Stuxnet's Legacy: Get Back to Basics or Get Owned
Gunkerty Jeb writes "Attacks such as Stuxnet, Operation Aurora or GhostNet are not what most enterprises and organizations need to be worried about. The plain fact is that most organizations are falling far short in protecting against the same threats that they've faced for the last 10 years. SQL injection, phishing, malicious attachments, social engineering. Old, every one of them. And yet, still incredibly effective at compromising networks in some of the best-known and theoretically best-protected companies."
No matter how much companies (and individuals) would like to pretend otherwise, security is really hard to do. It's not just a matter of having the right technology in place; people have to follow some inconvenient rules and exercise self control and common sense.
So we're always going to have some of these problems.
Well, the problem with most of these is even if you know about them it only takes one lazy employee to introduce them. So, its hard to be 100% vigilant against the threats and because it only takes one crack to break the damn, this makes it impossible for most security companies to improve.
Momento Mori
SQL injection, phishing, malicious attachments, social engineering. Old, every one of them.
And every one of them gets learned the hard way by the new batch of up-and-comers. It isn't like the average knowledge of us IT folk has gotten any bigger. Old, season folks leave, and new, green folks join. Also, management.
"When life gives you lemons, don't make lemonade. Make life take the lemons back!" -- Cave Johnson
I thought phishing was a type of social engineering?
And social engineering isn't a technical problem likely to be "fixed" - it's a continuous education of users that can never be considered done or even successful.
If you fire the dummies, they just end up at someone else's company (and you get other companies' dummies. Ain't no technical fix for stupid, son.
I see a lot of comments about "dummies." Management needs to take a look at themselves as well. They hold the purse strings and the power of decision. In cases I have been exposed to, it's not the admins that are dropping the ball, it is the people making the decisions about things they do not appreciate or understand. Don't get me started on the overwhelming and pervasive attitude of users, "you mean I have to remember my password!?!"
I'll just whip those Chinese children a little harder to increase production a few more percent so that you're happy.
Seven puppies were harmed during the making of this post.
PHP is a big part of the problem. PHP's interface to SQL encourages putting in parameters without proper escaping. Python has a slightly different interface, one where there's one SQL statement with fields represented by %s, and a tuple with the values to be filled in. The values are escaped automatically. If PHP had only such an interface, most SQL injection attacks would fail.
It would help if there was simply a restriction that only one SQL statement can be submitted per call. Since all the major SQL implementations now have transactions, there's no reason to put two statements in one call any more.
Another problem with PHP is a tendency to install a large number of standard PHP scripts which shouldn't be installed at all. Look at your server logs and you'll see constant attempts by hostile sites to call common bad scripts.
Hosting "control panels" implemented in PHP are part of the problem. If you have one of those, you can't just turn off PHP, even if you're not using it. Worse, "control panels" tend to run with very high privileges, and present a large attack face.
I'm not sure how stuxnet is a proper illustration of old vulnerabilities being ignored. From what I recall of stuxnet, it is a WORM that exploits multiple zero-day vulnerabilities, at least one of which was due to security certs stolen from a hardware vendor in Asia.. Sure, best practices were ignored wherein industrial centrifuge controllers should have been physically firewalled from any devices that connect with other networks or devices.
But seriously, stuxnet isn't as good an example of a glaring security incompetence as the recent HBGary intrusion. That started with a simple SQL injection, and ended up with executive emails revealing nefarious corporate dealings by a company pretending to be a security consultant.
Here is an EXCELLENT technical dissection of the HBGary attack. Nothing spectacular involved. Just nuts-and-bolts hacking with impressive results.
Seth
$5 / month hosted VPS on linux = awesome!
Thank you, Anonymous Coward. You've helped me to figure out exactly why Linux is more secure than Windows. It isn't the operating system. It isn't the user. It isn't any application, set of applications, or combination of utilities. It's right there in your post. "average users wont start giving a damn" For the most part, Linux users are those who give a damn. The attitude - nothing more, nothing less. You've got to give a damn, or the best system is just a non-secure mess of code!
"Windows is like the faint smell of piss in a subway: it's there, and there's nothing you can do about it." - Charlie Br