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Amazon EC2 Failure Post-Mortem

Posted by Soulskill on from the ted-tripped-over-a-power-cord dept.

CPE1704TKS tips news that Amazon has provided a post-mortem on why EC2 failed. Quoting: "At 12:47 AM PDT on April 21st, a network change was performed as part of our normal AWS scaling activities in a single Availability Zone in the US East Region. The configuration change was to upgrade the capacity of the primary network. During the change, one of the standard steps is to shift traffic off of one of the redundant routers in the primary EBS network to allow the upgrade to happen. The traffic shift was executed incorrectly and rather than routing the traffic to the other router on the primary network, the traffic was routed onto the lower capacity redundant EBS network. For a portion of the EBS cluster in the affected Availability Zone, this meant that they did not have a functioning primary or secondary network because traffic was purposely shifted away from the primary network and the secondary network couldn't handle the traffic level it was receiving."

2 of 117 comments (clear)

  1. At least they admit it by jesseck · · Score: 4, Insightful

    I commend Amazon for providing us with this information. Yes, bad things happened, and data is gone forever. Amazon knows what happened and why, and I'm sure they will implement controls to prevent this again. I doubt we'll hear as much from Sony, though.

    1. Re:At least they admit it by david.emery · · Score: 4, Insightful

      We all benefit from these kinds of disclosures, I remember Google posting post-mortem analyses of some of their failures. Even Microsoft provided information on their Sidekick meltdown. This does seem to be the 'typical' melange of a human error and cascading consequences.

      Someone first said, "You learn much more from failure than you do from success." If nothing else, it's the thesis of the classic Petrosky book, "To Engineer is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design" http://www.amazon.com/Engineer-Human-Failure-Successful-Design/dp/0679734163 (If you haven't read this, you should!!)

      And I'm also reminded of a core principle from safety critical system design, that you cannot provide 100% safety. The best you can do is a combination of probabilistic analysis against known hazards. As a Boeing 777 safety engineer told me, "9 9's of safety, i.e. chance of failure 1/10 ^-9, applied over the expected flying hours of the 777 fleet, still means a 50-50 chance of an aircraft falling out of the sky." That kind of reasoning also applies to the current Japanese nuke plant failure...