Mozilla Posts File Containing Registered User Data
wiredmikey writes "Mozilla yesterday sent an email to registered users of its addons.mozilla.org site, letting them know that it had mistakenly posted a file to a publicly available Web server which contained data from its user database including email addresses, first and last names, and an md5 hash representation of user passwords."
http://blog.mozilla.com/security/2010/12/27/addons-mozilla-org-disclosure/
Active accounts have their password SHA-512 hashed with per-user salt, so they're safe (for a while). However those 44,000 holders of older (and now disabled) MD5 hashed accounts should rush changing their passwords elsewhere, if they have the bad habit of using the same password everywhere...
There's a browser safer than Firefox, it is Firefox, with NoScript
This is really well played by Mozilla. We are witnessing a prime example of crisis-communication. The basic rules are:
- Communicate early (even if you don't have all the facts yet)
- Communicate honestly (even if you're to blame)
- Promise follow-up (as needed)
Performing their crisis-communication this well will probably improve public perception of Mozilla. It will certainly raise the bar for other companies.
I have a photographic memory for numbers. I know almost a hundred of them.
Nope no exploit. They just accidentally made a backup publicly accessible.
They went through the logs and no one actually downloaded it except the person who notified them of the problem.
Consider the consequences if it doesn't "excuse" it.
Essentially, a company making a mistake has two choices: Hush it up or come forwards. Now, obviously the latter does not have any immediate benefit for them. It becomes known that they fucked up. Not good.
Trying to cover it up has the nice effect that maybe nobody notices. And in this case, the chance of this happening was actually pretty high.
If the net effect is the same, whether they cover it up or admit it, the choice is obvious. If I get accused of a crime and whether I plead not guilty (and hence force a lot of witnesses to testify and clog down the legal system) or guilty (and spare the witnesses to face me again, as well as running the whole process with far less waste of resources) has no effect on the verdict, nobody will plead guilty and confess anymore. Why should they? There's nothing to gain with it, is there?
If you condemn a company making a mistake no matter whether they admit it or try to hide it, nobody will admit it anymore. And that can cause quite a bit more harm if that info gets into the wrong hands and hence your passwords get known by people who might abuse them, all because a company decided to play possum and you not knowing that your credentials have been compromised.
We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
I got one last night.
Mozilla Add-ons to davidbroome
show details 6:52 PM (11 hours ago)
Dear addons.mozilla.org user,
The purpose of this email is to notify you about a possible disclosure
of your information which occurred on December 17th. On this date, we
were informed by a 3rd party who discovered a file with individual user
records on a public portion of one of our servers. We immediately took
the file off the server and investigated all downloads. We have
identified all the downloads and with the exception of the 3rd party,
who reported this issue, the file has been download by only Mozilla
staff. This file was placed on this server by mistake and was a partial
representation of the users database from addons.mozilla.org. The file
included email addresses, first and last names, and an md5 hash
representation of your password. The reason we are disclosing this event
is because we have removed your existing password from the addons site
and are asking you to reset it by going back to the addons site and
clicking forgot password. We are also asking you to change your password
on other sites in which you use the same password. Since we have
effectively erased your password, you don't need to do anything if you
do not want to use your account. It is disabled until you perform the
password recovery.
We have identified the process which allowed this file to be posted
publicly and have taken steps to prevent this in the future. We are also
evaluating other processes to ensure your information is safe and secure.
Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact the
infrastructure security team directly at infrasec@mozilla.com. If you
are having issues resetting your account, please contact
amo-admins@mozilla.org.
We apologize for any inconvenience this has caused.
Chris Lyon
Director of Infrastructure Security
The day before this was noticed my Gmail account was hacked by Chinese spammers and I know I used the same password there. So I am skeptical about the claims that no one had downloaded this file. The email only says when they noticed the problem, but doesn't specify how long the file was available before that. It could have been available for a long time.
Urrgh.
Please, don't encrypt passwords. Encryption implies that you can retrieve them if you have the keys, which could have made this much worse.
MD5 hashing is probably still a secure practice, done right, for a given degree of "secure". Like any kind of data security, it's all about raising the cost of obtaining the data beyond the amount that a given person is will to pay to do so. While MD5 costs less to crack these days, the cost to obtain each Mozilla user account password is probably still higher than most are willing to pay (although stealing the resources to do this via a botnet probably reduces this cost considerably).
Given equally sound methodology, encrypting passwords is always less secure than hashing them, because encryption implies that you can retrieve the plaintext, which leaves it open to all sorts of additional attacks, like stealing the encryption keys along with the data, "persuading" the sysadmin to decrypt them with either a rubber hose or a wad of cash, etc, etc.
On the other hand, hashing means that you genuinely cannot retrieve the password without expending a large amount of CPU time, and persuasion isn't going to help.
Any site that will emails you your password as plaintext is doing it wrong - there is no reason that any authentication system should be able to retrieve your plaintext password. It's acceptable to offer a means to force a password change, it is NOT acceptable to send my password to me via a medium that any intervening server could read, and it's not acceptable to be storing passwords as plaintext or even encrypted when it is demonstrably less secure than hashing and there is no benefit to retaining them.
In fact, you should mail the sysadmin of any such system and let him know that his system is doing it wrong, and why.
I just checked with the RIAA and they said that it is likely that thousands of people downloaded it from that person's machine.