems the evidence currently leans towards a probably Israeli or possibly US cyberwarfare attack on Iran.