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New Rootkit Bypasses Windows Code-Signing Security
Trailrunner7 writes "In recent versions of Windows, specifically Vista and Windows 7, Microsoft has introduced a number of new security features designed to prevent malicious code from running. But attackers are continually finding new ways around those protections, and the latest example is a rootkit that can bypass the Windows driver-signing protection."
Give me "trusted computing" where I control the keys and decide what software is "trusted" and I'd be fine w/ it.
The problem is, 99% of our society cannot properly decide whether software should be trusted or not, and even with more granular controls and proper feedback from the OS a lot of malware will slip through.
I don't think this is an unsolvable problem. I like the iPhone App store model to some extent. A company with professionals should be vetting software and should be telling users what software should and should not be able to run. But the iPhone App store fails in many ways as well.
First, there should not be one company deciding. We should harness the free market and build a system that takes inputs from whatever security feeds users subscribe to and weight those security feeds based upon the end user's preferences. Also, we should be able to override the choices for any given case. If we really want to run some software but our security feeds think it is malware, we should be able to do it. Heck, there are valid reasons, such as research, for wanting to run malware. It should just be a very advanced setting that makes it perfectly clear to the end user that they're handing complete control of their device to some other party, forever.
I'm convinced we could leverage the benefits of both an iPhone app store approach and a traditional package manager approach. I fear, however, that none of the companies in a position to actually make a good system and push it to end users is going to be motivated to do so. Apple will wait for others, and Microsoft sees the way they could leverage their monopoly using an iApp store of their own. Canonical has laid the groundwork, but only as far as copying Apple and incorporating it into their package manager. They're not much for making revolutionary new technologies, nor are they in much position to push it and, lastly, unless they're aiming at the ultra-secure market, their users are currently least in the need of beefing up security.
A company with professionals should be vetting software and should be telling users what software should and should not be able to run.
IMO, the software should be saying what type of sandbox it wants upfront. From a finite manageable set of sandbox templates.
The software could also instead request a custom sandbox, but a "custom sandbox and app pair" need to be signed by a trusted party. Either the OS vendor, or someone else with their cert installed (e.g. Corporate IT).
I proposed something like this to Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+bug/156693
Rather than solve something harder than the halting problem (you often don't have the full inputs to the program), you just get the programmers to declare upfront what access the programs need, and if declared OK, the OS enforces the sandboxes.
Actually, the best use is to install drivers that bypass DRM.
There are 4 boxes to use in the defense of liberty: soap, ballot, jury, ammo. Use in that order. Starting now.