Hidden Backdoor Discovered On HP MSA2000 Arrays
wiredmikey writes "A hardcoded password-related security vulnerability has been discovered which apparently affects every HP MSA2000 G3, a modular large scale storage array. According to the alert, a hidden user exists that doesn't show up in the user manager, and the password cannot be changed, creating a perfect 'backdoor' opportunity for an attacker to gain access to potentially sensitive information stored on the device, as well as systems it is connected to."
That doesn't need a single hardcoded password. Generate one based on the serial number of the device. Recoverable, and a heck of a lot more secure than a single password for everybody.
It amazes me how many Slashdot has, how quickly people here will believe some amazingly complex and willy explanation over a simple and obvious one. So what is the obvious one here? Simple: HP support. They want to be able to get in to the units to help their customers, and do shit like recover passwords (which customers will lose). So they add their special hardcoded maintenance account.
Seriously, going from this to "OMG government conspiracy," based on NO additional evidence means you are presupposing. You've decided on a conclusion (that the government requires everything to have a backdoor, which is 100% false) and are then making a massive illogical leap with no supporting evidence to that.
On the article some guy said it is only accessible through the serial port.
Which kind of changes the whole tone in my opinion. I'm of the persuasion that if a black hat has physical access to your hardware, you've already lost. It's still shockingly bad practice from a vendor, but if this is true it goes from a serious issue to a moderate one.
If someone disables the building's primary security system, defeats the lock on your front door, breaks in, when nobody's there, figures out where your MSA is, defeats your server room's dedicated primary alarm system, breaks through the steel fire door into your server room, defeating the ANSI GRADE 1 industrial access control locks, figures out the precise cage where your MSA2000 is located, defeats the cage locks, figures out the combination to open your cabinet, and somehow removes the faceplate without triggering the intrusion alarm, or motion detectors, noise sensors, and surveillance cameras attached to the server room's secondary security/environment monitoring system.
Then yes... there is a small chance someone might be able to insert a serial connector into your MSA to login as this GUI-unavailable backdoor user without the perp getting caught pretty quickly.
By the way, the 'password security' on many routers can be defeated by sending a BREAK via serial console during reboot, or by pushing a recessed RESET button. Where is the outrage?