Following the Money In Cybercrime
jbrodkin writes "Five dollars for control over 1,000 compromised email accounts. Eight dollars for a distributed denial-of-service attack that takes down a website for an hour. And just a buck to solve 1,000 captchas. Those are the going rates of cybercrime, the amounts criminals pay other criminals for the technical services necessary to launch attacks. This criminal underground was detailed Wednesday in a highly entertaining talk given by researcher Stefan Savage at the annual Usenix technical conference in Portland, Ore. Savage's research into the economics of cybercrime began as lip service to satisfy the terms of a government grant, but it turned out to be the key to stopping computer attacks. Targeted methods — such as using CAPTCHAs — don't stop criminals, but they add to the cost burden and put the inefficient criminal organizations out of business, letting security researchers focus only on the ones that survive."
I am beginning to think that everyone should be forced to take an economics course in their lifetime. So much of the world is driven by economics that I think you'll understand the world quite a bit better if you understand the dollars and cents behind it. Perhaps its a case of "the more economics you know, the more economics you see."
Busting CAPTCHAs is not a crime. Not usually, anyway. Sure, it may violate a website's terms of service, but US courts so far (quite correctly) say that's not a crime, unless you're "stealing" a for-pay service. And maybe not even then.
It is not valid to label something a "crime" just because it's inconvenient for some people. The lesson to be learned here is that CAPTCHAs are a lazy (and often lousy) way to prevent "unauthorized" access.
Also, while most CAPTCHAs today can be busted with automated tools, as OP says it's often more economical to just hire teams of people from Pakistan or India to do it manually. The going rate on freelancer sites is about $1 per 1000, but sometimes it's even less.