Encrypted VoIP Meets Traffic Analysis
Der_Yak writes "Researchers from MIT, Google, UNC Chapel Hill, and Johns Hopkins published a recent paper that presents a method for detecting spoken phrases in encrypted VoIP traffic that has been encoded using variable bitrate codecs. They claim an average accuracy of 50% and as high as 90% for specific phrases."
I'm pretty sure that identifying a specific word with 50% accuracy is better than random chance. There are more than two words in the English language.
Use fixed-bitrate encoding for VoIP.
I think if half the time you can identify a phrase in a supposedly encrypted stream ... that's better than 'chance'.
Lost at C:>. Found at C.
Teh Recognisining.
"I'd like to order pizza, with pepperoni, pineapple, mushroom and an Iludium Pu-36 space modulator delivered to Hall of Justice."
A feeling of having made the same mistake before: Deja Foobar
Come on, 50% is better than most unencrypted voice recognition!
This reminds me of the guy Colbert interviewed regarding the Large Hadron Collider who thought there was a 50% chance that it would destroy the universe. When questioned as to how he got those odds, he said, "Well, there's two options... either it will happen or it won't happen. 50%."
The CB App. What's your 20?
A'LA'IH
When you want to secure something, you must think carefully about how you might be leaking information. You can't just slap some encryption on and call it a day.
Once they discover a method to wire trap encrypted video calls, that would open a new era in porn scene.
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I'm pretty sure that identifying a specific word with 50% accuracy is better than random chance. There are more than two words in the English language.
Maybe he's talking about the porn film.90% seem to be "oh" or "yes" (or so i am told)
The conference version of the paper appeared in IEEE S&P 2008.
http://cs.unc.edu/~fabian/papers/oakland08.pdf
I remember following this logic... when I was three. No shit, I have a vivid memory of trying to figure out how proportions worked - I knew that a penny tossed would give a 50/50 split, but that other problem with two states - e.g., when I threw a rock, I'd either hit the matchbox car or I wouldn't - weren't. I gave up, and figured it out later, when I was five or so.
Learn about Photography Basics.
The definition (somewhere in the 'net archives) of encryption quality is how distinguishable the encrypted message is from random noise. Clearly setting bitrates, or any other parameter, based on the input, is not random.
Pick a better algorithm and/or suck it up and waste a little bandwidth.
https://app.box.com/WitthoftResume Code: https://github.com/cellocgw
The pitch is the main thing in the art form.
A low German voice - "ooohhh yaaaaa", over and over. then you have the high pitched Japanese squeak sound - "ii, ii, ii, kimochi". Which really gets annoying these days. It took a few years; but it IS annoying.
The two phrases are "can you hear me?" and "I have a bad connection, let me call you back."
This issue is a bit more complicated than you think.
A few solutions...
Add some number of pad bytes to each packet to fill in blanks.
Tweak existing high complexity codecs (ilbc, speex..etc) to maintain a persistant bitrate by dynamically scaling quality to even out the per packet bits.
Use a fixed bitrate codec (most of these really suck from bw effeciency vs quality perspective)
Switch variability to the time domain adding jitter to mask the signal and control latency/security tradeoff.
SRTP scares me because it was invented for a single narrow purpose. Would much prefer the use of DTLS to secure RTP streams which being very similar to TLS has received much more scrutiny than SRTP likely ever will.
First of all, statements like "50% accuracy" are nearly useless; you need to know both precision and recall. And to the degree that "50% accuracy" tells you anything, it tells you that the system is pretty bad.
Finally, the countermeasure for this is the same as the countermeasure for other automated speech analysis techniques: play some singing or theater in the background.