Verifying Passwords By the Way They're Typed
Zothecula writes "There are good passwords and bad passwords, but none of them are totally secure. Researchers at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon, are working on strengthening an approach to password security that's not just about what you type, but how you type it (abstract)." Note that the actual paper appears to be behind some crappy paywall: hopefully the research exists elsewhere on-line.
How would such a system know if I am typing on my normal keyboard vs. using an on-screen one on a tablet vs. using a coworkers "ergonomic" keyboard vs. being interrupted in the middle of typing my password by my kids?
Don't blame me, I voted for Kodos
I had an account at a bank that did something like this.
It sure was great fun having to type in my password 3 times because it didn't like the way I typed it.
And forget about trying to log-in from a mobile device.
(and before you tell me to switch banks, they do have other advantages that make it worth it. Just online-access is a pain-in-the-ass.)
The libertarian solution to the failures of capitalism is to apply more capitalism til the failures are fixed.
Note that the actual paper appears to be behind some crappy paywall
Then don't post it until you find a reference w/o a paywall. Period.
I remember hearing a story that this system was used to determine the state of mind for soviet military pilots.
You type a control paragraph of text, and then you have to type the same thing again before each flight. The computer just measures the pattern of how you type, and sinc ethere's substantial amount of text (not just shorter password) I guess it could work.
Of course this was easy to bypass if you just typed initial control text already drunk. :) Just make sure you are drunk for each flight afterwards.
BTW, I have also heard a lecture in my uni 15 years ago from a guy that was trying to develop the system to also determine general mood of the person by the way they typed. Not sure how far that went.
Ctrl-V is rendered useless when your bank uses flash for the login disabling Ctrl-V.
I reviewed a company's offering a few years ago that was recording the relative timing between keystrokes when you entered a password. Any subsequent attempts had to match that relative pattern in order to be verified.
It failed miserably.
I had a demo with the company. They showed me a nice fake online banking login screen. They then told me the name and password and said "Go ahead and try to login." I did so. And it let me right in. The woman giving the demo couldn't believe it. I took a screenshot and sent it to her as verification. Sure enough, their system did not stop me from logging in.
So she reset the password to something else, ran through a couple of calibration runs to make sure she could login, and then again gave me the password. I once again logged in immediately.
Once more she changed the password, and again asked me to try it. I couldn't login. So I tried a few more times, and on the third try I was once again staring at fake bank accounts.
I realized two things from this demo. First, its easily breakable by a human with comparable typing skills to the victim when the password is known. Second, the only thing this (particular product) could defeat was an automated system attempting to login. ...I don't think that review ever got published...
Jeremy Baumgartner
I was just thinking about this the other day when I needed to log into a computer at work while I was holding a part I wanted to look up in our system. I heard about password systems using pattern logging a while ago and thought it would be ridiculous in the real world. On a similar note, I had an uncle that retired from a workplace that had fingerprint, voiceprint, and a weight scanner to get into work. He said if you had a cold or gained or lost more than 5 pounds you had to be escorted to the security office and have your identity verified before they would let you in. Some security measures are just too odd. (A scale? WTF?)
I have heard it called keystroke dynamics, and as others have said it isn't too feasible for just straight-up identify verification. However, you can do a lot of cool things with KD software. Hasn't this concept been around for quite awhile?
Yup, it has. I worked on a mainframe system back in the early 1970s whose OS provided keystroke timings to apps that wanted the info. The first use was in the login code, which used the character-pair timings to verify the user. It was actually fairly successful, and didn't have the rampant failures that many people here describe. In fact, it pretty quickly made login ids unnecessary, since the "system" could identify each user fairly quickly when they typed anything at all.
There was a funny follow-on gimmick implemented by some guys in the organization (a university computer center): They got access to the schedule of the operators and others who worked there, and wrote a routine that compared the people typing with the schedule. One day, a fellow (call him Joe) called in sick, and another (Bill) took his slot. Soon after Bill started typing (without identifying himself), the computer came back with a comment like "Hey, Bill, you're not Joe. Joe was scheduled now, not you. What happened? Is Joe sick or something?" The staff freaked out, and some of them were afraid to type to the computer until the programmers came in and explained what they'd done.
But most current OS's hide the timing info from user-level software, so it's not surprising that people nowadays would find that the idea doesn't work very well. To work, the code has to have access to fairly precise timing of keyboard events, and that just isn't possible with most current (commercial) computer systems. You'd have to have a Real-Time kernel for it to work at all, and any software layer that munges with the timings would kill the idea entirely.
Those who do study history are doomed to stand helplessly by while everyone else repeats it.