Hiding Backdoors In Hardware
quartertime writes "Remember Reflections on Trusting Trust, the classic paper describing how to hide a nearly undetectable backdoor inside the C compiler? Here's an interesting piece about how to hide a nearly undetectable backdoor inside hardware. The post describes how to install a backdoor in the expansion ROM of a PCI card, which during the boot process patches the BIOS to patch grub to patch the kernel to give the controller remote root access. Because the backdoor is actually housed in the hardware, even if the victim reinstalls the operating system from a CD, they won't clear out the backdoor. I wonder whether China, with its dominant position in the computer hardware assembly business, has already used this technique for espionage. This perhaps explains why the NSA has its own chip fabrication plant."
What, you can't sniff the traffic going in and out of your machine?
For justice, we must go to Don Corleone
You don't even have to go to this great of a length; if you want to root Linux machines, release a proprietary driver in the form of a binary Linux kernel module and watch as your customers blindly install it.
This is one reason why we should insist on the source code to all firmware - or reverse engineer write new firmware ourselves.
everyone knows it's easy to slip backdoors into hardware, but hiding it is the hard part. every fabless chip maker does spot checks of their products and will find these backdoors. at the very least they will find that the shipping products aren't like the ones they designed with extra circuits.
anyone with data that's worth keeping secret will have it behind firewalls and all kinds of security appliances that will start flashing alerts if there is traffic to a high risk geographic area
By which I mean the summary is in error.
That's what they want you to think.