A New Class of Nuclear Reactors
prunedude tips this quote from a post at Freakonomics about Japan's nuclear crisis:
"The folks over at IV Insights, the blog associated with Nathan Myhrvold's Intellectual Ventures, point out that it was the complete loss of power that disabled the cooling systems protecting the plant's reactors. Which raises the question: Is there nuclear technology that could withstand such a catastrophe? Possibly. TerraPower, an Intellectual Ventures spin-off that also boasts Bill Gates as an investor, is working on a new reactor design called a traveling wave reactor that uses fast reactor technology, rather than the light water technology used at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. The two biggest advantages of the fast reactor design is that it requires no spent fuel pools and uses cooling systems that require no power to function, meaning the loss of power from the tsunami might not have crippled a fast reactor plant so severely."
From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thorium
Some of the benefits of thorium when compared with uranium as fuel:
* Weapons-grade fissionable material (U-233) is harder to retrieve safely and clandestinely from a thorium reactor;
* Thorium produces 10 to 10,000 times less long-lived radioactive waste;
* Thorium comes out of the ground as a 100% pure, usable isotope, which does not require enrichment, whereas natural uranium contains only 0.7% fissionable U-235;
* Thorium can not sustain a nuclear chain reaction without priming, so fission stops by default.
Indeed, this was what came to mind immediately to me as well.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pebble_bed_reactor
"Who is the Journal of Quantum Physics going to believe?" --Stephen Hawking
Actually, the pebble reactor in Julich, Germany (I'll assume that's what you are referring to) had severe problems leading to long half-life fission products contaminating the soil and water around the reactor.
The flaws are not based on the particular design of the AVR facility, but seem to be flaws in the whole pebble-bed idea. You can read the Julich Research Facilities own post-mortem here: http://www.eskom.co.za/content/AVR-Report-Press.PDF
Germany ran a pebble bed reactor at the Nuclear Research Facility at Juelich. The Juelich post-mortem report concluded that pebble bed reactors have severe problems in practice (at least some of them base design flaws), in the specific case of the Julich AVR reactor leading to Strontium-90 contamination of the soil and aquifer beneath the reactor.
The post-mortem report is posted here http://www.eskom.co.za/content/AVR-Report-Press.PDF
Some interesting bits from the report:
The AVR primary circuit is heavily contaminated with metallic fission products (Sr-90, Cs-137) which create problems in current dismantling. The amount of this contamination is not exactly known, but the evaluation of fission product deposition experiments indicates that the end of life contamination reached several percent of a single core inventory, which is some orders of magnitude more than precalculated and far more than in large LWRs.
[...]
It leads to the conclusion that the AVR contamination was mainly caused by inadmissible high core temperatures, increasing fission product release rates, and not - as presumed in the past - by inadequate fuel quality only.
From the conclusions:
As outlined above there exist unresolved safety problems in pebble bed reactors for design basis accidents, as for beyond design basis accidents like severe air ingress with graphite burning. Previously a superior safety behaviour of pebble bed reactors was claimed compared to other nuclear systems including an allegedly catastrophe free design. According to the above presents arguments there are doubts, whether this depicts reality.
So while pebble bed reactors have some advantages over traditional designs, they are by no means the silver bullet that some people make them to be.
Because, in order for the reactor to produce power it needs at least some of its control rods to be removed. Having the control rods removed during an emergency is FAR FAR more dangerous than a loss of cooling. The point of the cooling pumps is to prevent the core from getting so hot that it melts the control rods and the slags down to the bottom of the containment chamber. All modern reactor designs do not need active cooling like these reactors do. They are some of the oldest reactor designs in existence and upgrading such reactors have by put off due to cost and unending legal challenges by environmental groups. It's sad that we could replace our horrendous coal and hydroelectric power grid that does untold damage to the environment, with modern safe reactors within a few decades but can't because "Environmental" groups hold on to this windmill pipe dream... oh wait, they file legal challenges on the windmills to...
"the two biggest advantages of the fast reactor design is that it requires no spent fuel pools and uses cooling systems that require no power to function"
Let's translate what this means. The core of the reactor will be VERY radioactive as it will have decay products from many more gigawatt hours---yes it will transmute quite a bit of these but do not underestimate just how hot it will be.
The cooling systems use molten sodium. It has the wee problem that it is explosive in contact with water. Say from a flood. Or if the building catches on fire. (and it's probably quite radioactive in itself simply from activation from the neutron flux). Or suppose there's a leak in the roof and it rains.
And it's right next to an extremely radioactive core. And if the explosion results in something cracking open......
One huge problem at Fukushima reactors was the unappreciated dangers of flooding, combined with the hydrogen explosions. These explosions damaged other important machinery and structures---you get a 'blunder chain reaction'.
See some other comments about the TWR
http://theenergycollective.com/barrybrook/43928/terrapower%E2%80%99s-travelling-wave-reactor-%E2%80%93-why-not-use-ifr
Yeah, but check out the talk page. There is a lot more information on the design there than in the main article.
The US government have made it clear that we have no inalienable rights; any we do not defend vigorously will be taken.
You can't just drain the coolant from a reactor, even when its already been shut down. The reactors in japan shut down the instant the ground started shaking.
The problem is all the decay products starting with the iodine. It takes a while for those to break down enough to not melt the fuel rods.
That's not to say that CANDU's heavy water design isn't a good idea, it is. It just isn't a solution to this particular problem.
Fukushima Daiichi was built to withstand a 5.7m tsunami, as required by Japanese regulators. It was hit with a 10m tsunami, though, which is why the generators were knocked offline.
You can never go home again... but I guess you can shop there.
CANDU is banned in the US because it has a small positive void coefficient when initially fueled. Over the life of the fuel it moves into small negative void coefficient - basically the reactor is neutral. Chernobyl had a HUGE positive void coefficient so that was probably a reason why CANDU is banned - another is it would compete with US corps.
But TBH, CANDU reactor was the first reactor designed for safe power generation. The BWR and similar designs are scaled up version of what drives US aircraft carriers - they are not designed to be safe. CANDU on the other hand, has dual independent cooling loops. The moderator is liquid (heavy water). It has dual emergency shutdown (control rods and neutron poison into the moderator). CANDU breeds and burns plutonium - so it can be a proliferation risk though normally plutonium content in fuel is very small.
I think CANDU is vastly safer than BWR. You can also refuel it without turning it off. Runtime can be up to 3 years before you have to power down for maintenance. I'm not certain what is better, the EABWR or CANDU-6, but I think I would stick with CANDU for now. They are more expensive to build than equivalent power EABWR.
Funny thing is, people built cheaper rather then safer and then they complain that the plant is not as safe as they wanted.
"One big tank on that big hill behind the plant,"
(Pardon my English Engineering units)
Let's see, 2.3 feet per psi, 1000 psi steam pressure (According to wikipedia, sounds a bit high to me) so we are looking at a 2300 foot high hill. If it's 600 psi steam, at least after shutdown, then it's only about 1700 feet of hill.
And the big tank has to still be there after the 9.0 earthquake. There is more complication in "All they needed" than you think.
The basic design is supposed to have a steam powered feed pump with a source of makeup water. Whether it broke, was never there, or the source of makeup water was a condenser that was mudded out by the tsunami, I don't know. And I would like to know. I used to serve on an SSN, so I have a certain professional curiosity.
A lot of the safety of the pebble bed design comes from the TRISO fuel particles that it uses. In the even of an accident like the one at Fukushima there would be no concern over the fuel melting down since the power density is so low and the melting point of graphite is so high there is no possible way for the fuel to melt down. These particles can be used in any sort of a Very High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor, of which the gas cooled pebble bed and prismatic designs are both very attractive options. The helium atmosphere in the core cools and helps to inhibit the ignition of a graphite fire.
The problem with the pebble bed reactors of releasing Cs and Sr are both due to the design of the TRISO particle. The TRISO particle has a silicon carbide (SiC) layer that provides structural stability as well as stopping for most fission products. Unfortunately there are a few fission products (Cs, Sr, Ag especially) that are able to pass through the SiC in significant quantities. There is research going on to investigate the use of zirconium carbide (ZrC) in addition to SiC in the TRISO particle. The addition of this layer provides many benefits, including the ability to stop fission products that SiC can't stop.
As a side note, TRISO particles also make a great waste form. Graphite doesn't dissolve readily in any natural environment and would be able to remain intact for millions of years.
Good Lord. This looks like a total scam. This is all funded by a known patent troll. It appears to be some sort of viral marketing campaign to drum up customers, i.e. moronic investors willing to part with huge sums of money they will never see again. And now we're all part of it, they'll point at Slashdot and say, "Look! Nerds are talking about it. Smart people. See them talking about it? Now give me some money." I feel dirty now.
- None can love freedom heartily, but good men; the rest love not freedom, but license. -- John Milton
So it's a building designed to withstand an earthquake larger than any that has been recorded in history. It's a building with a 6m tsunami wall around the grounds to withstand a larger tsunami than has ever been experienced anywhere on that pacific rim. Oh and it had battery backup that is stored in a sealed room which was completely unaffected by all the above and worked entirely as intended, but ultimately ran out of juice.
Basic planning. You don't rely on your backup backup to run the plant as it's designed. You rely on that first backup in case the main system fails, and you rely on the second backup to buy you enough time to restore one of the primary backups. This is common in all industrial situations. Here's a question for you, can your datacentre run indefinitely on battery power, or does battery power only keep you up for an hour or so to ensure that your diesel generators have a) time to kick in, and b) if they are out you can reasonably expect main power to come on within the intended time anyway?
Here's another question for you. Has your disaster plan taken into account a direct nuclear strike? I mean just because it hasn't happened before doesn't mean it couldn't happen right? What about an alien attack? Both of these were just as likely to occur as an earthquake of this magnitude followed by a tsunami of that size.