Slashdot Mirror
Vendors Say Data Protection Software Too Complicated To Use
jfruhlinger writes "With a series of major data breaches over the past few months, you'd think more and more companies would be investing in data protection software, which can help keep data secure even on systems that have been compromised. Unfortunately, even organizations that have paid good money for this software often don't use it, because, as one of the vendors admits, it's often too complicated to use."
They did not store the passwords in cleartext, from the PSN Blog:
"One other point to clarify is from this weekend’s press conference. While the passwords that were stored were not “encrypted,” they were transformed using a cryptographic hash function. There is a difference between these two types of security measures which is why we said the passwords had not been encrypted. But I want to be very clear that the passwords were not stored in our database in cleartext form. For a description of the difference between encryption and hashing, follow this link."
http://blog.us.playstation.com/2011/05/02/playstation-network-security-update/
The article is about a quote from a marketing mouth from a single vendor, Check Point, who made a sound bite about how hard DLP is to use. And, just by coincidence, they're announcing a security product that is easy to use!
This sort of data simple should not have been available to anyone outside Sony's corporate headquarters and the only people with access to it there should have been developers.
This is false. Developers should not have access to production data, especially not highly-sensitive production data! Only system operators should remotely have access to this kind of data. I do not understand how Sony never got audited for this kind of thing. Normally, investors want some kind of insurance from an audit that stuff is at least partially secure. Most password change restrictions come from this kind of audit.
Read "What To Do if Compromised", the official instructions for merchants who accept VISA cards. Sony is clearly doing some of the things VISA requires: "Do not access or alter compromised systems, i.e. don't log on at all to the compromised systems. ... Do not turn systems off. Isolate compromised systems from the network ..." Then they have to call the VISA Incident Response Manager, and the full list of compromised cards has to go to VISA, which parcels it out to the issuing banks for card cancellations and reissues.
VISA has the contractual right to send in a forensics team. VISA will assess fines up to $500,000 if VISA's security requirements haven't been met. If compromised data includes PIN numbers for debit cards, or CVV2 data for credit cards, which merchants aren't supposed to store at all, VISA sends in a Qualified Security Assessor. They check that the systems are no longer storing that data, and that all historical data of that type has been erased, before they go back on line.
Now it's clear why Sony is off line. Their actions look like what happens when a major debit card breach occurs and VISA sends in the forensics and security teams.
So there's your answer when management doesn't want to have proper security on credit card data. VISA can and will shut temporarily down your ability to accept payments. You'll have law enforcement, forensic auditors, and security experts questioning your management. Your company may have to pay sizable fines to VISA. Your CEO may have to explain the screwup to reporters.
And that's the good case. The bad case is when VISA decides you don't get to accept credit or debit cards any more, permanently. This happens routinely to screwed-up small businesses.