50 ISPs Harbor Half of All Infected Machines
Orome1 writes "As the classic method of combating botnets by taking down command and control centers has proven pretty much ineffective in the long run, there has been lots of talk lately about new stratagems that could bring about the desired result. A group of researchers from the Delft University of Technology and Michigan State University have recently released an analysis of the role that ISPs could play in botnet mitigation — an analysis that led to interesting conclusions. The often believed assumption that the presence of a high speed broadband connection is linked to the widespread presence of botnet infection in a country has been proven false."
Well, since Verizon and Comcast harbor 10% of all user customer PC's all by themselves, this is not so impressive.
My first Journal Entry ever, in 8 years! http://slashdot.org/journal/365947/aphelion-scifi-fantasy-horror-poetry-webzine
"I say we take off and nuke the entire site from orbit. It's the only way to be sure."
You mean like the Malicious Software Removal Tool which is already offered through Windows Update as a critical update? Or Microsoft Security Essentials which either is or will shortly be available through Windows Update as a recommended update?
The study (linked to from the fine article) was of 200 ISPs, so 25% of ISPs are responsible for 50% of infected machines. Not surprising at all.
The real shocking truth here is that one single OS harbors the vast majority of botnets and viruses. That OS should be the real target, not ISPs or poor users or something. Sheesh...
"A door is what a dog is perpetually on the wrong side of" - Ogden Nash
A friend of mine who was tasked with looking after a university network years ago had a setup that worked well. When the user first connected, they were put in a sandbox, and thus not allowed outside access. They would be greeted with a web page stating that their computer was being scanned for ports well known for viruses and/or spyware. Once the scan was completed, which took about 60 seconds IIRC, they were allowed access to the Internet. Perhaps there is a way that ISP's could do the same sort of thing?
My site at home has been under a distributed hack attempt (a long list of IPs all trying to ssh in as root*) for days now. On the first day the attempts were quite frequent; approaching 1 per minute. Now on day 4 the attempts are trickling it as infrequently as one every 20 minutes. A system on a reasonably fast connection could on its own surpass the 1/minute barrier when running a dictionary password attempt through ssh if it wanted to; hence this looks like it could well be systems on slow connections. Add in that some IPs disappear for a while and then come back - as if the PC is logging off and then on again - and it certainly does look like a low-speed botnet.
* Naturally, my ssh denies all root attempts. Even if they got the password right they wouldn't know it, because the rejection would be the same. Other botnets have tried whitepages-style attacks using long lists of common user names and not matched any allowed users on my system as well.
** Yes I know I could just change my ssh port and much of this would go away. But I find it amusing and I have bandwidth to burn.
Damn_registrars has no butt-hole. Damn_registrars has no use for a butt-hole.
One big problem with this logic is that it is based on IP addresses analyzed from captured spam. The problem with that is some major ISPs (including AT&T) are blocking access to out-of-network e-mail servers, and doing other things to make it difficult for even their legitimate customers to send legitimate e-mail. So this method of knowing where the botnets are would completely miss major botnets if they are unable to get spam out efficiently.
You may say "Why does that matter as long as the spam is stopped?", but it matters a lot. The machines are still infected and could be used for other things, from denial of service attacks to hosting and spreading kiddy porn to just watching for private data to go by (like banking information and credit card numbers) and report them directly back to the control system. Making major judgments about botnets based only on IP addresses seen in spam is short sighted and foolish. And it also assumes that all botnets are honest enough to not forge IP addresses. Any smart botnet could easily forge the IP address the spam is coming from, to make it that much harder to find. If a clever bot just changed the fourth or even third and fourth part of the IP address and replaced it with a random number, the botnet would look much larger than it really is and make it much harder to track back to the infected machine, but would not be easy to detect by comparing the supposed source IP and the SMTP server from outside the network.
I'm an American. I love this country and the freedoms that we used to have.
Not linked with high speed broadband != Linked with dial-up.
And low education is not necessarily linked with dial-up. Here in Portugal we have 12mbps for 20/month, which is affordable by most people, and yet we have terrible education levels compared to the rest of the EU (81% of the working population only have lower basic education levels).
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There is a simple solution to the problem. Unfortunately, being simple does not mean it is easy.
1) ISPs by default implement some basic filtering:
1a) do not allow access to port 25, save to their own servers
1b) do not allow inbound nor outbound access to certain "LAN only" type services (e.g. NFS, SMB/CIFS, etc.)
2) NOTA BENE: ISPs SHALL allow users to elect to bypass these filters, but:
2a) This shall require action on the part of the account owner.
2b) Upon doing so, the account owner SHALL be responsible for their actions
2b.i) The ISP SHALL provide a contact mechanism (e.g. WHOIS record for that IP) that notifies both the ISP and the account holder of abuses.
2b.ii) The ISP SHALL act on complaints if the user does not.
2c) The action to disable blocking SHALL be done in a way that prevents a bot from doing it (e.g. require a phone call to the ISP, or a Turing test, etc.)
3) ISPs SHALL look for "infected" behaviors, like port scans, BEFORE the traffic leaves their network (remember people, the term "firewall" comes from building codes, where a building is supposed to have MANY levels of firewall. ISPs should be no different).
3a) such behaviors SHALL be investigated, and potential infectees quarantined and the owners contacted.
4) ISPs SHALL be required to address complaints
4a) The SHALL be required to have an automated means to report such abuses. No, Web pages don't count.
4b) ISPs that fail to address complaints SHALL be listed in such a way that other entities can block them (e.g. DNS-RBLs).
For too long ISPs have been able to externalize the costs of infected machines. Obviously, any cost a business can externalize will be externalized, and thus the business won't handle it. The solution is to force the costs of infected machines to be internalized to the ISPs. They will, of course, bitch mightily about this - again, no business will allow a previously externalized cost to be internalized without a fight.
www.eFax.com are spammers
Who are the 50? Publish the names and IP ranges and let the admins loose on them.
That's our life, the big wheel of shit. - The Fat Man, Blue Tango Salvage
Naturally, my ssh denies all root attempts. Even if they got the password right they wouldn't know it, because the rejection would be the same. Other botnets have tried whitepages-style attacks using long lists of common user names and not matched any allowed users on my system as well.
I usually recommend disallowing password-based authentication, and permitting only key-based logins.
Pirate Party UK